To What Extent are Frontline Statutory Social Workers Employing Their Discretion in the Post- Munro Review World of Child Protection? by Murphy, C. M. M.
Murphy, C. M. M. (2019)To What Extent are Frontline Statutory Social Work-
ers Employing Their Discretion in the Post- Munro Review World of Child
Protection? Doctoral thesis (PhD), Manchester Metropolitan University.
Downloaded from: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/625094/
Usage rights: Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Deriva-
tive Works 4.0
Please cite the published version
https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk
  
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE FRONTLINE 
STATUTORY SOCIAL WORKERS 
EMPLOYING THEIR DISCRETION IN 
THE POST- MUNRO REVIEW WORLD 
OF CHILD PROTECTION?  
 
 
 
 
C M M Murphy 
 
PhD  2019 
  
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE FRONTLINE 
STATUTORY SOCIAL WORKERS EMPLOYING 
THEIR DISCRETION IN THE POST- MUNRO 
REVIEW WORLD OF CHILD PROTECTION? 
 
CIARÁN MICHAEL MARTIN MURPHY 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements of the Manchester 
Metropolitan University for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Social Care and Social Work  
the Manchester Metropolitan University 
July 2019 
  
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
In May 2011, Eileen Munro concluded her review of the English child protection 
system. Within, she identified obstacles which she believed were hindering the 
realisation of an ‘effective’ and ‘child-centred’ system. This included the ‘risk’ 
associated with the social worker’s discretionary space, leading managers to 
restrict, and practitioners to minimise, opportunities for frontline discretion. It was 
on this basis that Munro called for reform of the system, so that social workers 
would be better able and motivated to exercise their discretion in the best interests 
of the individual child. It is also in these terms that the author set out to explore the 
degree to which social workers are employing their discretion within the 
contemporary child protection system. This thesis reports on the results of a 
qualitative mixed methods case study of one local authority’s child protection team. 
The focus of enquiry pertained to the extent and nature of the discretionary space 
encountered; whether social workers were willing to employ discretion within 
different contexts; and the factors that were understood to be impacting upon 
discretionary space and choice. The research comprised of an iterative design, 
incorporating focus group, questionnaire, interview, observation and documentary 
analysis. The main findings were that social workers were experiencing 
discretionary space in a de jure, de facto and entrepreneurial sense; that 
practitioners were more likely to choose to exercise their discretion within the 
managerially endorsed space; and that a series of systemic factors were continuing 
to impede both the opportunities for, and propensity to choose, discretion. 
Ultimately, whilst the research provides some evidence in favour of Munro’s image 
for discretion within the system, the identification of continued barriers leads to 
the thesis’ conclusion that further reform may be required if child protection social 
workers are to more consistently employ their discretion in the interests of the 
individual child. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
The literature concerned with the public service worker’s discretion has tended to 
focus on the extent of their discretionary space to make decisions and take actions 
independently from other actors (Molander, 2016). The discussion pertaining to 
England’s statutory social workers is no exception (see Chapter 2). However, within 
the social work literature, a dichotomy has emerged. For example, there are those 
who argue that the ‘political’ and ‘human’ tensions inherent within statutory social 
work provision means that the discretionary space of the practitioner is inevitable 
(for example, Lipsky, 1980; Baldwin, 2000). Alternatively, others assert that 
discretionary space has been ‘curtailed’ in the wake of the managerialisation of 
statutory social work departments (for example Howe, 1986; 1991). 
Similar themes prevail in commentary pertaining to statutory child protection social 
work, most recently brought forth in the Munro Review of Child Protection (2010b; 
2011a; 2011b). Here, Munro, in echoing previous assertions that discretionary 
space has been ‘ero[ded]’ (Munro, 2005: 13), positions the lack of space and value 
placed in social worker discretion as a most pressing challenge facing the English 
child protection system; limiting its ability to operate ‘effective[ly]’ in the best 
interests of the individual child (Munro, 2011b: 23). A more ‘child-centred’ system 
(p. 1), she asserts, would place better value in, and thus enable, the discretionary 
space of the social worker.  
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It is here that I locate my research aim of exploring the extent to which frontline 
statutory social workers are employing their discretion, in the post-Munro Review 
world of child protection. However, within this exploration, I look to expand the 
enquiry beyond notions of discretionary space in the binary sense and, aided by an 
empirical framework developed from the wider social work literature, I consider 
how discretionary space changes according to the context and characteristics of the 
social work task.  
What is more, I look to develop the level of understanding as it pertains to the role 
of agency within the social worker’s discretionary behaviour. Recognising the social 
worker’s ability to choose whether, or not, to employ discretion, I explore social 
worker willingness to use discretion in different circumstances, and the factors that 
influence this willingness.  
Further, and true to my critical realist underpinnings (see Chapter 3), I seek to 
identify some of the mechanisms, present in the micro, macro and meso 
environments, that impact upon both the discretionary space and willingness of the 
social worker. I then discuss the implications of these findings in terms of Munro’s 
conceptualisation of a more ‘child-centred’ and ‘effective’ system. 
1.1 The structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with defining ‘discretionary space’ 
(Section 1.2); positioning the ‘politics of outrage’ as the foreground to the Munro 
Review (Section 1.3); identifying the pertinent findings and recommendations that 
emerged from the review in respect to social worker discretion (Section 1.4); and, 
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in so doing, setting out how my research focus developed, and thus identifying ‘why 
this study, why now?’ (Section 1.5). 
In Chapter 2, I provide a review of the literature concerned with discretionary space 
in an English statutory social work context; developing an empirical framework to 
guide my own study; whilst explicating the ‘knowledge gap’ regarding the 
contemporary space available to, and behaviours of, England’s statutory child 
protection social workers.   
Chapter 3 comprises the ‘methodology’ chosen to undertake this study. Here, I 
justify the chosen methods of data collection and analysis in the context of my own 
ontological and epistemological positioning. In addition, I reflect on some of the 
challenges, but also the advantages, brought forth by my ‘intimate insider’ position 
on the team being studied. 
Chapters 4 to 6 constitute the ‘research findings’ setting out where the social 
workers had, and did not have, discretionary space, and indeed, the type of space 
encountered (Chapter 4); the factors that impacted upon the social workers’ 
willingness to employ discretion – including the contexts in which they were 
generally more or less willing (Chapter 5); and the mechanisms identified as 
impacting upon both the social workers’ space and willingness to employ discretion 
(Chapter 6). 
Within Chapter 7 I discuss the research findings in the context of the wider 
literature, particularly as they pertain to the Munro Review of Child Protection. 
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Here I consider the evidence of change relative to Munro’s recommendations for 
reform, and argue on this basis, that further reform may be required if we are to 
achieve the more ‘child-centred’ and ‘effective’ system that Munro had envisioned. 
In Chapter 8 I conclude the thesis with a summary of the preceding chapters, 
considering the limitations of my study, and the implications for future research 
and practice.    
1.2 Defining ‘discretionary space’ 
In my review of the social work literature (see Chapter 2) I found a tendency not to 
define ‘discretion’, despite it often being the central concept in the discussions and 
analysis (for example, Lipsky, 1980; 2010; Howe, 1986; 1991; Baldwin, 2000; 
Munro, 2004; 2005; 2009).  This tendency is generally representative of the wider 
academic literature (Molander, 2016) but can be construed as problematic in the 
sense that ‘discretion’ can take different forms and can mean different things, in 
different contexts (Evans, 2010).  
On this basis, Smith (1981, cited in Evans, 2010) advocates that researchers 
prioritise their participants’ understanding of the concept as the starting point for 
enquiry (something I accommodate in my research design – see Chapter 3), over 
any conception of the term in the wider literature. However, in the context of 
grounding my research focus, I believe that it is important to offer some 
consideration of the term here, and more so, how we might conceive ‘discretionary 
space’ at the frontline of public service provision. 
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1.2.1 Distinguishing between discretionary space and reasoning 
In his book ‘Discretion in the Welfare State’, Anders Molander (2016) applies a 
critical lens to how discretion as a concept has evolved and can be understood. He 
reminds us that the origin of the word discretion is the Latin word discretus ‘a form 
of the verb discernere, which means to separate, discern or distinguish’ [original 
emphasis] (Molander, 2016: 7). He cites English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1679) in stipulating that, on this basis, ‘discretion’ can be conceived as an 
‘“intellectual virtue” … required when “discerning is not easy”’ (see Molander, 
2016: 9 for an elaboration of this point). 
Further, Molander develops Hobbes’ notion of discretion as a civil liberty, and 
introduces the idea that discretion, in one sense, can involve the possession of a 
‘negative liberty’ (Molander, 2016: 9), that is: an ‘area for choice and action 
consisting of those options that are neither forbidden nor prescribed’ (p. 9). It 
affords the bearer a freedom to decide and act without interference by other 
persons, including external restraint (Molander, 2016), and broadly speaking 
therefore, to have discretion in this sense is  
to possess a restricted and protected space where [there is] a 
certain kind of liberty to judge, decide and act (p. 9).   
This conception compliments other cited definitions of ‘discretion’ (see for 
example, Davis, 1969; Jowell, 1973; Galligan, 1986; and Hawkins, 1992), and with it 
as his basis, Molander (2016) distinguishes between ‘discretionary space’ and 
‘discretionary reasoning’ (Molander, 2016: 4), or to use Robert Alexy’s (2002: 393) 
terms, discretion in a ‘structural sense’ and discretion in an ‘epistemic sense’. Such 
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a distinction, he asserts, is critical in any discussion about how to understand a 
concept like discretion, and indeed is important to consider when undertaking 
empirical research on the subject.  
He suggests that ‘epistemically’ 
discretion is a form of reasoning that results in judgments about 
the properties of various kinds of objects under conditions of 
indeterminacy (Molander, 2016: 10). 
Whereas in contrast ‘structurally’ 
discretion is the space for decision-making and action-taking on 
the basis of discretionary judgments (p. 10).  
The latter, he proffers, can be understood as an ‘opportunity concept’ (p. 4) – a 
term adapted from Charles Taylor’s (1985) analysis of negative liberties – that is, it 
is the opportunity or possibility to act without interference. Alternatively, discretion 
in an epistemic sense can be considered as an ‘exercise concept’; it is a cognitive 
activity performed within the discretionary space of professional judgment and 
decision-making (Molander, 2016).  
Whilst the social work literature tends to conflate these two notions (see Chapter 
2), the focus of my study lies with discretion in the structural sense of the term; in 
this regard, it is important to consider how discretionary space is constructed and 
understood in the context of the public service worker’s role.  
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1.2.2 ‘Discretionary space’ in the provision of public services 
Ronald Dworkin’s (1977) book ‘Taking Rights Seriously’ is considered seminal in 
understanding the concept of discretion in spatial terms, particularly for public 
service workers (Evans and Harris, 2004; Evans, 2010; Molander, 2016).  He argues 
that discretion is not the absence of rules, but rather the ‘space’ between them; ‘it 
is out of place in all but very special circumstances… only [applicable] in one sort of 
context’ (Dworkin, 1977: 33), specifically ‘when someone is in general charged with 
making decisions subject to the standard set by a particular authority’ (p. 31). Thus, 
[d]iscretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as 
an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction. It is 
therefore a relative concept. It always makes sense to ask, 
‘discretion under which standard?’ (p. 31). 
Molander (2016) develops Dworkin’s argument, contrasting ‘two concepts of holes’, 
each of which can be distinguished by issues of ‘entrustment’ and ‘accountability’ 
that accompany the delegated power of the ‘principal-agent’ relationship (p. 21-
22).  
‘Negative liberties’, Molander asserts, are by definition exempt from the demand 
for accountability, as they are constituted by a freedom to do what one pleases 
without having to offer justification for one’s actions. However, the public service 
worker, acting as ‘agent’, is accountable to the ‘principal’ (the public) and has 
delegated power to act on their behalf. In this sense they are at the same time both 
entrusted to independently decide and act and can be held accountable for their 
decisions and actions; thus, their ‘discretionary space’ always holds some level of 
restriction (Molander, 2016: 21).  
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As such, the public service worker’s discretionary space is better conceived as 
emerging from ‘entrusted relations’ (Molander, 2016: 21), in which, rather than be 
afforded the type of ‘autonomy’ associated with negative liberties, workers 
encounter different degrees of ‘liberty’ or freedom to decide and act within a belt of 
restriction – comprising, for example, professional standards, legislation etc – that 
directs their practice (p. 24).  
On this basis, Molander (2016) considers that discretionary space within public 
service provision is both ‘inherently ambiguous and riddled with tension’ (p. 23).  
This is because within the discretionary space of entrusted relations, the public 
service worker does not have complete license to do as they please, but yet are 
often afforded an ‘open’ area to use discretionary power and choose a course of 
action based on best judgment. According to Molander (2016), this indubitably 
cultivates ‘a tension between liberty and accountability’ (p. 24), and it is this 
tension that has become a specific focus of debates about the value versus the cost 
of ‘street-level’ (see Section 2.2) discretion in public service provision (Molander, 
2016).  
1.3. The ‘politics of outrage’ as the foreground to the Munro Review 
In 1973 seven-year old Maria Colwell was killed by her stepfather. From the 
subsequent public outcry, and inquiry, England’s contemporary child protection 
system emerged (Munro, 2002; Rogowski, 2010; Parton, 2014). 
It has been argued that Maria’s case was specifically influential because ‘her story 
was so distressing that it forced itself into public awareness’ (Munro, 2002: 41). It is 
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in a similar context that the origins of the ‘Munro Review of Child Protection’, and 
my research focus, can be traced. 
On 11th November 2008, two men were convicted of causing or allowing the death 
of a 17-month-old boy in August of the previous year (the child’s mother had 
already pleaded guilty to the offense). The child, who at that time was only known 
as ‘Baby P’ so as to protect his identity, but was later identified as Peter Connelly, 
had been subjected to repeated and prolific abuse and had suffered extensive 
injuries over an eight-month period prior to his death.  
Like Maria some 35 years earlier, the media response was extensive and highly 
critical of the services involved (Parton, 2014; Warner, 2013; 2015). However, 
unlike Maria, Peter had been subject of a child protection plan and had received 
over 60 contacts from related agencies. Thus, the narrative that followed was of a 
‘failing’ statutory child protection system (Warner, 2013; 2015). In this context, the 
issue of child protection became ‘politicized and scandalized to a new level of 
intensity’ most distinctively by the then opposition Conservative Party, led by David 
Cameron (Parton, 2014: 69).  
Employing a ‘politics of outrage’ (Parton 2014: 79) to critique New Labour’s 
stewardship of child protection, the Conservative Party utilised several mediums to 
propagate a message that the system was ‘not-fit for purpose’ and that meaningful 
reform could only be achieved under a Conservative administration (Warner, 2015). 
For example, writing in the London Evening Standard the day after Peter’s abusers 
were convicted, Cameron (2008) proclaimed:  
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It is an outrage that less than 10 years after the murder of Victoria 
Climbié – and more than three decades since the case of Maria 
Colwell – another child was left to slip through the safety net to 
their death [emphasis added]. 
This referenced the case of Victoria Climbié which had also been the subject of a 
public inquiry only five years earlier – one that had led to a 400-page report with 
108 recommendations for child protection reform (see Laming, 2003).  
At that time, the Labour Government made the commitment that ‘lessons [had 
been] learnt from Victoria’s death’ and a similar tragedy would not be allowed to 
happen again (HM Government, 2003: 26). However, as noted by Cameron, Peter’s 
case held many of the same hallmarks of ‘systemic failure’. Indeed, the fact that, 
like Victoria, Peter had been the recipient of services from Haringey Children’s 
Services Department, which itself had been judged as offering a ‘good’ service to 
children only months before Peter’s death, was used by Cameron to strengthen his 
assertion that ‘the system [was] not working’ (Parton, 2014). He continued: 
No amount of child protection legislation is a substitute for 
properly trained and supported professionals…. Social workers 
who can spend time with vulnerable children and not in front of 
computer screens collecting data and ticking boxes (Cameron, 
2008). 
This extract can be understood as an implicit attack on New Labour’s flagship ‘Every 
Child Matters’ Programme (HM Treasury, 2003), implemented after the Laming 
Inquiry (and enshrined in statute in the Children Act, 2004), but which had become 
associated with burdensome bureaucracy and social workers spending their time 
away from children (Parton, 2014; Warner, 2015; see also Wastell et al., 2010; 
White et al., 2010; Jones, 2014; Shoesmith, 2016).  
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On this basis, Cameron (2008) called for a reduction in the process-driven and 
standardised practice of social workers, so that they were not only enabled, but 
expected to act in the best interests of the child: ‘common sense’ and 
‘responsibility’ would prevail in the ‘memory of Baby P’ he declared.  
These themes were echoed in an opening speech to the House of Commons debate 
on the state of child protection by the then shadow minister for children, Tim 
Loughton MP. Indeed Loughton (HC Deb 3 Feb 2009 vol 487: c767-772) cited ‘the 
[Labour] Government’s obsession with bureaucracy’ and claimed that social 
workers were existing in some ‘bureaucratic nightmare… shackled to computers, 
paperwork and rigid procedures’. 
More explicitly decrying the New Labour reforms, Loughton (2009) suggested that 
they were ‘undermining the effectiveness of the child protection system’ (HC Deb 3 
Feb 2009 vol 487: c766), qualifying his statement with reference to the Director of 
Haringey Children’s Services Department’s explanation that with regards to Peter 
Connelly’s case, ‘her social workers had done their jobs properly, [as] all the 
procedures had been followed’. Emphasising his party’s dissatisfaction with this 
explanation, Loughton laments…  
Absurdly… we are expected to accept that as long as the right 
pages in the rule book were followed and the requisite number of 
boxes were ticked, the system [is] working properly… By the way, 
a 17-month-old boy had died in horrific circumstances, despite 
being on the council’s at-risk register and having had contact with 
various professionals on at least 60 occasions (HC Deb 3 Feb 2009 
vol 487: c766). 
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On this basis, he called ‘on the Government urgently to restore confidence in the 
system…’ by reducing bureaucracy and thus ‘free[ing] up social workers… to 
maximise the time available to spend with vulnerable families’ (HC Deb 3 Feb 2009 
vol 487: c765). 
This became an established and repeated narrative propagated by the Conservative 
Party in the run-up to the General Election in May 2010 (Parton, 2014). It also 
became the context within which, only six weeks after their election success, they – 
along with their Liberal Democrat Coalition partners – followed through on their 
pre-election pledge to commission a new ‘independent review to improve the child 
protection system’ (Gove, 2010, quoted in Munro, 2010b: 44). 
The review was led by Eileen Munro, Professor of Social Work at the London School 
of Economics – a qualified social worker in her own right and someone with 
‘extensive research experience in child protection’ (Gove, 2010, quoted in Munro, 
2010b: 44) and whom had published several peer-reviewed commentaries on the 
need for reform during New Labour’s tenure of government (see Chapter 2). 
Notable in the Secretary of State’s letter of invitation to Eileen Munro – in which he 
set out the requirements of the review (see Munro 2010b: 44-46) – was the 
absence of any mention to Peter Connelly, or of those sentiments of ‘outrage’ 
characteristic of the Conservative’s preceding position. However, common themes 
were again observed: that ‘the system of child protection [was] not working’ and 
that ‘social workers [needed] to be free from unnecessary bureaucracy and 
regulation’; ‘clear about their responsibilities and… accountable in the way they 
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protect children’; whilst also enabled ‘to make well-informed judgments… in the 
best interests of [the] child’ (Gove, 2010, quoted in Munro, 2010b: 44).  
He requested that Eileen Munro ‘review’ and ‘set out the obstacles preventing 
improvements and the steps required to improve child protection’ over a ten-
month period, culminating in a final report to be published in April 2011 (Gove, 
2010, quoted in Munro, 2010b: 44).  
Ultimately, this final report was published a month late in May 2011, but by this 
time Munro had authored a 340-page critique of the English child protection 
system, highlighting barriers to effective practice, and areas requiring ‘radical 
reform’ (Munro, 2011b: 13).  
In the following section I elucidate the Munro Review’s findings and 
recommendations in respect to the social worker’s discretionary space, and how 
discretion in the best interests of the child, became central to the image put forth 
of a more ‘child-centred’ and ‘effective’ system. In so doing, I will continue to set 
out and justify my specific research focus. However, here I provide context to this 
focus by highlighting how the origins of the Munro Review emerged in the ‘politics 
of outrage’ witnessed in the aftermath of the Peter Connelly case; an ‘outrage’ that, 
irrespective of the self-serving origins, ostensibly reflected the national feeling 
following another child death tragedy, and the desire – shared by the author – to 
ensure that the system entrusted to protect our children is optimised to reduce the 
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likelihood1 that others might be subjected to the type of experiences suffered by 
Peter.  
1.4 The Munro Review of Child Protection 
The Munro Review of Child Protection took place between June 2010 and May 
2011. Its aims matched the broad remit set out within the Secretary of State’s letter 
of invitation: to identify the range of problems facing the child protection system in 
England; to analyse those problems and seek possible explanations; and to make 
recommendations for improvement (Munro, 2010b). The scope and scale of the 
review and its findings was extensive and comprised of three reports and 340 
pages. 
1.4.1 Design and methodology 
‘Part One: A Systems Analysis’, was published in October 2010 and aimed to identify 
the problems the child protection system was facing. The theoretical framework 
upon which the analysis was based stemmed from an idea that had emerged as far 
back as the mid-1970s (for example, Pincus and Minahan, 1973; Forder, 1976) but 
which Munro had been considering for several years (see for example, Munro, 
1998; 2005), and had been featured in an article published at the beginning of the 
same year (see Munro 2010a). In it, Munro argued that a more sophisticated 
method to review and reform would be to adopt ‘a systems approach’ (Munro 
                                                        
1 Despite popular media and political accounts that child harm can be eradicated, this is something 
that Munro (2004; 2005; 2009; 2010b; 2011a; 2011b) and other social work academics (notably, 
Ferguson, 2011; Parton, 2014; Jones, 2014) argue is unrealistic, especially given the ‘unpredictability’ 
of people. 
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2010b: 1), so as to ‘avoid looking at parts of the [child protection] system in 
isolation [but instead] analyse how [it] function[ed] as a whole’ (p. 10). 
Munro suggested that the traditional ‘atomistic’ approaches (see Munro, 2010b: 13 
for an overview of this concept) had underestimated the complexity of the system 
and those it purported to serve. Indeed, she argued that previous child protection 
reforms, whilst well intentioned had led to a series of unexpected consequences 
and negative ‘ripple effects’ (a concept taken from systems theory – see Munro, 
2010b: 47-51), resulting in a system that she observed to be overstretched, over-
standardised and overly concerned with defensive practice at the expense of 
meeting the needs of the individual child (Munro, 2010b).  
Munro (2010b) outlined that she would employ systems theory in two ways: firstly 
to ‘look back’ and understand why and how previous reforms had produced 
unintended and adverse consequences (see Section 1.4.2); then using this 
knowledge as a basis to ‘look forward’ and make recommendations for how the 
system could be better designed to support social workers in the future (p.10). 
The ‘Interim Report’, entitled ‘The Child’s Journey’, was published in February 2011. 
The analysis within it sought to articulate how problems identified within the 
system were impacting upon the ‘child’s journey’ through it (Munro, 2011a: 8). It 
also set out the ‘characteristics’ of what ‘a [more] effective system’ would look like 
– with social worker discretion as a central feature – and also the ‘reforms that 
might help… get closer to [that] ideal’ (Munro, 2011a: 14). 
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The final report, entitled ‘A Child Centred System’ was published in May 2011 and, 
at 173 pages, was the most extensive. While it revisited the problems identified 
within the system and described how those problems were being experienced by 
different stakeholders, its main focus was on proposing solutions. Indeed, it sought 
to ‘set out recommendations that… taken together, help to reform the child 
protection system’ (Munro, 2011b: 5), so it was better able to meet the individual 
needs of the children it served.  
Munro was supported in her data collection and analysis by a personal reference 
group, comprising ten experienced social workers, judges and academics (see 
Munro, 2011b: 3). This, in turn, was backed by a multi-agency working group, with 
representatives from social work, health and the police. The review also drew from 
the work of six sub-groups, constituting over sixty leading professionals, from 
academia, social work, the judiciary, policing and health. Munro (2011b: 2) also 
outlined how the review ‘worked closely’ with nine local authorities and 
visited/used as a case study a further eleven, as well as two primary care trusts and 
two voluntary sector organisations. 
The review employed an iterative mixed-method design. Although Munro gathered 
and analysed quantitative data – specifically around the level of demand being 
placed on the system (for example, the number of referrals, child protection plans 
etc) – her focus was on qualitative accounts of the challenges facing the system and 
ideas for how these could be remedied. To this end she used a mixture of formal 
(for example, interviews, questionnaires and focus groups) as well as informal (for 
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example, meetings, emailed submissions and feedback gathered after giving 
presentations) qualitative methods of data collection.  
The extent of enquiry was vast and by the final report, Munro and her review team 
had spoken with more than 250 individual children, several groups of parents; 
social workers; social work managers (the exact numbers of which were not 
specified) and various heads of organisations working as part of the child protection 
system – for example, The British Association of Social Workers, Barnardo’s (a 
children’s charity) and Ofsted (the local authority children’s services inspectorate). 
They had conducted a thematic analysis of over 550 submissions, both written and 
emailed, and explored the child protection models of several other countries 
(though these were also not specified), as well as drawing upon the substantial 
evidence submitted to other public inquiries.  
1.4.2 Findings relating to social worker discretion 
Whilst the findings to emerge from the three review reports were extensive and 
covered a myriad of challenges being experienced within the English child 
protection system, the focus of my research is on the discretionary space and 
behaviour of the statutory social workers practising within that system. As such, I 
am concerned with, and will outline here, those findings which have a similar focus 
to my own, namely, social worker discretion. 
It is prudent to note – and I will continue to reference this where applicable – that a 
number of the assertions made within the review share hallmarks of arguments 
proffered by Eileen Munro within her earlier writing – see Chapter 2, Section 2.6.2. 
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The difference being that here, her analysis is informed by an extensive empirical 
account, provided by those working in, and receiving services from, the system; 
strengthening the basis for the recommendations that follow. 
Munro (2010b; 2011a; 2011b) outlines that both the space for, and value placed in 
social worker discretion within the child protection system, has been severely 
constrained (she previously spoke of an ‘erosion’ of discretion – Munro, 2005: 13) 
over a number of years. This she considers to be problematic for two reasons: 
Firstly, because it has reduced the system’s ability to be innovative and respond 
flexibly. Secondly, because by reducing innovation and flexibility the system has 
become less able to account for, and react to, the individual needs of children 
whose circumstances do not fit neatly within predefined cohorts. This then 
heightens the risk that these children will ‘slip through’ the proverbial ‘net’ of 
protection, and the implication is that, in this context, there is increased risk of 
tragedies occurring (Munro, 2011a; 2011b). 
Explaining how this situation has been able to manifest, Munro (2011b) refers to 
‘four driving forces’ of change (p. 14) – presented as historical ‘influences’ in her 
earlier work (see Section 2.6.2). These are: 
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• The importance that society has historically placed on children’s safety 
and welfare, and, consequently, the strength of reaction when a child has 
been killed or suffered serious harm (see also Munro, 2005; 2009)2;  
• Society’s preoccupation with managing risk, compounded by the limited 
understanding of the public and policy makers of the unavoidable degree 
of uncertainty involved in making decisions within child protection, and 
the impossibility of eradicating risk in this context (see also Munro, 2004; 
2005; 2009); 
• The tendency of Serious Case Reviews (SCRs) and public inquiries into the 
harm/death of children to cease investigation at the point of discovering 
human error, and then rely on hindsight bias to form conclusions that 
instances of harm were more predictable than perhaps they were (see 
also Munro, 2005; 2009); and 
• The increased demand for transparency and accountability required by the 
managerialist approach to public service provision which has led to an 
increase in audit and performance management strategies, including 
inspection, timescales and targets (see also Munro, 2004; 2009). 
                                                        
2 The assertion here does not appear to be that society has not always had some degree of concern 
for the welfare of children (see Ferguson, 2011; Parton, 2014), but more so, that there has been a 
growing tendency – certainly, since the 1970s – for high profile cases of child harm to enter the 
public domain (possibly because of evolving media approaches – see Ayre, 2001; Franklin and 
Parton, 2001; Parton, 2014; Warner, 2013; 2015) and result in public outcry. The argument is that 
the weight of this outcry (experienced as ‘moral panics’ – see Cohen, 1972; Butler and Drakeford, 
2003) is said to have had a pervasive impact on the development and evolution of the English child 
protection system (Munro, 2011c – see also, Parton, 2014).  
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Subsequently, the cumulative impact, and an ‘unintended consequence’ of these 
drivers brought about by a series of ‘ripple effects’ (Munro, 2010b: 47), is a system 
less able to cater for the individual needs of the children that it purports to protect 
(Munro, 2011a; 2011b). Munro elucidates a number of these ‘ripple effects’ as they 
relate to the constriction of discretion.  
For example, she identifies how an exponential increase in legislation and ‘best 
practice’ guidance since the 1970s – ostensibly designed to improve practice but 
with the added aim of ensuring that social work is ‘transparent’ and ‘accountable’ – 
has contributed to the system becoming ‘over-bureaucratised’ (Munro, 2010b: 18) 
and ‘over-standardised’ (p. 38). Whilst this echoes previous assertions (for example, 
Munro, 2004; 2009), here Munro is more explicit in stating that, at a basic level at 
least, the increased amount of prescription and regulation has limited the 
discretionary space available to social workers: 
The main criticism is that [procedures] have become too extensive 
and are so dominating practice that space to exercise professional 
judgment is being severely reduced (Munro, 2011a: 61).  
Similarly, Munro develops her account for how a ‘culture of blame’ (Munro, 2010b: 
38) has evolved within the child protection system. Like previously (see Munro, 
2005; 2009) she asserts that this ‘culture’ is in part a manifestation of the 
traditional conclusions of local SCRs and national public inquiries, which have opted 
to blame human error, rather than explore systemic failures, as an explanation for a 
child being harmed (see Butler and Drakeford, 2003 for wider discussion). However, 
she also reflects on the role that the media has played in cultivating this ‘culture’; 
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highlighting its power and ability to influence public and political opinion, and its 
tendency to perpetuate unrealistic expectations placed on social workers, especially 
when reporting the circumstances of a particular tragedy (Munro, 2010b; 2011a). 
The implication is that, against this backdrop, professional discretion has become a 
‘risky’ option: 
For some, following rules and being compliant can appear less 
risky than carrying the personal responsibility for exercising 
judgment (Munro, 2010b: 6). 
In this context, Munro bemoans the climate of ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’ (Munro, 
2010b: 17) that, she asserts, has come to exist within the child protection system 
(see Munro, 2009). However, she develops her discussion to consider also the 
role that audit, and inspection has played in cultivating this, with reference to the 
negative consequences associated with a critical external (Ofsted) inspection 
report – including the prospect of punitive media and political action, often 
accompanied by a loss of jobs for both senior managers and frontline staff. This 
she argues, has led to a shift in focus towards preparation for inspection, with an 
unhealthy concern with evidencing ‘compliance’ through easily quantified 
‘output’ measures of practice, such as procedures followed, and timescales met 
(Munro, 2010b; 2011b). 
Finally, Munro identifies this inspection ‘preparation’ as an example of ‘defensive 
practice’ behaviour (Munro, 2011b: 20); affirming the inherency of the latter 
within contemporary social work teams, where practitioners and their employers 
have succumbed to an environment in which Government prescription, 
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SCR/public inquiry conclusions and their experiences of the inspection regime, 
endorse strict adherence to processes as evidence of ‘good practice’, but where 
little value is placed in the use of frontline social worker discretion (Munro, 
2011b). However, for Munro, this is a misconceived notion and she criticises the 
‘compliance culture’ (p. 107) that has developed from it, suggesting that 
protecting the professional practitioner and/or organisation has become, at 
times, a greater influence on practice than the need to help the individual child: 
[T]here has been a shift towards defensive practice where a 
concern with protecting oneself or one’s agency has competed, 
and sometimes overridden, a concern with protecting children 
(Munro, 2011b: 20). 
1.4.3 Recommendations for reform 
Munro’s image for ‘radical reform’ entailed shifting the system from one that was 
‘over-bureaucratised’, ‘over-standardised’ and ‘defensive’, to one in which social 
workers would be enabled, encouraged and therefore, motivated to use their 
discretion in the best interests of the child. Such a system would, she argued, be 
better geared towards meeting the needs of the individual child, and therefore 
would be more ‘child-centred’ (Munro, 2011b: 1) and thus ‘effective’ (p. 23). As 
such, within her recommendations for reform, Munro sets out ways in which to 
improve both the space for, and value placed in, social worker discretion, and I will 
consider these here, having organised them under the following headings:   
• Reduced prescription; 
• Moving from a compliance to a learning culture;  
• Positive risk-taking in the best interests of the child; and 
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• More realistic expectations on social workers. 
1.4.3.a Reduced prescription 
Munro made specific recommendations designed to reduce the level of national 
and local prescription, and thus also the extent of ‘bureaucracy’ and 
‘standardisation’ that she observed to be inherent within the system – the 
implication being that in so doing, social workers would be afforded more 
discretionary space to respond to the individual needs of the child (Munro, 2011b). 
Nationally, Munro recommended a revision to statutory guidance. Whilst she 
recognised a continued requirement for national government to provide ‘a clear 
and regulatory framework’, she called on it to ‘strip away’ much of the 
‘unnecessary’ and unhelpful top-down bureaucracy that had become synonymous 
with child protection; providing a better distinction between rules as opposed to 
guidance; and delineating the key principles underpinning this (Munro, 2011b: 22). 
At a local level, whilst Munro (2011b) recognised the continued benefit of some 
procedures and guidance – for example, providing the means with which to share 
knowledge between experienced and less experienced staff – she argued that the 
‘proliferation’ of local procedures (which she refers to elsewhere as 
‘protocolization’ – Munro, 2004: 1096) had gone too far and needed to be rolled 
back (p. 40). She called on local providers to review their procedures, and jettison 
anything that was, on balance, more burdensome than conducive to the best 
interests of the child, including where unnecessary process encroached into 
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valuable discretionary space (Munro, 2011b). Where it was decided that 
procedures should remain, Munro recommended that they be followed 
‘intelligently’ (p. 37) – that is, social workers would be encouraged to use discretion 
if, in a given context, they judged, and could justify, that not adhering to process 
was in the best interests of the individual child.  
Further, Munro (2011b) cited her particular concern for the barriers created by the 
Integrated Children’s System (ICS) – a nationally prescribed ICT database, with 
different versions procured and used locally (see Chapter 2, Section 2.6.1) –
especially in respect to the prescribed workflow element inherent within many of 
variants. She lamented the fact that conforming to the different stages of the 
workflow – along with the expected level of case recording – had become a means 
of evidencing compliance, which had not only hindered professional discretion, but 
necessitated that social workers spent most of their time at their computer. Munro 
stressed the importance of redesign and of local agencies commissioning versions 
of the ICS that relaxed the burdens of workflow and case recording with the 
expectation that social workers would be more able to use their discretion in how 
best to spend their time. 
1.4.3.b Moving from a ‘compliance’ to a ‘learning culture’ 
Munro envisioned that a shift from the defensive ‘compliance culture’ to a ‘learning 
culture’ would enable a better focus on the best interests of the individual child and 
would cultivate a greater value being placed on social worker discretion in achieving 
those interests.   
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One area targeted for reform was the approach to external inspection. Munro 
(2011b) recommended ‘modify[ing]’ the Ofsted-managed inspection system so that 
it would ‘drive child-centred practice and improve outcomes for children’ (p. 46). 
This could be achieved by changing inspection arrangements so that they were 
carried out on an ‘unannounced’ basis, thereby ‘minimis[ing] the bureaucratic 
burden’ brought about by a culture of ‘inspection preparation’ (p. 46). 
Furthermore, Munro (2011b) advocated changing the focus of inspection so that it 
better ‘enable[d] and encourage[d] professionals to keep a clear focus on children’s 
needs’ and to exercise their discretion in how best to meet these needs (p. 39). This 
could be achieved by inspectors looking beyond those easily quantifiable ‘output’ 
measures which had become associated with inspection, to focus instead on the 
ability of frontline staff to use their discretion to improve ‘outcomes’ for children. 
The implication is that if inspectors were also interested in evidence of the 
appropriate use of discretion, then there would be more value placed in it at a local 
level, and thereby more motivation to sanction/engage in its use.  
1.4.3.c Positive risk-taking in the best interests of the child 
For systems to be more ‘child-centred’, Munro (2011b) stressed that both 
employers and social workers needed to reject the defensive approach to risk and 
engage in positive risk-taking when it was judged to be in the best interest of the 
child. She asserted that practitioner discretion lay at the heart of this.  
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To this end, Munro (2011b) recommended that employers incorporate a series of 
‘risk principles’ into local social work polices, and that these should ‘underpin 
practice’ (p. 107). These ‘risk principles’ had been adapted from the Association of 
Chief Police Officers ‘Statement of Risk Principles’ (see The College of Policing, 2013 
for a full account), and set out the specific expectations both for social workers and 
employers around risk taking. Of particular note for this thesis:  
• Principle 1: The willingness to make decisions in conditions of 
uncertainty (i.e. risk taking) is a core professional requirement for all 
those working in child protection [emphasis added] (Munro, 2011b: 43). 
• Principle 10: Those working in child protection who make decisions 
consistent with these principles should receive the encouragement, 
approval and support of their organisation (Munro, 2011b: 44). 
1.4.3.d More realistic expectations on social workers 
However, Munro (2011b) recognised that in order for employers and social 
workers to view discretion as less ‘risky’, action was required to readdress the 
climate ‘fear’ and ‘culture of blame’ that, she believed, had become inherent 
within the system. Indeed, she recommended a concerted national 
‘programme of action’ designed to improve public understanding of child 
protection social work and its complexities, assigning roles to several bodies 
(p. 121).   
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For example, Munro (2011b) recommended that a College of Social Work 
(recommended by the Social Work Task Force, 2009) should take a lead role 
in supporting social workers, their employers and the media to improve 
collaborative working around the promotion of positive news stories, and 
how to effectively respond to high profile incidents.  
This would be aided by Local Authority Press Teams, who would take a lead 
on reporting success stories within their localities; as well as a newly created 
national ‘Chief Social Worker’, tasked with building relationships with 
journalists and editors, so as to become a trusted and reliable source offering 
balanced accounts about social work practices, especially after high profile 
incidents (Munro, 2011b).  
Importantly, Munro (2011b) also placed great emphasis on the 
responsibilities of journalists and editors to report more accurately when 
covering cases with child protection concerns. She advised that it was their 
duty to ‘help society to understand more about what child protection work 
entails’ (p. 124) and urged them to question the impact of their reporting on 
the wider system, and whether a particular story – or the approach they took 
to it – was really in the best interests of vulnerable children and the wider 
public.  
Likewise, Munro (2011b) called on public figures (including local and national 
politicians) and other professionals involved in child protection (for example, police, 
health and education) to provide thoughtful, calm and non-reactive responses 
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when high profile incidents occurred. This would help to avoid a sense of scandal 
and quell the desire for knee-jerk reactions, which, she argued, had historically led 
to limited conclusions and ill-designed reform. 
1.4.4 The need for ‘regular reviews of progress’ 
Munro (2011b) also emphasised the importance of reviewing the changes being 
made within child protection, and the extent to which her more ‘child-centred’ and 
‘effective’ system had been realised. She called for ‘regular reviews of progress’ in 
the form of follow-up research which would look specifically at 
the extent to which the changes are being implemented, any 
barriers to implementation and whether the reforms are having 
the desired impact on improving outcomes for children and on 
the workforce (p. 22). 
It is in this context that I locate my own research piece; setting out below ‘why this 
study and why now?’  
1.5 Rationale for research – why this study and why now? 
Here I locate my research focus in the context of my own, rather reluctant, passage 
into child protection social work practice. I emphasise the importance of the Peter 
Connelly case and its coverage as a contributor to this reluctance, but also as a 
precursor to what became my fascination, as a newly qualified practitioner, with 
the Munro Review, its findings and recommendations. I set out how this 
fascination, in combination with my early practice experiences, led me to my 
specific research focus, and in so doing, I outline the value of this study at this 
moment in time.  
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At the time of submitting my thesis proposal, and indeed for the majority of my 
‘PhD journey’, I was a practising social worker in a local statutory child protection 
team (it is only towards the end of my PhD studies that I have made the transition 
into academia). However, this had not been by design. Indeed, as many ‘second 
generation’ social workers will attest, having ‘grown-up’ in a household with 
practising social workers and witnessing the tendency of work-life to encroach into 
home-life (although I believe my parents were generally very skilled at navigating 
this terrain), I was all too aware of, and keen to avoid, the level of stress and 
pressure that I observed a career in social work to bring. Thus, on completing my 
undergraduate studies in 2005, whilst I wasn’t sure what my career would be, I was 
sure that it wouldn’t be in social work.  
Hence, it was somewhat of a surprise when, in September 2008, I returned to 
University to begin my social work studies, and take my place in what is now 
affectionately, but perhaps ironically, referred to as ‘the family business’. The date 
is significant. Indeed, only six weeks into my social work course, the Peter Connelly 
(or ‘Baby P’ as he was then known) news story entered the public domain. The 
subsequent attack on social workers by the media and general public (see Jones, 
2014; Warner, 2013; 2015; Shoesmith, 2016 for an account) – personally 
experienced through the medium of BBC 5Live ‘phone-ins’ – formed the backdrop 
to, and persisted throughout, my social work course. (Nigel Parton [2014] notes 
that one of the defining characteristics of the Peter Connelly case was how long it 
maintained a high profile in the media and public consciousness, and indeed, that it 
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continued to be the subject of in-depth coverage and political debate up until – and 
I would argue, beyond – the General Election of May 2010.) 
My experiences of this coverage, and my continued desire to avoid the life of 
‘stress’ and ‘burnout’ which testimonies – including those of friends, family and 
colleagues – informed me was symptomatic of the child protection field, meant 
that when I qualified as a social worker in July 2010, I pursued my first position of 
employment with the adopted mantra of ‘anywhere but child protection’. However, 
perhaps also partly because of the recency of specific negative media coverage and 
political comment, I found, initially to my dismay, that the only job vacancies 
available to me, were indeed in child protection. (By way of example, I recall vividly 
a conversation with the Assistant Director of my final placement authority, who, 
when I made the case to remain on her ‘Looked After Children’ Team, advised me: 
‘sorry Ciaran, there are no job vacancies on the LAC Team, but don’t worry, we 
always have vacancies on the Child Protection Team’.) 
Thus, I began a position on a statutory child protection team – somewhere that I 
would remain for 7 years – in September 2010. The date is again significant, as 
within four weeks of my start, the first Munro Review report: ‘Part one: A Systems 
Analysis’ (Munro, 2010b), was published. This report and its companions, ‘The 
Child’s Journey’ (Munro, 2011a) and ‘A Child-Centred System’ (Munro, 2011b) 
became key texts for me in my early years within the profession (indeed, I read 
each report several times during this period). Their allure lay not only in the way 
that Munro was able to bring forth those reasons which, on reading, I realised had 
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contributed to my initial aversion to becoming a social worker, and indeed, my total 
trepidation at the prospect of child protection practice; it was also her ability to 
articulate these as issues within the system, issues that had been played out so 
publicly in the Peter Connelly coverage, and which I myself was now experiencing in 
my own practice; further, it was that her conclusions were empirically based and 
informed by the testimonies of those working in, and receiving services from, the 
child protection system. 
As such, Munro’s findings and recommendations resonated with me as a 
practitioner, but specifically her assertion that a more ‘effective’ system, could be 
achieved by enabling social workers to employ their discretion in deciding/actioning 
the best interests of the individual child. 
Ultimately, I submitted my thesis proposal in the Spring of 2012 having then 
recently read Munro’s (2012) ‘Progress Report’. Within, she had commented upon 
the degree of change achieved during the first year following the publication of her 
final review report, as well as the potential obstacles to further realising the level of 
reform that her review had envisaged. The importance of improving the ‘space’ and 
motivation for social workers to employ discretion in responding to the ‘variety of 
needs of children’ (p. 8) was again central to the discussion. However, I was struck 
by the absence of enquiry which sought to explore and report on the degree to 
which this element of a more ‘child-centred’ and ‘effective’ system had been 
realised. 
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Thus, within my submission to the University, I argued for the value of an empirical 
enquiry exploring the ‘extent [to which] frontline statutory social workers [are] 
employing their discretion, in the post-Munro Review world of child protection’. I 
suggested that such an enquiry would offer valuable evidence to any further 
appraisal of ‘progress’ of the Munro recommendations and would thus make an 
important contribution to the knowledge area. 
It is within this context that I set forth the rationale for my research, and specifically 
‘why this study and why now?’. 
In the next chapter, I will identify and review the literature pertinent to my focus on 
the frontline statutory social worker’s discretionary space. 
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
My specific focus in carrying out this literature review is the structural discretion 
(discretionary space) of England’s statutory social workers (i.e. their freedom in 
decision-making and action taking) and less their epistemic discretion (i.e. their 
discretionary reasoning) (see Section 1.2.1). As described, this focus arises from my 
interest in the findings and recommendations pertaining to social worker discretion 
made by Eileen Munro in her review of the English child protection system (Munro, 
2010b; 2011a; 2011b). However, in commencing my research I was unaware of the 
body of literature that engaged specifically with the concept of social worker 
discretion in the broader sense, nor indeed with that literature (beyond Munro’s 
formal ‘review’ reports) that dealt with the concept of discretion in the narrower 
context of child protection. Thus, from September 2012 I have been engaged in a 
structured and transparent literature search.  
Accepting that literature databases operate differently, and with a desire to reduce 
potential for the omission of pertinent texts, I applied the same open-ended search 
criteria to four database search engines, specifically: Applied Social Sciences; 
Scopus; Social Care Online; and Web of Science. Initially starting with the criteria 
that the title, abstract or key words included the term ‘discretion’ I returned over 
15,000 results. When this was further refined to also include the criteria ‘social 
work*’ this reduced the number to 173. However, as I developed my understanding 
of the different iterations of ‘discretion’ within the literature, I repeated the search 
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but replaced the term ‘discretion’ with ‘judgment’, ‘autonomy’, ‘liberty’ and 
‘freedom’. These different iterations produced a further 1,644 results (see Table 1).  
Finally, I further refined the search with the inclusion of the criteria ‘child*’ (in 
reference to my focus on child protection), which reduced the number of results to 
394 (see Table 1). The publication data (including abstracts) for each of these 394 
were exported, allowing me to undertake a manual review of each source. Where I 
found an example of literature or author that I considered to be particularly 
applicable to my area of enquiry, I highlighted it, and expanded my search strategy 
to include forward citation searching, and a review of the authors’ other published 
works.  
Table 1. Literature search combinations and results 
Search terms Number of returns 
‘Discretion’ 15,176 
‘Discretion’ + ‘Social Work*’ 173 
‘Discretion’ / ‘Judgment’ / ‘Autonomy’ / 
‘Liberty’ / ‘Freedom’ + ‘Social Work*’ 
18,017 
‘Discretion’ / ‘Judgment’ / ‘Autonomy’ / 
‘Liberty’ / ‘Freedom’ + ‘Social Work*’ + 
‘Child*’ 
394 
During the manual review of the publication data, I further sorted, refined and 
focussed the literature through the application of three specific exclusion criteria. 
The first cohort of texts to be discarded were those where, despite the inclusion of 
the term ‘social work*’ within the search criteria, I found the focus to be on only 
non-social work professionals (for example, police, probation, teachers, nurses). 
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Secondly, I excluded those texts which were only concerned with social workers 
practising in a non-statutory context (i.e. working in the voluntary, charitable or 
criminal justice sector). Similarly, I excluded those in which the focus was only on 
social workers practising in a statutory context of a country other than England 
(including Europe, USA and other parts of the UK – i.e. Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland). Where I identified literature in which the focus included 
statutory social workers along with other public service professionals; which 
considered social work in both a statutory and non-statutory context; or which 
discussed statutory social work in England as well as another country/countries; I 
judged the merits of inclusion on the basis of potential value in contribution to my 
framework for enquiry. 
The application of these exclusion criteria filtered the list of applicable texts down 
to 67. In the final stage of refinement, I resolved to analyse this literature in more 
detail, distinguishing between that which was concerned with epistemic discretion 
and that which shared my focus on structural discretion. However, this proved to 
be the most challenging and time-consuming stage of refinement, as most of the 
remaining literature did not articulate the exact focus of their discussion/enquiry 
and indeed tended to conflate the two notions rather than discriminate between 
them. The literature that ultimately progressed into the final cohort for 
consideration in my review, were those in which I was able to identify a discernible 
discussion/finding pertaining to the discretionary space of England’s statutory social 
workers (not limited to the field of child protection). 
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Following this process of identification, selection and refinement, the remaining 
literature, that I judged to be most closely aligned to my area of empirical enquiry, 
constituted three inquiry reports; ten books; fifteen standalone book chapters; and 
seventeen journal articles, comprising, in total, forty-five individual sources (see 
Table 2).   
Table 2. Sources included in literature review 
Source Number 
Public Inquiry report 3 
Book 10 
Standalone book chapter  15 
Journal article 17 
Employing Wallace and Wray’s (2011: 41) ‘critical synopsis of text’ framework 
(which encourages the reader to interrogate the source by applying a series of 
questions – see Appendix 1), I evaluated each, creating a critical comparative 
summary, from which I identified a cohort of six areas pertinent to my own 
research: 
• Managerialism and managerialisation; 
• Street-level bureaucracy; 
• Curtailment versus continuation of discretionary space; 
• Types of space; 
• Choice within discretionary space; and 
• Discretionary space in a child protection context. 
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These areas form the basis of my literature review. Although there is a degree of 
overlap within and between them, for the purposes of clarity and structure, I will 
consider each in turn, identifying the pertinent implications for future research and, 
in so doing, develop an empirical framework for my own study.  
2.1 Managerialism and managerialisation 
The concept of managerialism and its emergence in the late 1970s as the preferred 
method of organising and running England’s public services (including social work), 
forms the basis of much of the critical analysis, inherent within the social work 
literature, concerning the continued discretionary space of statutory social workers 
(i.e. Howe, 1986; Baldwin, 2000; Evans and Harris, 2004; Taylor and Kelly, 2006; 
Evans, 2010; Ellis, 2011; 2014; Munro, 2004; 2005; 2009; 2010b; 2011a; 2011b). 
The tendency of authors is to retrospectively chronicle the social, political and 
ideological changes that have arisen since this time and evaluate the impact of 
managerialism for encroaching into social workers’ discretionary space. Given the 
centrality of the concept within their analysis, it is necessary to provide an overview 
of these accounts, so as to contextualise the arguments that follow. 
As such, this section is divided into four parts. Firstly, I draw from the literature to 
consider the principles of the pre-managerialist style of public service 
administration – bureau-professionalism – and highlight the centrality of 
professional discretion within it. Secondly, I identify the shift to managerialism as 
being concurrent with an ideological move – specifically, on the part of the UK 
Government – towards neoliberalism. I then reflect on the contrasting principles of 
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managerialism and professionalism, the notion that, in the former, it is managers 
and not professional practitioners who possess the requisite knowledge and skills 
for implementing statutory policy on public service provision. Finally, I compare two 
alternative perspectives on the extent to which the ‘managerialisation’ of social 
work can be considered a completed process and align these to different 
conceptions of continued discretionary space for the statutory social worker. 
2.1.1 What came before? – Bureau-professionalism as the basis 
for professional freedom 
Rogowski (2010) provides a robust historical account of the changing philosophical 
influences on social work in England, from the origins of social welfare in the 17th 
Century to its ‘zenith’ in the early 1970s (p. 41). The latter he asserts was 
characterised by the creation of Social Services Departments (SSDs) following the 
Seebohm Report (1968), with the explicit aim of providing ‘community-based… 
family-oriented social services… available to all’ (Cmnd. 3703, 1968: paragraph 2) 
(see also Harris, 2003). 
It is argued that the creation of SSDs was symbolic of the high point of the social 
democratic consensus (see Seyd, 1987 for a comprehensive account of this 
concept), emerging after the Second World War, seeking to achieve egalitarianism, 
whilst eliminating the causes of social inequality via state intervention, 
predominantly through the provision of welfare (Howe, 1986; Harris, 2003; Harris 
and Unwin, 2009; Rogowski, 2010). Within the departments, social workers 
operated within a style of governance, characteristic of the time, that Clarke et al. 
(1994) label ‘bureau-professionalism’; that is, they were ‘guided by bureaucratic 
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rules but had the professional authority to respond flexibly to individual 
circumstance’ (Ellis, 2014: 2273).  
Rogowski (2010) elaborates, affirming that bureau-professionalism can be 
understood in the context of the organising principles of bureaucracy and 
professionalism of the early SSDs (see also Evans, 2009). He outlines that the 
departments, whilst situated in the bureaucratic structure of local authorities, were 
particularly influenced by professional principles of organisation. Here, fellow 
professionals acted as supervisors rather than managers per se, and entrusted their 
social workers, on the basis of their expertise, to exercise a large degree of 
discretionary freedom in carrying out their work (see also Clarke, 1996; Harris, 
2003; Evans, 2009). 
Harris and Unwin (2009) further suggest that whilst the ’bureau’ element of 
bureau-professionalism traditionally ensured impartiality through ‘administration’, 
in the form of rules and procedures, for a service like social work, where the often-
unique circumstances of its service user meant that the straightforward application 
of rules was more difficult, provision relied on the discretion of professional social 
workers to decide and action how services were delivered. At the same time, any 
concern with performance was delegated to the professional element, as social 
workers were seen to possess distinct skills and knowledge that enabled them to 
define their own goals and what constituted acceptable practice in pursuit of 
achieving them (Harris and Unwin, 2009). 
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Three interrelated types of social worker discretion are suggested to be 
characteristic of bureau-professionalism (Taylor and Kelly, 2006; see also Ellis, 2011; 
2014). Value discretion pertains to notions of fairness and justice, and entrusts 
professionals, based on their professional training, knowledge and experience, to 
decide and act, according to what they judge to be in the best interests of the 
individual user. When the professional encounters an unexpected situation, or one 
too complex for bureaucratic categorisation, they are thus credited to employ two 
additional types of discretion. These are rule discretion, or the ability to interpret 
and decide a course of action in relation to which rules are applicable and how they 
should be applied, and task discretion, which is the ability to decide and action 
freely the specifics of how practice tasks are carried out (Taylor and Kelly, 2006). 
Ultimately, bureau-professionalism embodied the Fabian model of social welfare 
that was characteristic of the social democratic consensus (see Rogowski, 2010), at 
the centre of which was the notion that expertise could be applied through 
professional discretion to alleviate social problems (Harris, 2003; Rogowski, 2010). 
However, Fabianist models of welfare became the subject of attack in the 
aftermath of the 1970s world financial crisis (again, see Rogowski, 2010 for a 
comprehensive account of this). Simultaneously, the acceptance of the professional 
as ‘expert’, and the discretionary freedom that accompanied this acceptance, 
dissipated in line with the emergence of the neoliberalist ideology of government, 
with sentiments of anti-welfarism and anti-statism embedded within it (Clarke, 
1996; Clarke et al., 2000; Harris, 2003; Harris and Unwin, 2009; Garrett, 2009). 
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2.1.2 Neoliberalism and changing notions of welfare provision 
As Harvey (2005: 2) notes, neoliberalism should be viewed as a ‘theory of political 
economic practices’, at the centre of which is the proposition that the advancement 
of human wellbeing is best achieved by ‘liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedom characteri[s]ed by strong private property rights, free markets, and free 
trade’. Furthermore, that it is the state’s role to ‘create and preserve an 
institutional framework appropriate to such practices’ (p. 2).  
The emergence of neoliberalism in the UK is associated with the ‘New Right’ politics 
of Margaret Thatcher’s conservativism. However, it can be argued that it has been 
embedded in successive government’s policy since this time (Harris and Unwin, 
2009; Evans, 2009; Garrett, 2009; Rogowski, 2010). With respect to the provision of 
welfare, Evans (2009) asserts that neoliberalism was critical of the notion of need 
that had underpinned professional practice and service provision in the welfare 
state. He cites O’Brien and Penna’s (1998) analysis of the ideas and values that 
were central to the New Right Administration’s (1979-1997) social policy agenda, 
highlighting a commitment to a more residual model of welfare, based on the 
assumption that welfare was the primary responsibility of the family and 
community, and that state intervention should be minimalistic, as it was by essence 
inefficient, oppressive and debilitating (Evans, 2009). 
Certainly, principal neoliberalist thinkers such as Hayek (1960; 1982) and Friedman 
(1962; Friedman and Friedman, 1980) had argued that the social democratic 
approach to welfare had eroded the freedom of citizens and required remedying 
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via ‘an injection of market discipline’ to promote efficiency, creativity and more 
effective services (Evans, 2009: 146).  Fundamental to this thinking was the notion 
that the state’s reliance on professionals to decide on what citizens needed, and to 
act on this basis, constituted a mistaken faith in professional expertise and an 
insufferable exercise of power over those citizens (Evans, 2009). Thus, once in 
government, the Thatcher administration set about reforming the bureau-
professional model of welfare governance in favour of something better aligned to 
its neoliberal principles (Harris, 2003; Garrett, 2009; Rogowski, 2010). 
In what Rogowski (2010: 136) describes a ‘prescient essay’, Clarke (1996) recounts 
these efforts, and analyses their impact on the provision of state social work (see 
also Newman and Clarke, 1994; Clarke and Newman, 1997; Clarke et al., 2000; 
Harris, 2003; Harris and Unwin, 2009). Three features are particularly important to 
reference here: ‘marketisation’; ‘the mixed economics of welfare’ and 
‘managerialisation’ (Clarke, 1996: 45-46).  The former referred to the ‘sponsored 
development of competition in the provision of welfare services’ that, along with 
the establishment of ‘internal markets’ within welfare departments, aimed to 
mimic market relationships (p. 45). These market-making strategies were reflected 
in the ‘mixed economics of welfare’, which referenced the sustained effort by 
government to change the balance of welfare provision towards the independent 
sector and voluntary/private service providers and the family.  However, it was 
managerialisation – the encroachment of ‘New Public Management’ business 
principles into public service provision (Newman and Clarke, 1994; Clarke et al., 
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2000) – that had arguably the most penetrating impact upon social work provision 
(Clarke, 1996; Harris, 2003). 
Clarke (1996) described two interrelated phenomena pertinent to understanding 
managerialisation: the ‘nature of modes of organisational coordination’ – ‘the 
principles on which organisations are organised and inter-organisational 
relationships are constructed’ – and the ‘nature of organisational regimes’ – ‘the 
characteristic patterns of structures, cultures and power within organisations’ (p. 
46). He asserted that neither markets nor the mixed economics could run 
themselves as they needed agents to work; he outlined that the preferred agent of 
neoliberalist regimes was managers, who embodied the types of knowledge and 
skills required to ensure the processes ran efficiently. This was in contrast to the 
professional as the preferred agent of the previous social democratic organisational 
regime, bureau-professionalism, in which the main mode of coordination had been 
rational administration and professional discretion (Newman and Clarke, 1994; 
Clarke, 1996; Clarke et al., 2000; Harris, 2003; Harris and White, 2009). 
2.1.3 Contrasting notions of managerialism and professionalism 
Several commentators describe the ‘two-waves’ of managerialisation that 
enveloped public service provision in the UK since 1979. The first being associated 
with the New Right Administrations of 1979-1997, and the second emerging from 
New Labour’s modernization agenda. These commentators agree that, during this 
time, managerialism had become the preferred mode of public service 
organisational coordination, characteristic of the neoliberal ideology of government 
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(Clarke, 1996; Clarke and Newman, 1997; Clarke et al., 2000; Baldwin, 2000; Harris, 
2003; Garrett, 2009; Harris and White, 2009).  
Drawing from the seminal works of Pollitt (1993), Harris and Unwin (2009) identify 
nine principles underlying managerialism including: ‘management’ as a ‘separate 
and distinct organisational function’; ‘increas[ed] productivity’ as the measure of 
‘progress’; the use of ‘information and organisational technologies’ to achieve 
‘increased productivity’; shifting focus from ‘inputs and processes to outputs’; and 
the need to increase ‘measurement and quantification’ (p. 11). 
Clarke et al. (2000: 8) compare managerialisation and managerialism to 
professionalisation and professionalism, describing them as ‘equivalent concepts’ 
but with very different connotations (see also Evans, 2010). For example, 
professionalisation refers to the process by which an occupational group makes 
claim to a distinct and valuable expertise and uses this as a basis to acquire 
organisational and social power (Clarke et al., 2000). Managerialisation, involves 
similar processes but is linked to a claim about who holds the right to direct/run 
organisations (Clarke et al., 2000).  
Likewise, both managerialism and professionalism ‘define expectations, values and 
beliefs’ and can be thought of as ‘normative systems’ concerned with what 
knowledge is deemed to be valuable; who holds that knowledge; and, as a 
consequence, who has the power to act (Clarke et al., 2000: 9). However, 
managerialisation has been associated with concerted efforts to subordinate claims 
of professionalism (Clarke, 1996). This is because, managerialism as an ideology 
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asserts the ‘right to manage’3 (Clarke et al., 2000: 9) thereby embracing managerial 
power (Harris and Unwin, 2009) as opposed to professionalism where the emphasis 
is on a professional’s power and freedom to decide and act on the basis of their 
expertise (Evans, 2010).  
Lymbery (2004) highlights two interconnected elements of managerialism: the goal 
of controlling bureau-professional power through regulation and audit, and the 
requirement for organisations to adhere to what Rogowski (2010: 139) describes as 
‘processes of self-discipline’, through such things as financial rationing, 
performance targets and increased bureaucracy. It is these two elements that form 
the basis of much of the literature in making the case for the threat of 
managerialism to the discretionary space of public service professionals. However, 
with regard to statutory social work, there are different arguments as to the extent 
of impact managerialism has on social worker discretion and how far it has 
advanced into the provision of services. 
2.1.4 Domination vs discursive managerialism 
As I will outline below, the debate on the extent to which social worker 
discretionary space exists in contemporary social services departments has 
developed in the literature since the mid-1980s. Central to the debate is the role 
managerialism has played in reducing discretionary space, since the peak of bureau-
                                                        
3 Note: it also led to the view that social services departments needed managers who did not have to 
have a social work background, as ‘good’ managers were seen to have transferable skills (Clarke et 
al., 2000). 
 
46 
 
professionalism in the 1970s (see Section 2.1.1). Indeed, whilst theorists agree that 
managerialism has systematically encroached into social work since this time, they 
disagree on the levels and extent to which it has therefore reduced social worker 
discretionary space. The opposing views are best understood as the ‘domination’ 
and ‘discursive’ perspectives, as distinguished by Evans (2009; 2010). 
The ‘domination’ perspective considers managers and professionals as two ‘distinct 
occupational groups’ (Evans, 2010: 41). To use Evans’ (2010) terms, managers are 
considered to be ‘creatures of the organisation’ whereas the professional is the 
worker, whose purpose is to carry out the ‘bidding of managers’ (p. 41).  The 
manager’s commitment is said to be to their employing organisation, rather than 
the profession from which they may have originated (Evans, 2009) and thus, their 
primary concern is with achieving the organisation’s goals, and in implementing and 
enforcing top-down policy objectives aimed at achieving those goals (Evans, 2009; 
2010). 
The position relies on an earlier iteration of Foucault’s framework of power, 
conceiving it in the ‘juridico-discursive’ sense (Foucault, 1981: 82), as ‘external, top-
down, law-like domination’ (Evans, 2010: 42). It argues that managers have become 
the all-powerful, whilst practitioners are powerless. Additionally, rather than see 
professional practitioners as experts in their field, they are considered to be self-
interested liabilities, who seek to organise services to fit themselves rather than 
those whom they purportedly seek to serve. As such, they require direction and 
control, thus, compelling managers to exercise their authority via strategies of 
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coercion and control. For example, by using budgets, eligibility criteria, 
performance indicators, procedures and audit, managers ensured organisational 
objectives were achieved (Evans, 2009). As such, this position assumes that the 
move from bureau-professionalism to managerialism as the mode of organisational 
coordination, is a completed process and that social worker discretionary space has 
been ‘curtailed’ (see Section 2.3.1). 
The discursive position distinguishes itself from the domination perspective on a 
number of points. The first being that it sees the encroachment of managerialism 
into social work departments as an ongoing, rather than a concluded process. 
Secondly, whilst it accepts the power of managers in line with the increasing 
managerialist discourse, it relies on later iterations of Foucault’s framework, 
asserting the importance of freedom and agency, and sees power as something 
more complex and multi-dimensional, fragmented and dispersed; conceiving it as 
being everywhere and at all levels of the organisational hierarchy (Evans, 2010). 
On this basis, the discursive perspective does not see professional practitioners as 
powerless or passive, but as able to resist forms of managerial control in specific 
contexts. Likewise, it does not accept that managers are only concerned 
with/committed to the objectives of the organisation, but that they retain a 
professional identity and commitment of their own, which can inform their 
decisions and the actions that they take. The position does not consider managers 
and practitioners as either distinct nor homogenous, but rather ‘actors that operate 
within fields of crisscrossing forces’ (Evans, 2009: 150). 
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Indeed, the discursive perspective is associated with continuation. It assumes a 
continued role of professionalism within the provision of social work. It asserts that 
‘managerialism has not replaced bureau-professionalism’, but instead a 
‘continuation’ of both professional concerns and practices persist (Evans, 2009: 
150), albeit in conjunction with an ‘increasingly powerful managerialist discourse’ 
(Evans, 2010: 41). In this sense, managerialism is conceived as only ‘another 
organisational stratum’ upon bureau-professionalism, ‘it may be thick or thin, 
robust or subject to extensive erosion in particular circumstances’ (Evans, 2009: 
150). Thus, the discursive perceptive is also associated with notions of continuation 
of social worker discretionary space (see Section 2.3.2). 
Later in this review, I will consider how these different manifestations of 
managerialism have contributed to the contrasting positions of curtailment versus 
continuation of statutory social worker discretion, and the implications for future 
research that emerge from this debate. However, it is first necessary to give an 
account of a second theme, one that is also integral to the construction of these 
contrasting positions. This is the theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980; 
2010) and the tendency within the literature to employ this as an analytical 
platform for exploring statutory social work discretionary space. 
2.2 Street-Level Bureaucracy 
Michael Lipsky’s theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy (1980; 2010) forms the 
analytical basis for much of the social work literature on discretion (For example, 
Howe, 1991; Ellis et al., 1999; Baldwin, 2000; Evans and Harris, 2004; Taylor and 
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Kelly, 2006; Evans, 2010; 2011; 2015; 2016; Ellis, 2011). As Smith (1981: 48) notes, 
this is due to the fact that Lipsky provided a group of hypotheses about discretion 
that enable transition between ‘theory to data and back again’, an essential 
component in analysing the concept (Evans, 2010). 
Whilst the value of Street-Level Bureaucracy Theory [SLBT] to the understanding of 
contemporary social work teams in England has been disputed on the basis of the 
time, location and context of its original conception (see Section 2.2.2), theorists 
have nevertheless placed the principles of Lipsky’s theory at the centre of empirical 
and theoretical discussions. From these have emerged particular implications 
pertinent to my own enquiry, thus further emphasising its value for consideration 
here. 
On this basis, this section is divided into two parts, the first of which provides an 
overview of Lipsky’s concept of discretion within Street Level Bureaucracy Theory 
(SLBT), with a particular focus on his explanation for the ‘inevitable’ discretionary 
space of the worker. The second considers some of the emerging critique of his 
theory and the implications for future research into discretion.  
2.2.1 SLB and the ‘inevitable’ discretionary space of the ‘street-
level’ worker 
Hupe et al. (2015) track the origins of ‘Street-Level Bureaucracy’, recognising that 
the term was first ‘coined’ (p. 3) by Michael Lipsky in his article ‘Toward a Theory of 
Street-Level Bureaucracy’ (Lipsky 1971). However, it should be noted that the works 
of Prottas (1978; 1979) and Weatherly (1979) were also integral to the construction 
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of ‘Street-Level Bureaucracy’ as a concept (Hupe et al., 2015), and indeed, that it 
appears in literature in different forms including: ‘point of entry’ (i.e. Hall, 1974) 
and the ‘public encounter’ (i.e. Goodsell, 1981). That being said, the focus for this 
review will be Lipsky’s (1980; 2010) book ‘Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of 
the Individual in Public Services’ which is considered the seminal text concerning 
SLBT (Hupe et al., 2015). It is in this text that Lipsky formulates his concept of 
discretion, arguing for the ‘inevitable’ discretionary space of the ‘street-level 
bureaucrat’ (Lipsky, 2010: 15). 
Lipsky’s conception of discretion arises from his analysis of the type, nature, and 
hierarchal control of the work undertaken by frontline or ‘street-level’ practitioners 
administering public services in North America in 1960s and 1970s. Whilst his 
analysis developed in the context of the study of American urban politics (Lipsky, 
1971; 1976; 1980; Hawley and Lipsky, 1976), his aim was to transition away from 
the then traditional approach of study – emphasising formal structure of 
organisations – and to explore the work conditions of policy implementation. Evans 
(2010) highlights that Lipsky’s writing was grounded in a strand of post war analysis 
of public service bureaucracies which considered the relationship between control 
and discretion on the frontline of provision. This came from the observation that 
public service workers were making policy on the frontline, despite extensive 
mechanisms designed to control their behaviour (Prottas, 1978). Lipsky’s (2010) 
starting point was a belief that this paradox could be explained by the ambiguity of 
public policy, and the need to employ discretion in its interpretation, prioritisation 
and application. 
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The nature of the organisation and the role within the organisation are both central 
to Lipsky’s conception of street-level discretion. He defines a ‘street-level 
bureaucracy’ as a public, rather than private, organisation that offers services to 
citizens or communities via ‘street-level bureaucrats’. These he describes as those 
workers who ‘interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs’, at the 
frontline – or ‘street-level’ – of public service provision, and who ‘ha[ve] substantial 
discretion in the execution of their work’ (Lipsky, 2010: 3). Lipsky (2010: xvii) argues 
that as well as police officers, teachers and judges, ‘all…[statutory] social workers… 
are [thus] street-level bureaucrats without further qualification’. Indeed, he 
considers the child protection social worker as ‘the ultimate street-level bureaucrat’ 
given the need for direct human interaction in their work, and the requirement for 
discretion in how to help families in crisis and how to protect children at risk of 
harm (Lipsky, 2010: 233). 
Lipsky’s central tenet is that street-level discretion arises because street-level 
bureaucracies are difficult organisations to work in, characterised by resource 
deficit and policy confusion. As Evans (2010: 13) notes:  
This environment of uncertainty and scarcity is placed at the 
centre of Lipsky’s understanding of the dilemmas and tensions 
that impact on street-level bureaucrats’ work and extend their 
discretion. 
Uncertainty, Lipsky argues, emerges as policy objectives are often simultaneously 
ambitious, vague and conflicting or else contradictory. Meanwhile, demand for 
services typically outweighs supply. Resource sparsity is not only understood in 
terms of restricted finances, but in the context of large (often unmanageable) 
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caseloads, with limited time availability leading to fragmented contact with service 
users (Lipsky, 2010). Within this context, street-level bureaucrats are compelled to 
negotiate both policy and resources, making sense of what their work should entail 
whilst prioritising some policies over others; deciding between contradictory 
polices; and pragmatically ignoring those which appear impractical in a resource 
sense (Lipsky, 2010).  
This constitutes the ‘political’ element of public service provision (Lipsky, 2010: 
237), and here Lipsky asserts the street-level bureaucrat has ‘considerable 
discretion in determining the nature, amount and quality’ of the services that they 
provide on behalf of their organisation (p. 13). Furthermore, the ‘human dimension’ 
of their work – that is the complicated, unpredictable and varied nature of the 
individual citizen – requires ‘complex tasks for which elaboration of rules, 
guidelines, or instructions cannot circumscribe the alternative’ (p. 15). It is the 
street-level bureaucrat’s duty as a ‘public service worker’ to  
translate… unique aspects of people and their situations… into 
courses of action responsive to each case… [albeit] within [the] 
limits imposed by their agency (p. 161).  
Lipsky asserts that in a context where the effective provision of services relies on 
the practitioner to reconcile vague, complex and contradictory policy with both 
resource sparsity and unpredictable/unexpected situations, their discretionary 
space is inevitable. However, this is not a situation that sits comfortably with him – 
a point often missed in evaluations of his commentary (Taylor and Kelly, 2006). For 
example, he is concerned with what he views as the tendency of street-level 
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bureaucrats to either maximise or minimise their discretion as they adapt to the 
tensions of their working environment. In one extreme, this involves denying their 
own freedom to use discretion, and rigidly sticking to rules and procedures, in order 
to acquire a defensive shield against potential blame (Lipsky, 2010). In another, 
workers are observed to manipulate their discretionary power to circumvent 
interference from their managers, thereby acting beyond the formal discretionary 
space afforded to them (Lipsky, 2010).  
Lipsky argues that this is problematic for SLB managers, whose primary concern is 
to ensure a consistent delivery of top-down policy. This, he asserts, manifests into 
efforts to increase control of street-level bureaucrats by reducing their 
discretionary space. In this sense he sees managers and street-level bureaucrats as 
acting in opposition, with the latter resisting efforts to control their discretionary 
space, as a means of coping with the tensions inherent within the SLB environment 
(Lipsky, 2010). Indeed, irrespective of management motivations and action, it is 
these tensions – particularly the enduring political and human elements – which 
means discretion at the street-level remains inevitable, as it serves as a prerequisite 
to the effective delivery of public services (Lipsky, 2010).  
2.2.2 Critique of Lipsky and SLBT’s continued relevance to 
statutory social work 
Tony Evans (2010; 2011; 2015; 2016) offers a critical examination of SLBT. He 
argues that, despite its enduring contribution to the study of public policy and as a 
starting point for understanding the discretionary space of the public service 
worker (Evans, 2010), the theory in its raw form ‘constrains the examination of 
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discretion and limits the exploration of the location, construction and deployment 
of discretion in welfare services’ (Evans, 2015: 279). Evans attests that SLBT does 
not sufficiently account for the role that the occupational setting, status and 
notions of professionalism play in how discretion is used in practice. 
Specifically, Evans (2015) questions Lipsky’s assumption that all ‘street-level’ 
workers are the same, asserting that street-level bureaucracies can be 
differentiated according to political, economic and policy contexts, providing a 
spectrum of roles. Furthermore, Lipsky’s conception of what constitutes a 
‘professional’ is too ambiguous. Evans (2010) observes that in the broad sense the 
concept ‘professional’ refers to a cohort of skilled, often white-collar workers. 
However, in a more restricted and technical sense it can be understood in terms of 
holding particular esoteric knowledge, attributes, status and power (Evans 2011). 
Lipsky, appears to conflate these contrasting conceptions into a singular notion.  
On this basis, Lipsky’s assumptions and focus on identifiable tendencies in the 
street-level worker’s use of discretion is reductionist (Evans 2015). It underplays the 
influence of other important factors, which, in specific contexts, may afford greater 
or lesser discretionary space to the street-level worker (Evans, 2010; Evans 2011). 
For example, the ‘ability to appeal to an idea of professionalism and associated 
ideas of professional discretion’ (Evans, 2015: 283). 
Evans (2010: 17) also criticises Lipsky’s assumption that it is only street-level 
workers that distort policy and his failure to acknowledge that policy outcomes are 
‘the aggregate of activity within the organisation’ – as much the result of manager 
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discretion as the street-level practitioner’s (see also Scourfield, 2015; Evans, 2016; 
Hupe et al., 2015). This is part of a broader criticism, namely that Lipsky is too rigid 
in his understanding of the role of managers (Evans, 2010; 2011; 2016), seeing 
them only as ‘obedient agents’ of the organisation (Evans, 2010: 21): 
A problem… with Lipsky’s analysis is that it gives insufficient 
attention to the role of managers as actors [themselves] with 
significant discretion in the policy implementation process (Evans, 
2016: 603). 
Certainly, SLBT fails to consider how a manager’s values, ethics, sense of 
professionalism and their own scope for discretion impacts upon the discretionary 
space afforded to the street-level worker (Evans, 2010; 2011; 2015; 2016). Evans 
(2010; 2011; 2016) argues that, contrary to SLBT, managers and street-level 
workers can share similar interests and concerns, and indeed often have 
comparable professional identities and goals. This can result in ‘cooperation and 
collusion… in the pursuit of shared professional [or organisational] commitments’ 
(Evans, 2010: 27), thus, granting – rather than restricting – specific discretionary 
space to the street-level worker (Evans, 2010; 2011; 2016) (see Section 2.4.2).  
Hupe et al. (2015) agree with this element of Evans’ analysis, but also suggest that 
Lipsky is not inclusive enough in his application of SLBT, citing his apparent 
reluctance to apply the theory to ‘all relevant public-sector interfaces’ (p. 3). They 
argue that Lipsky should have more critically explored the roles to which SLBT might 
apply and the type of tasks which can afford discretionary space.  However, the 
authors agree with Lipsky, in that SLBT is particularly pertinent to understanding 
the practice behaviours of certain professional workers (in the specialised, technical 
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sense of the term), including social workers. This is a position shared by others, 
where the particular focus is England’s statutory workforce (for example, Ellis et al., 
1999; Baldwin, 2000; Ellis, 2011; Scourfield, 2015).  
In this regard, Evans and Harris (2004) argue that one of the reasons why SLBT 
remains popular and relevant is because the environmental conditions described by 
Lipsky (2010) continue to endure in contemporary public service departments (see 
also Ellis et al., 1999).  Indeed, though Lipsky’s theory is based on his research into 
American public services in the 1970s, his account of those organisations at the 
time is argued to be similar to more contemporary social work departments in 
England. This is particularly true in terms of resource shortfall, high demand, and of 
the managerial factors such as control, surveillance and coercion, and the language 
of eligibility, performance monitoring and measuring outputs (Baldwin, 2000; 
Evans, 2010). 
For others, the contemporary relevance of SLBT is aligned to the managerialisation 
of social work departments and the continued existence of bureau-professionalism 
(Howe, 1991; Taylor and Kelly, 2006). Indeed, for some, SLBT is symptomatic of the 
bureau-professional era, an era, they argue, which is in the past, thus limiting 
Lipsky’s ongoing relevance to the field of statutory social work (Howe, 1991).  
In the next section, I consider how these arguments underpin the principles of the 
‘curtailment’ perspective. Here however, it is pertinent to emphasise how, in the 
second iteration of his book, Lipsky (2010) in responding to this critique, accepts 
that neoliberalism and managerialism have encroached into contemporary public 
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service provision, but argues that the defining characteristics of street-level 
bureaucracies remain, and as such SLBT serves as a cogent starting point for 
exploring statutory social workers’ discretionary space and behaviour.  This 
assertion appears to have little opposition in the social work literature (for example, 
Ellis et al., 1999; Baldwin, 2000; Evans and Harris, 2004; Taylor and Kelly, 2006; 
Evans, 2010; 2011; 2015; Ellis, 2011). Indeed, even those more vocal critics of 
SLBT’s limitations assert that Lipsky’s analysis remains useful due to its strengths 
and weaknesses, and in that its hypotheses about discretion enable the move 
between theory and inquiry (Evans, 2010). 
2.3. Curtailment versus continuation of discretionary space 
The third area pertinent to my own study links to the previous two and pertains to 
whether or not statutory social workers continue to experience discretionary space 
within their day to day practice activities. This binary focus forms the basis of much 
analysis and discussion within the literature (for example, Howe, 1986; 1991; 1996; 
Baldwin, 1998; 2000; Ellis et al., 1999; Evans and Harris, 2004; Taylor and Kelly, 
2006; Evans, 2009; 2010; Ellis, 2011; 2014), and from it, two polarising viewpoints 
appear: either that social workers continue to have opportunities for discretion (the 
continuation stance) or that they do not (the curtailment stance).  
This section is divided into three parts. Firstly, I will identify the core features of the 
curtailment argument with a review of the work of its principal protagonist, David 
Howe. Here I will demonstrate how the position manifests from an adherence to 
the domination managerialism perspective and that given this, it argues against the 
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continued relevance of SLBT for understanding the discretionary practices of 
contemporary statutory social workers. Secondly, I will compare the curtailment 
argument to the alternative continuation stance, by reviewing the work of its 
principal protagonist, Mark Baldwin. Here I will emphasise Baldwin’s affirmation of 
the continued relevance of SLBT and his implicit positioning in the discursive 
managerialism camp, whilst observing the distinctions between the opposing 
arguments, and the emerging implications for future enquiry. In the final section, I 
will consider Evans and Harris’ (2004) paper citing the ‘(Exaggerated) Death of 
[Social Worker] Discretion’ which serves as a standalone critical commentary of 
these opposing curtailment and continuation perspectives. 
2.3.1 Principles of ‘curtailment’: The work of David Howe 
David Howe was one of the earliest, and most cited, proponents of the curtailment 
argument (Evans and Harris, 2004; Evans, 2010). His research published in ‘Social 
Workers and their Practices in Welfare Bureaucracies’ (Howe, 1986), studied the 
practice of 285 generic social workers and social work assistants, undertaking a 
broad range of professional tasks in English social service departments in the late 
1970s. An ethnographic study, Howe’s interest was in understanding the 
‘organisation of social workers as an occupational group and the nature of their 
practice’ (p. 6). Using qualitative research methods (in the form of questionnaires) 
he explored the extent of social worker professional power and their ability to 
control their own work.  
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Like his proponents, Howe (1986; 1991; 1996) reflects on the high point – or 
‘golden age’ – of statutory social work freedom, arising in the new social services 
departments formed in the wake of the Local Authority Social Services Act (1970) 
(see also Harris, 1998; 2003; Rogowski, 2010). However, he concludes that within 
ten years of the formation of these departments, statutory social workers had 
suffered ‘the proleterianization of the professional’ (Derber, 1982, cited in Howe, 
1991: 215), that is, they had been disempowered and lost control over their work; 
their discretionary space had been ‘curtailed’ (Howe, 1986: 126)  
Central to Howe’s argument is his belief that the growing influence of 
managerialism, which accompanied the ascension of New Right politics and 
neoliberalism (see Section 2.1.2), had served to shift power and control away from 
the street-level social worker and towards hierarchal management. He reports that 
managers within his study were seen to be totally dominant, powerful and in 
control over social workers and their practice (Howe, 1986; 1991). These managers 
were observed to be a distinct occupational group from social workers. Their 
commitment was to their employing organisation and their primary concern was in 
realising the organisation’s goals. This they achieved by enforcing top-down policy 
using prescription and standardisation, but at the expense of social worker 
discretionary space (Howe, 1986; 1991; 1996). In this regard, Howe’s argument is 
aligned to the domination perspective of managerialism (see Section 2.1.4), and 
certainly, implicit within his account is that the managerialisation of statutory social 
work in England is a completed process (Evans, 2010).  
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Elaborating on the mechanisms of curtailment, Howe (1986), highlights the 
departmental manager’s increasing use of budgets and procedures to establish 
control, whilst enforcing compliance through surveillance and audit. He correlates 
this with what he considers to be the ‘bureaucratisation’ (p. 150) and ‘routinisation’ 
(p. 103) of statutory social work, with limited space for, and value placed in, street-
level discretion (Howe, 1986; 1991). His observation is that failure to comply with 
managerial prescription could result in disciplinary action, thus dissuading social 
workers from resisting efforts to control their behaviour, and inclining them 
towards conformity (Howe, 1986). 
This image of managers as totally dominant, and of social workers as powerless, 
passive and compliant also forms the basis of Howe’s (1991) argument against the 
continued relevance of Lipsky’s SLBT; he recognises that SLBT poses a fundamental 
challenge to his assertion of curtailment (Evans and Harris, 2004) – although there 
is some accord on the focus of the manager’s organisational commitment and goals 
(Evans, 2010). Howe (1991) critiques Lipsky’s theory on the basis that it offers, in his 
opinion, a mistaken view of the street-level worker’s professional power. He asserts 
that England’s statutory social workers do not have the type of freedom that SLBT 
would claim. In fact, he concludes that other than in ‘matters of style’ all of the 
‘substantive elements’ of social work are 
determined by others, either directly in the form of managerial 
command or indirectly through the distribution of resources, 
departmental policies and procedures (Howe, 1991: 204).  
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2.3.2 An alternative view: Mark Baldwin and continuing degrees 
of freedom  
Mark Baldwin’s research is outlined in his book ‘Care Management and Community 
Care: Social Work Discretion and the Construction of Policy’ (Baldwin, 2000). It took 
place in 1996 and in a further contrast to Howe – whose participants were generic 
social workers – the focus of his enquiry was a specialised group of adult service 
‘Care Managers’ (including a cohort of 28 social workers). Using semi-structured 
interviews, he set out to explore their practice behaviour in undertaking needs 
assessments, seeking to understand if they employed their ‘professional discretion’ 
in the implementation of new policy (Baldwin, 2000: 1).  
Whilst Baldwin accepts the impact of managerialism in shifting the power and 
control of the social work task away from the social worker, he takes the stance, in 
opposition to Howe, that the reach of management control is limited within social 
service departments. Here, Baldwin implicitly subscribes to the discursive 
managerialism stance – not seeing social workers in his study as powerless or 
passive, but as able to offer resistance to forms of managerial control in specific 
contexts (Evans, 2010).  
In this regard Baldwin aligns himself with Lipsky (1980; 2010), asserting that the 
contexts in which resistance occurs arise from the complexities inherent within the 
provision of welfare services, especially the ‘political’ and ‘human’ elements (see 
Section 2.2.1). Indeed, Baldwin found that the social workers in his study employed 
discretion when encountering convoluted policy; when managing disparity between 
what was possible in a resource context, and what had been promised in a policy 
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context; and when responding to unforeseen or else unaccounted-for situations. 
These he assessed as characteristic of contemporary statutory social work practice, 
leading to his argument for the continuation of social worker discretionary space 
(Baldwin, 1998; 2000).    
The implication is that whilst one might accept the impact of managerialism in 
shifting the power and control away from the social worker (Howe, 1986; 1991; 
1996), that is not to say that the social worker is powerless and without continued 
opportunities for professional discretion (Baldwin, 1998; 2000). Even Howe (1986; 
1991) recognises that ‘social workers and their work are difficult to fix absolutely’ 
(Howe, 1991: 219).  Indeed, he asserts that ‘pockets of freedom’ are still available 
to social workers in ‘areas which are not wholly amenable to routine and 
standardised practice procedures’ (p. 219). Whereas he underplays the significance 
of these ‘pockets’ – asserting that they are limited to negligible ‘in situ judgments’, 
costing only social worker time and/or skills, and those practice tasks that have 
little relevance in a legal or resource sense (p. 219) – the point remains that he, as 
the principal advocate of curtailment, accepts that opportunities for continued 
discretion remain, however insignificant: 
The style and manner of practice [is deferred to] the practitioner 
… So long as she is involved it does not matter how she conducts 
herself (p. 219). 
A further distinction between the two camps, can be understood in the contrasting 
positions taken on the nature of discretion.  Howe (1986; 1991; 1996) in 
expounding curtailment views discretion in a binary sense, i.e. a social worker 
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either has, or does not have, discretion (freedom to decide and/or act without 
interference), as determined by an increasing level of managerial power and 
control. Baldwin (2000: 81), in contrast, offers an alternative view, by describing 
that discretion is better understood as ‘degrees’ of freedom that exist along a 
‘continuum of discretion’. Indeed, he postulates that the ‘degree’ of freedom 
experienced by the social worker is dependent on the social work task and context, 
as this determines the extent, reach and/or effectiveness of management control.  
Similarly, Baldwin (2000) distinguishes himself with his finding that social worker 
discretion can arise in ‘unacknowledged habits of routine practice’ (p. 81). His 
position is that in certain circumstances, those employing discretion do not 
recognise their use of it and can even dismiss or overlook their discretionary space. 
The implication here is that researchers who rely on qualitative accounts of social 
workers need to be proactive in accounting for unrecognised discretionary 
freedoms before arriving at conclusions of curtailment. Such a safeguard is not 
evident within Howe’s literature (above), raising necessary questions about the 
efficacy of results and accuracy of conclusions, and highlighting a learning point for 
future empirical enquiry.  
2.3.3 The ‘(Exaggerated) Death of Discretion’ 
In a discursive paper entitled ‘Street-Level Bureaucracy, Social Work and the 
(Exaggerated) Death of Discretion’, Evans and Harris (2004) provide an analytical 
critique of the contrasting curtailment versus continuation positions, focusing 
specifically on the arguments put forward by Howe and Baldwin.  The purpose of 
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the paper is to assert the continued relevance of Lipsky’s SLBT for understanding 
the discretionary space of England’s contemporary statutory social work teams 
(Evans and Harris, 2004), and on this basis the authors’ critique is heavily weighted 
towards the arguments put forward by David Howe.   
For example, they criticise Howe for his assumption that management in social 
services departments functions flawlessly, and that managers can therefore coerce 
social workers according to their will. They see this position as reductionist as it 
omits a consideration of key influential factors, such as the political and human 
elements of public service provision (see Section 2.2.1), and the influence of 
personal and professional values (see Section 2.4.2).  
Secondly, drawing on Dworkin’s (1977) assertion that there are different types of 
discretion understood in the weaker and stronger sense of the term (see Dworkin, 
1977: 32 for an overview), Evans and Harris (2004) criticise Howe for collapsing 
discretion completely into the latter. Indeed, they argue that by ‘seeing the 
development of rules as the end of discretion itself’ (p. 882), Howe underplays the 
significance of being able to interpret and decide within, and between, rules. The 
authors argue that with the ‘proliferation’ of rules and procedures that has 
accompanied the rise of managerialism, this weaker form of discretion has become 
‘increasingly significant’, due to the growing requirement to interpret which apply, 
and decide how to implement them (p. 882). 
Furthermore, the authors critique Howe on the basis that he ‘does not 
acknowledge the significance of [his] concession… that until the central interests of 
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the organisation are at stake’ (p. 883) – for example, in a resource or legal sense – 
then the ‘style’ and ‘manner’ of the work is deferred to the social worker: 
Howe’s recognition that decisions about style of provision 
continue to be a matter for professional discretion undermines 
his claim that discretion is marginal. Style of work – seen as the 
way in which it is done – is central to the service that is provided 
… [r]ather than being a secondary concern, the discretion that 
operates here is of great significance (Evans and Harris, 2004: 
883). 
The authors also critique, what they consider to be the ‘unifying strand’ between 
Howe and Baldwin, seen in the way that both  
tend to treat professional discretion as a phenomenon that is 
either present or absent and rest on a background assumption… 
that… discretion is self-evidently a ‘good thing’ (p. 871). 
Such a position, is, they assert, too simplistic. Firstly, discretion is neither ‘good’ nor 
‘bad’: 
In some circumstances it may be an important professional 
attribute, in others it may be a cloak for political decision-makers 
to hide behind or it may be an opportunity for professional abuse 
of power (p. 871). 
Secondly, discretion rather than be conceived as either present or absent, is better 
understood as a ‘series of gradations of freedom’ that change on a ‘situation-by-
situation basis’ (p. 871). 
Whilst I agree with this critique in part, I feel that it misses some of the nuanced 
elements of Baldwin’s argument. Certainly, by lamenting the ‘curtailment’ of 
discretionary space, the implication is that Howe sees discretion as favourable. 
However, Baldwin’s position is subtler, and his acknowledgement that social 
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workers can use their discretion to undermine official policy, along with his 
advocacy of Lipsky, might be interpreted to mean that he considers discretionary 
freedom as neither inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’. 
Secondly, the authors seemingly overlook Baldwin’s (2000: 81) assertion that 
discretion is best understood as ‘degrees’ of freedom that exists along a ‘continuum 
of discretion’ and that it is informed by situational and contextual factors. Indeed, 
their position that discretion should be regarded as ‘a series of gradations…’ or ‘the 
degree of freedom professionals have at specific conjectures’ [emphasis added] 
(Evans and Harris, 2004: 871-872) is more complimentary of Baldwin’s position than 
they appear to realise. 
It is possible that in applying this critique the authors were referring to the 
language of ‘curtailment’ and ‘continuation’ rather than the respective advocates of 
these positions, as these sentiments do implicitly encourage the notion of 
discretion in the binary sense. However, this is not how Evans and Harris (2004) 
present their argument.  
Ultimately, the cogent point that emerges from a review of these authors’ analysis, 
is that each camp, as represented by an identified key theorist, appears to arrive at 
contrasting conclusions because of the different ways in which they conceptualise 
discretion. In the next section I will develop this point, with consideration of a later 
analysis by Tony Evans, in which he contends that Howe and Baldwin’s arguments 
are formed in part because of the different ways in which each conceives 
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discretionary space, and that within this framework their viewpoints are not as 
polarising as they first appear.  
2.4. Different types of space 
The next area pertinent to this study explores the various types of discretionary 
space available to statutory social workers. The literature reviewed to this juncture 
has tended towards the notion that where discretionary space exists, it does so 
because of the complexities inherent within public service provision and the 
propensity of ‘street-level’ social workers to resist managerial efforts to control 
their behaviour (Lipsky, 2010; Baldwin, 2000). However, another narrative can be 
found in the writing of Tony Evans: that discretionary space can emerge through 
both officially and unofficially granted freedoms designed to ensure the efficient 
and effective delivery of services. 
In this regard, Evans’ ideas evolve within three specific texts: ‘Professional 
Discretion in Welfare Services: Beyond Street-Level Bureaucracy’ (Evans, 2010); 
‘Professionals, Managers and Discretion: Critiquing Street-Level Bureaucracy’ 
(Evans, 2011); and ‘Street-Level Bureaucracy, Management and the Corrupted 
World of Service’ (Evans, 2016). As the titles imply, the starting point of Evans’ 
analysis is Lipsky’s SLBT. However, he also considers the different arguments put 
forward by the curtailment (Howe, 1986; 1991) and continuation camps (Baldwin, 
1998; 2000), and contrasting domination versus discursive managerialism 
perspectives.   
68 
 
Evans’ approach is to compare these different positions to the findings generated 
through his own empirical case study, conducted in the mid-2000s. Like the 
researchers before him (including Lipsky, 1980; Howe, 1986; and Baldwin, 2000), 
Evans (2010; 2011; 2016) employed qualitative research methods, specifically in the 
form of interviews supplemented with documentary analysis and observation, to 
explore the discretionary space available to statutory social workers. The basis of 
this analysis is taken from the contributions of a cohort of ten social workers and 
five (local team) managers employed across two statutory adult service teams – a 
Community Mental Health Team and an Older Persons Team – of a single English 
social services department. 
Evans’ assertion is that different types of discretionary space exist, and these can be 
distinguished and understood by the manner in which they are acquired. The 
remainder of this section will consider this argument and highlight the emerging 
implications for future enquiry, including my own. It is divided into three parts: 
firstly, I reflect on Evans’ distinction between discretionary space that is officially 
granted and recognised (‘de jure’), and that which occurs through circumstance (‘de 
facto’) – highlighting how the features of each are set out by contrasting Howe and 
Baldwin’s apparently polar arguments. Secondly, I consider Evans’ distinction 
between the ‘local’ and the ‘senior’ social services department manager and the 
position that each take in the granting of discretionary space. Thirdly, I set out the 
role of senior managers in cultivating an alternative, granted yet informally 
recognised, ‘entrepreneurial’ space, considering its features and the associated 
advantages and costs. 
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2.4.1 Distinguishing between de facto and de jure discretion 
Locating the focus of his analysis in the structural sense of the term, Evans (2010) 
defines discretion as the ‘freedom within the work role’ (p. 33). Referring to Davis’ 
(1971: 4) observation that ‘a public officer has discretion whenever the effective 
limits of his [sic] power leave him free to make a choice between possible courses 
of action’, he offers the distinction between the freedom to act that arises due to 
circumstance, and a freedom that is formally granted by those with power to do so 
(for example, a hierarchal manager). 
‘De facto’ discretion, Evans (2010: 33) asserts, is ‘the power to act, though not 
officially recognised’, whereas ‘de jure’ discretion is ‘having the power to decide as 
an officially recognised entitlement’. A further distinction lies in the subtleties of 
finding a capacity to act, as opposed to be given formal authority to do so (Evans, 
2010).  De facto discretion arises when a practitioner encounters an opportunity to 
act due to an absence of external direction or control (Evans, 2010). Conversely, de 
jure discretion implies that the practitioner has official recognition of a right (or 
entitlement) to decide on a course of action, including inaction (Evans, 2010). 
Evans (2010) argues that this distinction represents the contrasting positions in the 
continuation debate as set out in the work of Howe and Baldwin. Whilst he agrees 
that the reason for the dichotomy is that each author has different conceptions of 
what social worker discretion is (see Sections 2.3.1-2.3.2), he specifically 
emphasises their distinct focuses in respect to how discretion is acquired. In this 
regard, he asserts that Howe and Baldwin are essentially at ‘cross-purposes’ (p. 33); 
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arguing for and against the continuation of social worker discretion but basing their 
arguments on what are, essentially, different types of discretion. For example, we 
can see that by asserting the curtailment of formally granted discretion due to the 
increasing control from management, Howe is referring to the de jure discretion of 
social workers (Evans, 2010); whereas, Baldwin focusses more on what Evans would 
term de facto discretion, where social workers are able to find capacity to exercise 
discretion in situations outside management control. 
In making this distinction, the implication is that when Howe (1986; 1991) – 
surprisingly at the first point of reading – acknowledges the presence of continued 
‘pockets’ of discretionary space for the social workers in his study, he is not 
contradicting his main argument, but rather referring to another type of discretion 
to that which he is ultimately concerned with; that is, de facto as opposed to de 
jure. Indeed, his contention is that these spaces emerge in contexts where the 
situation is ‘not wholly amenable to routine and standardised practice procedures’ 
(Howe, 1991: 219). Therefore, in this aspect of his analysis Howe makes similar 
claims to Baldwin, yet it is only by distinguishing between de jure and de facto 
discretion that the reader can decipher this. Similarly, the distinction helps the 
reader to understand why the two authors form different views about the 
continuing relevance of Lipsky’s SLBT. 
Evans (2010) suggests that Howe and Baldwin represent different interpretations of 
Lipsky’s work – ‘perhaps because of Lipsky’s ambivalent… treatment of discretion’ 
(p. 37). Howe (1991), in arguing against the continued relevance of SLBT, bases his 
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conclusion on de jure discretion, which, he asserts, has been curtailed in the post-
SLBT world of (domination) managerialism. However, Lipsky’s argument, whilst not 
explicitly stated (hence Evans’ criticism mentioned above), appears to be based on 
de facto discretion: discretionary space is inevitable in a world of public service 
provision, where the ‘political’ and ‘human’ tensions are beyond any ‘elaboration of 
rules, guidelines, or instructions’ (Lipsky, 2010: 15). As such, it is the shared focus 
on de facto discretion which can explain Baldwin’s (2000) continued advocacy for 
the relevance of SLBT (Evans, 2010). 
Essentially, Evans’ analysis allows this continuation/curtailment debate to be seen 
from a different perspective, and in doing so, it appears that a ‘polar’ description of 
the argument becomes less pertinent, as both sides arrive at their conclusions by 
using an alternative concept for how discretionary space is acquired. It is entirely 
plausible that both arguments are accurate; with the rise of managerialism, social 
work department managers have acquired more powers to limit de jure discretion 
(as suggested by Howe), and yet the complexities in delivery of street-level social 
work (for example, the ‘political’ and ‘human’ tensions of provision) continues to 
offer space for de facto discretion, as social workers react to situations outside of 
management control (Baldwin, 2000). The implication is that both Howe and 
Baldwin should be more explicit in how they present their conclusions, for example: 
‘the curtailment of de jure discretion’ for Howe, and ‘the continuation of de facto 
discretion’ for Baldwin. Future researchers would benefit from acknowledging this 
distinction so as to avoid any later critique of reductionism. 
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2.4.2 The importance of the social worker relationship with the 
local manager  
Evans (2010: 156) attests that statutory social work management is better 
understood as a ‘complex set of fractured layers and alliances’ than ‘the 
homogenous and monolithic entity’ represented in the theories of SLB (Lipksy, 
1980; 2010) and curtailment (Howe, 1986; 1991). He differentiates between 
‘senior’ and ‘local’ management in the following way: 
‘Senior’ managers operate at a ‘strategic’ level of the organisation and are thus 
positioned further away from the ‘street-level’ or frontline (Evans, 2010: 42). 
However, they set the context of street-level work through their control of 
resources and development of procedures. By contrast ‘local’, or first line, 
managers function at an ‘operational’ level and are responsible for the day-to-day 
management and supervision of street-level staff. They are expected to implement 
and enforce the procedures and budgetary controls designed by senior managers 
(Evans, 2010). 
Whilst Evans (2010) accepts that, with the rise of managerialism, both local and 
senior managers have become more powerful within contemporary social service 
departments, he does not agree with the notion held, particularly in the theories of 
curtailment and domination managerialism, that these managers will always use 
their power to limit the discretionary space of social workers. Instead, he argues 
that in different conditions, and for different reasons, they seek ways to enable 
social worker discretion. This is apparent not only in those officially granted and 
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acknowledged discretionary spaces (de jure discretion), but spaces that are 
provided on an unofficial, discrete and/or informal basis (Evans, 2010; 2011; 2016). 
With regards to local managers, Evans explicitly positions himself in the discursive 
managerialism camp. He reports from the findings of his study that local managers 
were not only concerned with/committed to the objectives of the organisation, but 
that they retained a professional identity and commitment of their own. This was 
observed to shape their decisions and actions around the granting and restriction of 
social worker discretionary space. Indeed, Evans (2010; 2011) outlines that local 
managers were just as capable as social workers at resisting senior manager 
direction and control and, on occasions, their professional concerns/commitment 
led them to grant informal and discrete discretionary space in contradiction of 
formal, senior manager directed, policy/procedures.4 
However, Evans (2010) also found that the decision to grant either formally 
recognised or more discrete discretionary space was informed by the local 
manager’s relationship with the individual social worker – a relationship that he 
asserts is more cooperative and collaborative than the conflictual one identified in 
the theories of SLB and curtailment. Two features of the relationship were found to 
be particularly conducive to the granting of discretionary space. The first involved 
managers and social workers holding complementary values, goals and beliefs. 
                                                        
4 It is perhaps important to acknowledge the that senior managers also have a line of accountability 
and have to report to the local authority Chief Executive, who in turn reports to the Elected 
Members of the Council. Whilst this might impact upon the discretionary space of the senior 
manager, this is not discussed in the cited literature, nor is it the focus of this study. 
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Evans (2010; 2011) emphasised in particular how a shared understanding of the 
value of professionalism, that is, a mutually held belief that professional status 
justified discretionary freedom, and a conviction that discretion was a valuable 
medium to achieving specific objectives, inclined the local manager towards 
granting discretionary space (Evans, 2010). 
Secondly, Evans (2010) reports that when a manager established a good working 
knowledge of the social worker, particularly of their personal attributes – 
understood as the distinguishing characteristics, features or qualities of the 
individual – and practice behaviour, they could better decide whether they ‘trust’ 
them enough to grant them specific discretionary freedom (p. 129). Indeed, Evans 
(2010) found ‘trust’ (in the inter-personal sense) to be a key facilitator of 
discretionary space within his study. He identifies a small number of social worker 
attributes that were more likely to elicit the trust of a manager, including: having an 
increased level of knowledge and/or practice experience and demonstrating 
consistency and responsibility in past decision-making (Evans, 2010).  Whilst this list 
is limited, the argument is a compelling one, with an implication that future 
research might seek to further explore and understand the impact of particular 
attributes on interpersonal trust within the local manager-social worker 
relationship, and how, in turn, they impact upon the discretionary space afforded. 
However, whilst Evans asserts that, for certain tasks, trust had to be established via 
a period of familiarisation, for others he reported that managers expected – and by 
implication trusted – social workers to employ their discretion on the basis of their 
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professional status alone – it was their ‘professional responsibility’ (Evans, 2010: 
160). Here he reflects on his experience of local managers’ frustration that social 
workers would, on occasions, seek the manager’s approval to employ discretion, or 
their direction of how to proceed, rather than use their own discretionary space in 
the first instance. Whilst this point is significant, Evans does not satisfactorily 
differentiate between the features of these different contexts/tasks, nor how a 
social worker would understand/recognise the difference. This also merits further 
consideration in future enquiry. 
Similarly, as the individual nature of the social worker-local manager relationship is 
central to Evans’ analysis, the implication is that different social workers who share 
the same manager can be afforded different ‘degrees’ of discretionary space; yet 
this does not become a point of discussion for Evans. It does however hold 
implications for future enquiry, where researchers should seek to explore 
discretionary space on a more individual-by-individual, and intra- as well as inter-
team basis (Evans, 2010).   
2.4.3 Senior managers and entrepreneurial discretion 
Evans (2010) identifies that the primary position of senior managers in 
contemporary social work departments has been to utilise ‘remote strategies of 
control’ (p. 376), in the form of budgets, procedures and audit, to reduce 
discretionary space and enforce compliance with ‘official’ top-down policy. 
However, within his study, senior managers were not observed to apply these 
strategies universally, as is Howe’s (1986; 1991) contention, but differentially, 
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according to the social work team, the tasks they undertook, and the degree of 
specialism required (Evans, 2010; 2011). In addition, Evans (2016) found that this 
tendency was not limited to formally acknowledged (de jure) discretionary space, 
but that which was granted on a more informal and discrete basis. 
Indeed, Evans (2016) asserts that, in granting formal discretionary space, senior 
managers must accept a level of accountability – in the sense that they could be 
held responsible – for the decisions and actions that occur within that space. 
However, senior managers who still favoured discretion for efficiency’s sake, 
especially in the human and political terms noted in SLBT, preferred a more 
‘informal’ (p. 608) discretionary space, one where social worker discretion was 
‘covert’ and ‘unofficially’ promoted (p. 609). Evans (2016) identifies this as an 
‘entrepreneurial’ space (p. 609); one that is characterised by surreptitious 
encouragement – sometimes through the medium of ‘nods and winks’ (p. 609) –  to 
be ‘flexible’ with, or else even ignore, policy and procedures’ (p. 609); thereby 
allowing social workers to ‘cut corners’ (p. 611) and ‘tak[e] risks’ in pursuit of a 
‘desired outcome’ (p. 609). 
For senior managers, providing ‘an entrepreneurial space’ allows them to maintain 
a formal position of policy compliance (thus reducing the risk of individual 
accountability), whilst enabling effective service provision in real terms (Evans, 
2016; see also Evans and Harris, 2004). Indeed, entrepreneurial discretion in Evans’ 
study was understood as unofficial policy – it existed, and was expected, but was 
not acknowledged in any formal policy documents (Evans, 2016). This does, 
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however, present particular challenges for the social worker – both in respect of 
recognising where they have entrepreneurial freedom and in choosing whether 
they will use this freedom (Evans, 2016). 
For example, Evans (2016) reports that the discrete and unofficial way in which 
entrepreneurial discretionary space was communicated and allocated made it 
difficult for street-level social workers to know which policies and procedures were 
negotiable and which were not. He identifies that a failure to comply with ‘must-do’ 
policies and procedures (p. 609), which, in his study, tended to relate to finance and 
anything that might impact upon the ‘external perceptions of performance’ (p. 
609), could result in disciplinary action being taken. He also found a lack of clarity 
about what these ‘must-do’ policies were, implying they could be different 
according to the team, time and context of the task, thus further compounding the 
dilemma for the social worker (Evans, 2016).  
Subsequently, whilst entrepreneurial discretion might be expected, and indeed 
discretely encouraged, it requires a skilled social worker to understand the ‘rules of 
the game’ and where they can and cannot employ ‘procedural pragmatism’ (p. 
609).  
The second dilemma identified by Evans (2016: 611) is that of ‘blame shift’ as a 
significant dimension of the ‘ecology of discretion’ in social services departments. 
Social workers risk individual culpability for negative outcomes emerging from their 
entrepreneurial decision-making/action-taking: 
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In concrete terms, the entrepreneurial emphasis was on 
encouraging local discretion to cut corners and get things done 
with least fuss; but this can also be seen as a strategy for cover for 
senior management – they cannot be held to account for policy 
deviation, they have set out their commitments in published 
policy, deviations must be down to individual bad practice at the 
frontline (Evans, 2016: 611). 
In this sense, maintaining discretionary space through nebulous policy can be a 
useful political strategy for senior managers, whereas employing entrepreneurial 
discretion is potentially costly for social workers (Evans 2016; see also Evans and 
Harris, 2004). However, Evans also recognises that an advantage of entrepreneurial 
discretion is that it allows social workers to shape decisions/actions according to 
their own values and motivations, including what they see as being in the best 
interest of the service user.  
Ultimately, the implication is that upon encountering an entrepreneurial – but 
perhaps also a de facto or de jure – discretionary space, social workers have to 
choose their course of action, weighing up costs and advantages to themselves, the 
organisation and the service user (Evans, 2016). Thus, there is value to be gained in 
exploring what informs this choice, and how choice is impacted by the type and 
context of social work task and discretionary space encountered.  This forms the 
focus of the following section. 
2.5 Choice within discretionary space 
Following on from the previous section, here I develop the idea of social worker 
‘choice’ within the discretionary space. The section is split into two parts; in the 
first, I reflect on choice in a binary sense, considering the notion that social workers 
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have choice in whether they employ discretion, or whether they do not. In the 
second section I draw from Kathryn Ellis’ (2011; 2014) ‘Taxonomy of Discretion’ in 
which it is argued that choice is as much about how social workers exercise their 
discretion as it is whether they do or not. 
2.5.1 Whether to choose discretion 
Hupe et al. (2015: 17) recognise that discretion is a multi-dimensional concept and 
distinguish between discretion ‘as granted’ and discretion ‘as used’. The former is 
defined as the ‘degree of freedom as prescriptively granted’ by someone with the 
power to do so (p.17) and is, ostensibly, comparable to Evans’ (2010) concept of ‘de 
jure’ (but also ‘entrepreneurial’) discretion. However, discretion ‘as used’ is 
identified as the degree to which discretion ‘as granted’, or indeed, as acquired (de 
facto discretion), is employed by the ‘actor’. The authors consider this distinction 
important when conducting research into the discretionary behaviour of public 
service workers such as social workers, where the means by which discretionary 
space is acquired provides the context for discretion ‘as used’, and indeed whether 
it will be used (Hupe et al., 2015).  
I take two things from this: firstly, that in order to understand a social worker’s 
discretionary behaviour, one must also understand the different contexts within 
which discretionary space emerge (see Sections 2.4.1-2.4.3); but secondly that the 
means with which discretionary space is acquired can inform whether or not social 
workers employ discretion. It should not be assumed that discretionary space 
invariably leads to discretionary behaviour (Evans, 2010). 
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Ellis et al. (1999: 264) consider that ‘professional discretion involve[s] both power 
and choice’, or as Young (1981: 22, cited in Ellis et al., 1999) affirms ‘the power to 
make choices between different courses of action or inaction’. Indeed, in 
considering the advantages and disadvantages of entrepreneurial discretion, Evans 
(2016) recognises that the dilemma for social workers is whether they are inclined 
towards employing discretion when they encounter entrepreneurial space: 
[This] helps us to understand the context within which frontline 
staff have to make choices and choose whether or not to use 
discretion… not only the often uncomfortable choices about 
whether or not to follow policy… and how to respond to any 
mismatch between [formal and informal policy]… [but 
additionally] not only how to use discretion but also whether or 
not to refuse to use it (Evans, 2016: 612).  
Of course, Lipksy (1980; 2010) cites the availability of choice when he observes that 
street-level bureaucrats’ tendency to either maximise or minimise their discretion 
(see Section 2.2.1). However, there is limited follow-up research or discussion into 
this observation within social work literature, which is surprising given the level 
with which authors engage with SLBT in their respective analyses.  The exception 
can be found, again, in the work of Tony Evans. 
Firstly, Evans and Harris (2004) consider how social workers can reject 
opportunities for discretion in specific contexts. Indeed, they build on Lipsky’s 
(1980) acknowledgement that practitioners can deny their own discretion to 
protect themselves, drawing from previous empirical work (see Harris, 1987) to 
introduce the concept of ‘defensive practice’ (Evans and Harris, 2004: 889). 
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Specifically, the authors suggest that in the context of contemporary social 
work (characterised by resource shortfall, policy ambiguity, and the propensity 
to blame social workers), rejecting opportunities for discretion to avoid the 
responsibility that accompanies difficult decisions can be an attractive, albeit 
defensive, alternative (see also Evans, 2010). Although the authors do not 
satisfactorily develop the discussion beyond how the ‘fear of blame’ (Evans and 
Harris, 2004: 890) can make discretion an ‘unattractive’ option (p. 889) – thus, 
negatively impacting on a social worker’s propensity to employ discretion – the 
implication is that social workers are able to choose whether or not to employ 
discretion. Furthermore, the choice is informed by how ‘attractive’ employing 
discretion is judged to be by the individual (Evans and Harris, 2004).  
Whilst the obvious follow-up questions are ‘what can make discretion an 
attractive option?’ and ‘in what contexts would social workers choose to 
employ discretion?’, the authors do not engage with them, merely implying 
that whilst choice can be beneficial in terms of defensive behaviour, it can also 
cause discomfort. 
This point is touched upon, albeit briefly, by Evans (2010). Here he 
acknowledges momentarily that when discretionary space emerges, social 
workers ‘are confronted with choices, not inevitabilities’ (p. 62). He recognises 
that different situations exist where ‘a powerful [managerial] discourse simply 
doesn’t correspond with their experience or commitments, and they have to 
choose what to do’ (p. 62). He recognises that the choice is rarely easy and can 
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be ‘uncomfortable’, and even ‘painful’, when the position adopted by the social 
worker contradicts powerful managerial interests. However, he asserts that 
this ‘struggle and discomfort do not remove choice… [which] perhaps explains 
the discomfiture of discretion’ (p. 63). 
In a more recent article entitled ‘Organisational Rules and Discretion in Adult Social 
Work’, Evans (2013) develops this idea and offers a more in-depth consideration of 
the issues of social worker choice. Here he reports on a ‘small… subsidiary study’ (p. 
746), in which he revisits the previous case study site and interviews twelve of the 
original cohort of participants (eight social workers and four local-managers).  
Specifically, Evans considers social worker choice in the context of how different 
notions of professionalism influence the approach taken to organisational rules.  
The findings reported contrasting choices of either following rules to ensure 
procedural fairness and limiting bias and favoritism; or breaking rules so as to offer 
a more individualised service (with notions of discretion as a professional virtue). 
However, the findings themselves are not the pertinent point as much as the 
emphasis that a social worker has to see value in using their discretion (for 
example, for themselves, the service user and/or the organisation), in order to be 
motivated, and indeed choose, to do so.  
This is a significant development in the established narrative. Where previous 
writing concerned itself primarily with whether social workers have opportunities 
for discretion, it did not expand the discussion beyond this focus (for example, 
Howe, 1986; Baldwin, 2000); instead adopting an implicit stance that to have a 
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discretionary space, meant using discretion. The importance of this progression is 
that it necessitates additional questions about what influences social workers to 
choose to employ or reject discretion. Evans, for his part, cites a ‘fear of blame’ 
(Evans and Harris, 2004; Evans 2016), notions of ‘professionalism’ and personal 
values (Evans, 2010; Evans, 2013) as being informative of choice, but does not 
comprehensively consider the mechanisms underpinning these influences, thus, 
highlighting an area for further enquiry. 
2.5.2 A ‘Taxonomy of Discretion’ 
In two papers entitled ‘“Street-Level Bureaucracy” Revisited: The Changing Face of 
Frontline Discretion in Adult Social Care in England’ (Ellis, 2011) and ‘Professional 
Discretion and Adult Social Work: Exploring its Nature and Scope on the Frontline of 
Personalisation’ (Ellis, 2014), Kathryn Ellis provides a retrospective analysis of four 
case study enquiries taking place between 1990 and 2007, concerning the 
assessment practice of statutory adult service social workers. Here, she indirectly 
expands on the assertions of Tony Evans, arguing that: 
Whilst discretion, in theory, implies the power to choose… the 
nature and scope of that power can only be understood by 
reference to the contexts within which it is generated (Ellis, 2014: 
2285). 
Ellis’ particular focus is the impact of the social worker’s practice micro-
environment on the choices they make with regard to their discretionary 
behaviour. Indeed, she considers how the interaction of ‘interlinked variables’ (Ellis, 
2011: 229) in the observed social worker practice micro-environment manifests into 
distinct types of social worker discretionary behaviour. These ‘interlinked variables’ 
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include: the position of the team within the overall social work departmental 
system; the level and type of demand placed upon them; their ability to access 
resources; and how social workers understood their relationship with the service 
user. The resulting behaviours are organised into a ‘Taxonomy of Discretion’ (Ellis, 
2011; 2014) (see Figure 1), and the implicit assertion is that ‘choice’ is as much 
about how discretion is used, as it is whether discretion is used. 
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practitioner bureau-professional
street-level bureaucrat paternalistic professional
 
Figure 1. ‘Taxonomy of Discretion’ (Ellis, 2014: 2274)  
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The taxonomy’s vertical axis represents the ‘formality’, or as Ellis (2011: 230) puts 
it, ‘in top-down policy and operational terms’, the ‘legitimacy’ with which discretion 
is exercised. This is the extent to which street-level social work practice is either 
assigned by top-down, or informed by bottom-up, decision-making. The horizontal 
axis reflects the conflict often reported in the continuation debate literature 
between professionalism and managerialism, and the relative influence of each in 
shaping discretionary space. 
In the upper left-hand quadrant of the taxonomy, operating in the formal and 
managerialist space, Ellis (2011; 2014) identifies a form of social work practice that 
she labels ‘practitioner’ (a term chosen in reference to the language of 
contemporary government guidance – Ellis, 2014). These social workers, who were 
typically located at the ‘front door’ of social work departments and were described 
by Ellis (2011: 231) as ‘gatekeepers’ to service provision, had limited scope for 
discretion as their practice was highly formalised and prescribed, so as to maintain 
a strict management of resources. 
Opposite, in the upper right-hand quadrant, still operating in a formal but a 
professionalised space, the ‘bureau-professional’ was distanced from pressures of 
resource management and tended to belong to specialist teams beyond the front 
door of service provision. Whilst their discretionary decision-making was still 
formalised, Ellis (2014) asserts that it was best understood as a ‘balancing of 
professional expertise and bureaucratic standards’ symptomatic of classic bureau-
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professionalism (p. 2275). Indeed, she observed a large degree of value discretion 
being exercised: 
By virtue of retaining both significant scope to negotiate 
prescribed tasks and rules and a sense of professional identity… 
the [social workers] saw themselves using their discretion to 
negotiate formal rules as a means of achieving professionally 
valued ends (Ellis, 2011: 233). 
The latter two types are located in the informal decision-making space of the lower 
half of the taxonomy and are characterised by the scope to employ rule and task 
discretion when confronted with dilemmas, the unpredictable/unaccounted for, or 
because of limited time and resources.  
On the managerialism side of the horizontal axis, the ‘street-level bureaucrat’ 
employed discretion in a way that was little influenced by professional training and 
values, but was more aligned to the defensive strategies observed by Lipsky (1980; 
2010). Indeed, Ellis (2011: 235) outlines that rules were ‘bent, broken or ignored’ 
and tasks carried out in a way that enabled the social workers to cope with the 
demands of the job. She, like Evans (2010) and others favouring the discursive 
perspective, observed that street-level discretion flourished despite managerialism 
as the increasing bureaucracy and proceduralisation that accompanied it offered 
discretionary space in the form of conflicting rules and competing work demands. 
She reports that such tensions were inherent within the entire social work system 
and, as such, street-level bureaucratic behaviour could be observed on both 
‘gatekeeping’ and more specialist teams. 
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In contrast, the ‘paternalistic professional’ (situated on the opposite side of the 
horizontal axis to the ‘street-level bureaucrat’) was found more within specialist 
teams, subverting bureaucratic controls and employing informal rationing 
techniques to determine who received services when, and in what form. Here 
discretion was employed on the paternalistic basis of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, 
deciding who to assist or otherwise through perceptions of client vulnerability, 
need and dependency. However, referencing the radical critique of professionalism, 
Ellis (2011) also noted that social workers sought to hold on to discretionary space 
as a source of power, resisting moral, material and professional hazards to their 
discretion from such threats as service user rights and empowerment. 
Whilst it remains to be seen whether Ellis’ taxonomy can be applied to a wider 
context of statutory social work – including other social work tasks beyond 
eligibility assessments – the implication that emerges from her analysis is that social 
worker choice is impacted by more than subjective influences such as values, 
notions of professionalism and fear of being blamed (see Section 2.5.1), but by 
micro environmental factors within the individual practice context (Ellis, 2011; 
2014). Indeed, there is an argument that future research should look at, but also 
beyond, the micro and consider the mechanisms impacting upon social worker 
discretionary space in the meso and macro environments. Such an enquiry would 
further develop an understanding on whether statutory social workers choose to 
employ their discretion, and in what way.  
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2.6 Discretionary space in a child protection context 
Compelling within the literature reviewed to this juncture is the focus on 
discretionary space in a statutory adult service context (i.e. Baldwin, 2000; Evans, 
2010; 2011; 2013; 2016; Ellis, 2011; 2014). Indeed, only Howe’s (1986) work 
includes any exploration of, or discussion about, the discretion of those practising in 
a child protection social work setting. However, even here the child protection 
element is only one part of the ‘generic’ framework of the practitioners being 
studied. What is more, the fieldwork component of Howe’s enquiry took place 
more than ten years before the implementation of the Children Act (1989), 
considered then, and now, as the transformative piece of child protection 
legislation setting out the primary statutory duties of childcare social workers (see 
Parton, 2014).  
My literature search found a sparsity of contemporary work concerned with 
discretionary space in a statutory children’s service context. Of the small number of 
texts identified, two strands emerge: those for which the focus is the impact of 
Information Technology (IT), and particularly the Integrated Children’s System (ICS) 
(see Section 2.6.1 for a definition); and those which have been authored by Eileen 
Munro, seemingly as a precursor to the arguments put forth within her formal 
review (see Chapter 1), in which she sets out her analysis for how an ‘erosion’ of 
social worker discretion has been allowed to manifest. I consider each of these in 
turn, but also offer a distinct reflective critique of this body of literature, 
highlighting the implications for future enquiry and the importance of my own 
study.  
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2.6.1 The Integrated Children’s System and its impact upon 
discretionary space 
Implemented in 2005 as part of statutory children’s services ‘Electronic Turn’ (see 
Garrett, 2005), the ICS was the brainchild of the Department of Health and (the 
then) Department for Education and Skills (Shaw et al., 2009). It does not refer to a 
single computer system, but rather a ‘national specification’ against which software 
suppliers developed ‘compliant’ software implementations (White et al., 2010: 
408). Its aspirations can be associated with at least seven distinct policy aims (Shaw 
and Clayden, 2009) associated with efforts to managerialise children’s statutory 
social work (Wastell et al., 2010; Wastell and White, 2014). These included: to 
increase accountability and transparency; to deliver better management of 
services; and to standardise the practice of those undertaking statutory social work 
tasks with children (Shaw et al., 2009; Pithouse et al., 2011).  
The ICS itself comprises a set of ‘core information requirements’ for children’s 
services departments in England (Pithouse et al., 2011: 163) integrated into an 
ingrained ‘workflow model’ and a reference set of electronic forms referred to as 
‘exemplars’ (Shaw et al., 2009; White et al., 2010). The ‘workflow’ element ‘rigidly 
defines the social work… process in terms of a branching sequence of tasks and 
timescales’ (White et al., 2010: 408) – each to be completed, reviewed and 
approved by managers before moving on to the next (Pithouse et al., 2011). The 
‘exemplars’ form the basis for the ‘screens’ that social workers see and use to enter 
information (Shaw et al., 2009: 615), setting out exactly the data entry 
requirements for each specific task (Pithouse et al., 2011).  
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Eight journal articles were identified which discussed the impact of the ICS on the 
social workers discretionary space. Within these I found a tendency of the authors 
to discuss discretion in a binary sense – that is, discretionary space as either present 
or absent. In this regard the language chosen is reminiscent of the curtailment 
debate (above), a point observed by Evans (2010) who ascribes the respective 
authors to each, ostensibly opposite, camp.  
However, my own appraisal is that, like those main protagonists of the curtailment 
(David Howe) and continuation (Mark Baldwin) positions, the authors actually 
make, what I assess to be, similar claims. The confusion emerges, I believe, from 
that ingrained tendency within the literature reviewed – one that is repeated here – 
which is to fail to explicitly set out the type of discretion being argued for. That 
being said, our knowledge of the features of different discretionary spaces (see 
Sections 2.4.1-2.4.3) enable us to look beyond claims of ‘continuation’ and 
‘curtailment’ that might otherwise set these accounts apart, and to understand that 
the authors claims, despite the language used, are more complimentary than 
otherwise.  
Ian Shaw and colleagues’ enquiry is detailed in two papers: ‘An Exemplary Scheme? 
An Evaluation of the Integrated Children’s System’ (Shaw et al., 2009) and 
‘Technology, Evidence and Professional Practice: Reflections on the Integrated 
Children’s System’ (Shaw and Clayden, 2009). The study reports on a formative 
evaluation of the ICS across four children’s services department sites (two in 
England and two in Wales) between 2004-2007, interpreting the findings ‘in terms 
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of the persistence and diversification of professional discretion’ (Shaw and Clayden, 
2009: 15). 
Like the aforementioned empirical enquiries set in an adult service statutory 
context, this study, and indeed that which is detailed below, relied on qualitative 
research methods including focus groups, questionnaires and interviews, with an 
emphasis on highlighting the ‘experience and views of social workers’ (Shaw et al., 
2009: 619).  
Shaw and colleagues argued for the continued space for discretion brought about 
because of the standardised and prescriptive elements of the ICS. The authors 
frame their analysis in the context of Evans and Harris’ (2004: 883) observation that 
‘the existence of rules is not inevitably the death-knell of discretion’. They assert 
that the increased standardisation and prescription inherent within the ICS, 
encourages social workers to find ways to reconcile the demands of practice – 
including the individual circumstances of the service user – with the expectations 
pertaining to data entry. For example, they identify examples in which (paper 
copies of) exemplar forms were altered ‘on the hoof’ or else timescales creatively 
expanded, as they were judged unsuitable and ‘unrealistic’ in the specific context.   
Here the implication is that whilst the ICS has reduced de jure discretionary space, it 
has led to increased de facto space, as social workers employ discretion within the 
belt of restriction imposed by the system (Shaw et al., 2009). Despite Evans’ (2010) 
assertions above, my understanding is that this is a position shared within the 
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second study, set out in six collaborative papers authored, in the main, by David 
Wastell, Sue White, Karen Broadhurst and Andrew Pithouse.  
The arguments proffered emerge from a multi-site ethnographic case study (carried 
out between 2007-2009) of five children’s services departments (four of which 
were in England) where the explicit aim was to explore the impact of the ICS on the 
discretion of the frontline social worker (Broadhurst et al., 2010b; Wastell et al., 
2010). The authors report on continued evidence of discretionary space available to 
social workers, observed within a series of ‘informal processes’ (Broadhurst et al., 
2010b: 3); ‘expedient manoeuvres’ and ‘workarounds’ (Pithouse et al., 2011: 173) 
designed to resolve the tensions which emerge from the restriction imposed by the 
ICS. 
The authors assert that on occasions, these ‘manoeuvres’ enable social workers to 
‘get on with the core task of helping children and supporting families’ (Pithouse et 
al., 2011: 173). However, unlike Shaw and colleagues, they also report that for 
every example of discretionary behaviour in the interests of the child, there were 
counter examples where the pressure to obey the all-powerful 
machine is compromising the ability of professionals to practice as 
they think best (Wastell et al., 2010: 316). 
In this context ‘expedient manoeuvres’ and ‘workarounds’ were used to satisfy ICS 
prescription, prioritising evidence of compliance over the needs/circumstances of 
the individual service user. For example, purportedly under duress to evidence 
decisions within set timescales, social workers were observed to routinely return 
referrals to the referrer, under the premise of asking for more information 
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(Pithouse et al., 2011), or else categorise anonymous referrals as ‘malicious’ as 
justification for closure without further enquiry (Broadhurst et al., 2010a: 360).  
Similarly, some social workers were reported to only partially complete 
assessments of children, or else rely on another professional's visit to a child when 
responding in the affirmative to the workflow question ‘has the child been seen?’ 
(Broadhurst et al., 2010a; White et al., 2010). 
It is in this context that the authors claim that the ICS has reduced the ‘scope for 
workers to exercise intelligent discretion’ [emphasis added] (White et al., 2010: 
412; see also, Munro, 2011b), and indeed that this element has been ‘squeezed 
out’ (Wastell and White, 2014: 144) and even ‘curtailed’ (Wastell et al., 2010: 311) 
by the ICS. This latter quote especially helps to explain why Evans positions these 
authors in the curtailment camp. 
Whilst at first these assertions appear rather contradictory, my analysis is that the 
claims are made in relation to a de jure discretionary space, and that ‘intelligent 
discretion’ refers to that value discretion (Taylor and Kelly, 2006) which embodied 
the aforementioned bureau-professional regime, where social workers were 
officially granted freedom to employ discretion as they judged it to be necessary in 
achieving the best interests of the service user (see Section 2.1.1). Whilst the 
authors ostensibly accept that discretion in the interests of the service user is still 
possible, they assert that it is not officially granted within the confines of the ICS, 
and the implication is that, at best, it exists in a de facto space, in which social 
workers can just as easily act against the interests of those service users.  
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Here the assertion is that ‘more of the former does not balance out less of the 
latter’ (Wastell et al., 2010: 318) and in this regard the authors are ‘less optimistic’ 
(p. 318) than Shaw and colleagues in reference to Evans and Harris’ (2004: 871) 
assessment that the ‘death of discretion’ has been greatly ‘exaggerated’. 
2.6.2 The ‘erosion’ of discretion: The wider writing of Eileen 
Munro  
Whilst the focus of the above cohort of papers is the impact of Information 
Technology, prescription and data entry, this constitutes only one part of the child 
protection social work task (Munro, 2010b; 2011a; 2011b) albeit one that perhaps 
occupies the largest portion of the contemporary social worker’s time (see White et 
al., 2010; Shaw et al., 2009). This aside, I found the literature concerned with 
discretionary space in the broader context of child protection practice to be limited 
to three discursive papers authored by Eileen Munro. Her positioning here is similar 
to that stated in her formal review reports (see Chapter 1): that is, that social 
worker discretion has been ‘eroded’ (Munro, 2005: 13).  
In this regard, it is not unreasonable to view Munro as an advocate of the 
curtailment position. However, the arguments proffered within these papers 
progress beyond those of the traditional curtailment camp, which ascribes the 
reduction of discretion to the impact of managerialism and the purported shift of 
power away from the frontline social worker (Howe, 1986; 1991). Instead, Munro 
frames managerialism as only one of four historical influences which, she argues, 
have cumulatively served to ‘erode’ social worker discretion; not only in terms of 
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reducing discretionary space, but also in the value placed in, and therefore 
motivation of and for, social workers to employ their discretion.  
In ‘The Impact of Audit on Social Work Practice’, Munro (2004) analyses how 
statutory social work in England has adapted to the ‘demands for accountability 
and transparency’ (p. 1075) that has accompanied the increasing influence of 
neoliberalism and managerialism in public service provision since the late 1970s 
(see Section 2.1.2). She reports on a growing research trend at that time, which 
highlighted that, on the one hand, social workers were afforded a high level of 
structural discretion in all aspects of their work (Parsloe and Stevenson, 1978; 
DHSS, 1981, cited in Munro, 2004); and yet, on the other, that they were unable to 
articulate the specifics of their practice (Goldberg and Warburton, 1979, cited in 
Munro, 2004).  
She charts how, by way of response, the Conservative Government of the era 
issued a raft of new legislation and non-statutory, but influential, practice guidance 
aimed at increasing control over street-level social workers and ‘reducing the scope 
for professional discretion’ (Munro, 2004: 1085). The implication is that this was to 
be achieved by increasing government directed prescription and thus reducing 
formally recognised (de jure) discretionary space – a trend that, Munro (2009) 
contends, has been continued by successive governments since this time.  
Indeed, Munro sets out how specific ‘mechanisms of control’ (2009: 1020) have 
been increasingly introduced in the form of targeted prescription and audit, 
including published objectives for practice; performance indicators; and standards 
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of performance (Munro, 2004). She reflects on how, in this context, social workers 
have become subject to a more punitive approach to the inspection of their 
practice, with inspectors given powers to ‘name and shame’ social work 
departments judged to be ‘under-performing’, which has in turn been used by 
national government to justify the withdrawal of funding and the outsourcing of 
services (Munro, 2004: 1096). 
As a consequence, Munro (2004) outlines that audit indicators have become 
strongly associated with risk, and indeed, the concept of ‘risk to the agency’ has 
emerged along with an augmentation of efforts by employers to protect the agency 
(p. 1096). This, she argues, can be seen, at the local level, in the increasing 
‘protocolization’ of practice – the process of introducing procedures and rules to 
direct social workers – and in the adoption of more explicit policies of ‘compliance’ 
(p. 1096). 
In this context Munro (2004) purports an active reduction in formally granted 
discretionary space at a local, as well as a national level – a strategy which, she 
considers, employers have come to view as beneficial in affording them a degree of 
protection from potential blame. (Significant here is Evans’ [2016] observation of 
the advantages of informally granted space.) 
The second article, entitled ‘Improving Practice: Child Protection as a Systems 
Approach’, was published a year later. Within it, Munro (2005) considers previous 
responses to practitioner error linked to child death, arguing that improvements to 
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the child protection system should be made through a ‘system-focussed approach 
to investigating [these] errors’ (p. 1).  
Citing her previous research (see Munro, 1996; 1999) she asserts that typically, 
child death inquiries have ceased their investigative element at the point of 
identifying human error – tending to attribute causation to the practitioner, who 
has either ‘not compl[ied] with procedures’ or ‘lapsed from accepted standards of 
good practice’ (Munro, 2005: 5). This is attributable to the importance society has 
come to place on the safety and welfare of children, and the potent reaction – 
dating back to the case of Maria Colwell (Munro, 2009) – that arises when a child is 
killed or suffers serious harm (Munro 2005).   
In this context, Munro (2005) points to what she believes is now an inherent need 
to find someone to blame when society is shocked by the circumstances of child 
death, as this serves to ease the sense of societal guilt that manifests from the 
reported circumstances of such an incident. Indeed, she reflects that most often the 
actual culprit – usually the parent – does not satisfy this ‘urge’, and as such, society 
has typically sought to blame practitioners (including, and especially, social 
workers) with assertions that they have failed in their duty to protect the child (p. 
6). 
Accordingly, the ‘traditional solutions’ (Munro, 2005: 13) to emerge from child 
death inquiries have included: the punishment of the identified ‘culprits’ (namely 
the agency and associated practitioners) as an example to others – exacerbating 
notions of ‘risk to the agency’(Munro, 2005); the minimisation of (formally granted) 
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discretionary space through the automatization,  formulisation, and protocolization 
of practice; and the boosting of managerial surveillance to ensure social worker 
compliance with prescription.  
Citing a then contemporaneous example – the public inquiry into the death of 
Victoria Climbié – Munro refers to the chair’s recommendations (see Laming, 2003) 
which, in her mind, were essentially ‘more blame, more procedures and more 
monitoring’ [original emphasis] (Munro, 2005: 13). 
Finally, in her article entitled ‘Managing Societal and Institutional Risk in Child 
Protection’ published a year before the start of her formal review, Munro (2009) 
summarises the arguments put forward in her previous two papers. She aligns 
society’s increased demand for transparency and accountability; its preoccupation 
with managing risk; the importance it places on children’s welfare; and the impact 
of child death inquiries, ‘traditional solutions’, with the reduction of ‘professional 
discretion’ in child protection social work.  
In her later review, Munro describes these as ‘four driving forces’ of change (Munro 
2011b: 14). Here however, she explicitly sets out her understanding for how they 
have collectively served to reduce (formally granted) discretionary space at both a 
national and local level; but also, how social workers have become less inclined 
towards employing their discretion due to, what she assesses to be, a blame culture 
that has developed within and around the system of statutory child protection. She 
argues that within this context 
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it looks a far safer option to follow rules and procedures at all 
times, even if one’s experience suggests it is not in a particular 
child’s interests (Munro 2009: 1022). 
This summarises Munro’s overall position. She believes that a more effective child 
protection system is one in which social worker discretion is both possible and 
valued (Munro, 2004; 2005; 2009). However, she describes a system that exists in a 
managerialist and risk averse culture concerned with transparency and 
accountability, and in avoiding blame to the organisation, the manager and the 
practitioner. In this context, Munro purports that social worker discretion has been 
‘eroded’ and consequently the system is failing in 
its aim of being a personal social service, perceiving and 
responding to the individual needs and circumstances of the users 
(Munro, 2004: 1101).  
2.6.3 A reflective critique: The importance of additional enquiry  
There are three pertinent reflections that can be made in respect to the existing 
child protection literature. The first is in the difficulties posed by the absence 
(including in Munro’s formal review reports) of any definition of the term 
‘discretion’.  
As noted above, a failure to ground discussions about discretion in some formal 
definition or understanding of the complexities and nuances of the term can be 
construed as problematic given the concept’s chameleon-like nature and its 
propensity to mean different things in different contexts (Evans, 2010). 
Indeed, in analysing these texts, I have benefitted from my prior knowledge of the 
different manifestations of the term ‘discretion’. This certainly facilitated my 
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identification of those rather more implicit assertions that emerge from the 
respective discussions.  However, other readers might not share this privilege, and 
thus, there is potential that they will form different conclusions from reading these 
texts. 
The implication is that future research into the child protection social worker’s 
discretion should explicitly locate its focus for enquiry and discussion in some 
formal nuanced understanding, especially differentiating between discretion in a 
structural and discretion in the epistemic sense. 
Relatedly, a second reflection can be made in respect to the general failure to 
engage with the wider social work literature, and especially the implications for 
enquiry and discussion that emerge within. For example, there is no explicit 
consideration within this cohort of texts of the different manifestations of 
managerialism (see Section 2.1.4) despite it being the basis of much discussion and 
analysis. Indeed, the authors continue to discuss discretion in the binary sense, 
ostensibly overlooking assertions that discretion is better conceived as degrees of 
freedom that change according to the social work context and task (Baldwin, 2000).  
Furthermore, the authors do not explicitly differentiate between those 
discretionary spaces which are formally (de jure) or informally (entrepreneurial) 
granted, and those which occur due to circumstance (de facto) (Evans, 2010; Evans, 
2016). There is also minimal commentary or analysis of how discretionary space is 
affected by the political and human tensions inherent within public service 
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provision (Lipsky, 2010); or indeed those relationships between, and the 
expectations, motivations and values of, the different actors involved (Evans, 2010).  
In addition, whilst implicit in these accounts, none of the authors formally 
acknowledge the role of the social worker’s sense of agency and their power to 
choose whether (Evans, 2010) and indeed how (Ellis, 2011), to employ discretion in 
different contexts. The general implication is thus the need to further explore the 
discretionary space of the contemporary child protection social worker, whilst 
better engaging with the empirical framework developed in the context of the 
wider social work literature. 
Finally, and perhaps most compellingly, as a point of reflection in the context of my 
research focus, is the absence of any literature, specifically concerned with social 
worker discretion, that is positioned as a follow-up to the Munro Review of Child 
Protection. 
In conclusion, it is in these three reflections that I set out the value and contribution 
to knowledge of my own study. 
In the next chapter I will outline the specifics of my research methodology. 
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CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the chosen research methodology for this study. The 
discussion is organised under six headings: 
• Research question(s) and aims;  
• Critical realist ethnography;  
• The research setting;  
• Access;  
• Locating myself within the research setting;  
• Ethics; and 
• A retroductive model of data collection and analysis. 
The chapter serves as a bridge between my review of the existing social work 
literature (Chapter 2) and the three results chapters (4, 5 and 6) that follow. 
3.1 Research question(s) and aims 
I have sought through this study to offer a contemporary account of the degree to 
which statutory child protection social workers are exercising their discretion in 
their practice decision-making/action-taking. Indeed, the research question 
underpinning this study is: 
To what extent are frontline statutory social workers employing their 
discretion in the post-Munro Review world of child protection? 
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This question was informed by my review of the ‘Munro Review’ reports and the 
wider social work literature (see Chapters 1 and 2), where I noted that, specific to 
the area of child protection, theorists have repeatedly failed to ground discussions 
about discretion in some formal definition of the term (thereby reducing the 
efficacy of their conclusions – Smith, 1981). Further, that they have not 
satisfactorily engaged with findings from adult service research, particularly those 
which assert that discretionary space is not binary but can be differentiated into 
different ‘types’, and that social workers are able to choose whether or not they 
employ discretion when encountering a discretionary space.   
These, along with my critical realist positioning (see Section 3.2), meant that I 
approached this study with five specific research aims: 
• To understand how child protection social workers construe notions of 
‘discretion’ and ‘discretionary space’, and to incorporate these 
understandings into my study; 
• To explore the extent to which contemporary child protection social 
workers experience discretionary space within their practice, and 
whether we can differentiate between the types of space encountered; 
• To explore whether on encountering a discretionary space, those social 
workers will choose to employ discretion; 
• To form an understanding of why social worker discretionary space and 
choice is manifesting thus; and, on this basis 
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• To comment on the degree that this element of Munro’s image for a 
more ‘child-centred’ system has been realised. 
In Chapters 4 -7 I present and discuss the research findings specific to these aims, 
and in so doing, address four supplementary research questions derived from them: 
1. Where do social workers encounter discretionary space? (Chapter 
4); 
2. When do social workers choose discretion? (Chapter 5); 
3. How are systemic factors impacting on social worker discretion? 
(Chapter 6); and 
4. What conclusions can be made about the realisation of Munro’s more 
‘child-centred’ system?  (Chapter 7). 
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I will identify the steps taken to address 
these research questions and thus, to achieve my research aims. 
3.2 Critical realist ethnography 
The methodological framework for this research has been that of critical realist 
ethnography. This section looks to explain this choice of framework by considering 
the principles underlying critical realist research and the characteristics of 
ethnography. 
3.2.1 Principles underlying critical realist research 
Critical realism is associated with the work of Roy Bhaskar (1978; 1986; 1989; 1991; 
1998; 2008; 2014). Ontologically speaking, it assumes a realist stance (there is a real 
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world which exists independently of our thoughts, viewpoints, and constructions), 
whereas epistemologically it favours a constructivist or relativist stance (how we 
understand this world is constructed from our own perspectives and standpoint) 
(Bhaskar, 1998; 2014).  
Methodologically, there are four principles which warrant consideration: that 
reality is a ‘stratified, open system of emergent entities’ (O’ Mahoney and Vincent, 
2014: 6); that there is emphasis on ‘causality’ and on forming an understanding of 
generative ‘tendencies’ amongst human populations (Houston, 2001: 851); that in 
identifying generative tendencies, there is an onus on challenging that which might 
be conceived as oppressive social structures (Houston, 2010); and, that abductive 
and retroductive reasoning underpin critical realist enquiry (Olson, 2007; 2009). I 
will consider the implications of the first three of these here (the latter is 
considered in the context of the research design in Section 3.7).  
Critical realist research seeks to move beyond notions of reality as recordable 
events, as with positivistic positions, or that reality can be collapsed into discourse, 
as with constructionism (O’Mahoney, and Vincent, 2014). It instead asserts that 
reality is best conceived as ‘stratified’ – that is, existing at different levels (see 
Bhaskar, 1998). Indeed, critical realists hold that the social world can be 
differentiated into three levels: the empirical – consisting of experienced events; 
the actual – consisting of all events, whether experienced or not; and the real – 
which consists of causal structures which generate the actual world together with 
the empirical (see Bhaskar, 1998; Houston, 2001; O’Mahoney, and Vincent, 2014). 
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The onus on the critical realist researcher is to engage in a depth of exploration, 
considering all three levels of reality, and in so doing, to move beyond descriptive 
accounts of what a social phenomenon is, to explanatory accounts of how and why 
that phenomenon manifests as it does (Watson, 2012; Bhaskar, 2014). 
On this basis, ‘causality’ is a central notion within critical realist enquiry (Bhaskar, 
2014). It is discussed in terms of ‘mechanisms’, which are understood as causal or 
generative structures and processes within the social world (Bhaskar, 1998). These 
mechanisms are believed to inform human agency and the social relations that this 
agency then reproduces (Reed, 2005).  
Causality acknowledges the capabilities of these mechanisms to produce 
regularities in the social world (Bhaskar, 1998). However, critical realists also 
recognise the ‘multiplicity’ (Bhaskar, 1978) and ‘indeterminacy’ of causal powers 
(Rees and Gatenby, 2014: 137); asserting both that there may be more than one 
cause, and that generative mechanisms can manifest differently – explaining 
therefore, why the influence on human agency may vary between individuals and 
groups (O’Mahoney and Vincent, 2014).  On this basis, critical realist research does 
not promote a hard determinism (as with positivist or empiricist models), but 
instead, places an emphasis on a researcher identifying the 'tendencies' which 
causal mechanisms are understood to create (Houston, 2010). 
This provides critical realist research with its emancipatory element (Bhaskar, 
1998); that is to say that it enables researchers, not only to identify, but to 
challenge those which might be conceived as oppressive social structures and 
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processes underpinning social phenomena (Bhaskar, 2014). This is something which 
makes critical realist research particularly suitable to social work (Houston, 2001; 
2010), and is an important consideration in the context of my research aims. 
Specifically, I believe that to robustly answer the overarching research question 
there is a need for me not only to identify and understand where discretionary 
space exists and when (and when not) it is used, but why this is the case. This 
compliments that which Munro advocates in her review of the child protection 
system; namely, that researchers should not be satisfied with descriptive accounts 
of the system, but should seek to understand and explain why the system is 
functioning as it is – with a particular emphasis on identifying and challenging any 
systemic factors which might be inhibiting ‘child-centred’ practice (Munro, 2011b). 
3.2.2 Characteristics of ethnography 
The second part of my methodological framework pertains to ethnography. 
Ethnography is the study of people in naturally occurring settings 
or ‘fields’ by methods of data collection which capture their social 
meanings and ordinary activities, involving the researcher 
participating directly in the setting, if not also the activities, in 
order to collect data in a systematic manner (Brewer, 2000: 6). 
In this sense an ‘ethnographer’  
participat[es]… in people 's daily lives… watching what happens, 
listening to what is said, asking questions – in fact, collecting 
whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are 
the focus of the research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 3). 
Indeed, ethnographic work usually entails the following features: 
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• People’s behaviour and discussions are studied in their everyday 
contexts, as opposed to conditions which have been created by the 
researcher; 
• Data is gathered from a range of sources, including documentary 
analysis, but also through observation and engagement in informal 
conversations; 
• The focus is usually small-scale, for example, a single setting or small 
group of people; thereby facilitating in-depth enquiry; 
• The analysis of the data involves interpretation of the meanings, roles 
and results of institutional practices and human actions, and the 
implications of these in a local but possibly also a wider context; and 
• The end result is, for the most part, verbal description, explanation 
and theories with quantification assuming a subordinate role 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 3). 
In justifying my selection of ethnography, it is prudent to note that in approaching 
this study, I considered that as a child protection social worker, practising amongst 
other child protection social workers, my preferred research participants would be 
my colleagues. Largely, this was because I believed that my status as an ‘insider’ 
(see Section 3.5) and the pre-existing relationships which it afforded me, would 
enable easier access to an appropriate research setting and sample of participants – 
something which can be otherwise difficult to achieve when the subject is a 
functioning, and often busy, statutory social work team (see Pepper, 2016).   
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Therefore, I required a methodological approach that would allow me to remain in 
my work setting, whilst assuming an additional role of ‘researcher’; studying my 
colleagues in their ‘natural setting’; and exploring with them their discretionary 
space and choice. I considered that ethnography offered me a suitable framework, 
agreeing with Leigh’s (2013) observation that: 
As a practising social worker… ethnography seemed not only 
natural but also appropriate… enable[ing] me to unravel and 
critically analyse a setting which I was already a part of (p. 83).  
Further, ethnography is well suited to those research methods that I, as a social 
worker, had extensive experience of – for example, observation, documentary 
analysis and interview (Brewer, 2000; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; and 
Bryman, 2012). 
However, perhaps most importantly, I conceived ethnography as an ideal medium 
for exploring the nature of a phenomenon (Rees and Gatenby, 2014) as it enables 
in-depth exploration of the socio-cultural contexts, structures, processes, and 
meanings within a given cultural system (Whitehead, 2005; Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007), and allows researchers to postulate as to causes of human 
behaviour (Watson, 2012; Sharp, 2018). 
Indeed, notwithstanding the critique of ethnography – for example, that it can be 
time-consuming; can create issues of personal safety for a researcher; and (without 
reflexivity) it can lead to accounts from research participants that are dishonest and 
inaccurate (see Brewer, 2000; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Bryman, 2012) – I 
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was confident that ethnography offered an ideal framework for achieving my 
research aims. 
3.3 The research setting 
This section details the specifics of the research setting, including: its geography 
and demographic; the constitution of its Children’s Services Department; and the 
make-up of the sample cohort of participants. 
So as to maintain confidentiality, I refer to the setting using the pseudonym 
‘Marketon’.  
3.3.1 About ‘Marketon’ 
Located in the North of England, Marketon comprises small towns situated across 
mainly rural terrain. It serves a population of approximately 200,000 of whom close 
to 50,000 are children. Key demographic information obtained from the Office of 
National Statistics indicates that at the point of the last UK census:  
• Approximately 90% of Marketon’s population were born in the UK – with 
the next largest groups originating from Pakistan (3%); Bangladesh (2%); and 
the Republic of Ireland (1%);  
• Approximately 90% considered themselves to be ‘White’; 7% ‘Asian’; 4% 
‘Mixed [heritage]’ and 1% ‘Black’; and 
• Twenty percent reported that they had ‘no religion’, as opposed to 67% 
identifying as ‘Christen’; 7% ‘Muslim’; and 6% ‘Jewish’. 
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Furthermore, approximately 75% of all householders within Marketon owned their 
own home (significantly higher than the national average); and of those of ‘working 
age’ (16 to 74 years) approximately 42% were economically active (higher than the 
national average) and approximately 30% had no academic qualifications (similar to 
the national average). 
Politically speaking, Marketon has traditionally been a Labour Party controlled 
council. Indeed, after the Local Election of May 2018, the Council remained in 
Labour control, with both Members of Parliament also elected from the Labour 
Party. 
3.3.2 Locating the Child Protection Team (CPT)  
Marketon’s current Children’s Services Department (CSD) was established in April 
2005 as part of the local authority’s response to the Children Act 2004. It combined 
the former Department of Education and Culture, the Youth Offending Team and of 
course, the Children's Social Care division of Social Services, whilst also creating 
links with children's healthcare staff from the local Primary Care Trust.  
The CSD is responsible for coordinating services for children, young people and 
their families. It provides a variety of services, from universal services (such as 
education); to targeted services (such as early help provision); and specialist 
services (such as children's social work/social care services). It is composed of five 
‘divisions’: three concerned with the logistical management of the department 
(‘Commissioning’; ‘Human Resources’; and ‘Finance’), and two comprising the 
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services provided to children and their families (‘Learning and Culture’ – including 
all education services; and ‘Social Care and Safeguarding’).  
The Child Protection Team (CPT) comes under the auspices of ‘Social Care and 
Safeguarding’, which is headed by one of only two ‘Assistant Directors’, and 
comprises thirteen social work and social care teams (ranging in staff size from 6 to 
32), organised into three domains (‘Early Help’; ‘Safeguarding’; and ‘Care Services’) 
– each overseen by a ‘Strategic Lead’. The CPT is situated in the domain of 
‘Safeguarding’ (see Figure 2, below). 
3.3.3 Responsibilities of the CPT 
In understanding the responsibilities of the CPT, it is helpful to consider its 
positioning in the Social Care and Safeguarding Division, and on this basis, I refer to 
Figure 3 (below) which has been adapted from a training document given to all of 
Marketon’s new childcare social workers. It depicts, from the point of referral, that 
which might be conceived as a ‘typical journey’ of a child through the Social Care 
and Safeguarding Division. Whilst the figure conceives this ‘journey’ as linear – 
which was often not the case (and is a point of emphasis within the Munro Review) 
– the figure helpfully summarises the pathway in which cases would move into, and 
out of, the responsibility of the CPT. 
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Indeed, there were two routes with which a child’s case was referred to the CPT. 
The first was directly from the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (‘MASH’), where 
after reviewing a new referral, the ‘MASH’ social worker decided that the case 
required the oversight of the CPT. However, this route was rarely utilised, and 
tended to be limited to those cases which had been previously held by the CPT, only 
to be closed and rereferred a short time later.  
Most often, a case transferred to the CPT from the ‘Assessment Team’, whose remit 
was to conduct a ‘Children and Family’ Assessment (conceived elsewhere as the 
‘Single Assessment’) so as to determine the level (if any) of social work intervention 
required. 
In completing this assessment, four options were available to the assessing social 
worker: 
• To decide that threshold was not met for social work intervention, but that 
support should continue to be provided by universal service provision 
(‘Other’) under the premise of ‘Team Around the Child’ (see Children’s 
Workforce Development Council, 2009); 
• To decide that a child met the criteria for ‘child in need’ (as defined in 
Section 17 of the Children Act, 1989) and therefore should be provided with 
ongoing social work services under the auspices of a child in need plan (see 
HM Government, 2018: 37); 
• To decide that the threshold for a likelihood of ‘significant harm’ (as 
outlined within Section 47 of the Children Act, 1989) had been met, and that 
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the child should therefore be provided with ongoing social work services 
under the auspices of a child protection plan (see HM Government, 2018: 
49); or 
• To decide that that the threshold for a likelihood of ‘significant harm’ had 
been met, and that the welfare of the child required immediate oversight by 
the Family Court under the auspices of child care proceedings (Section 31 of 
the Children Act, 1989) (see Department for Education, 2014). 
If the outcome decision constituted any of the latter three options, then the case 
was transferred to the CPT for oversight and management by a child protection 
social worker. The CPT would only relinquish a case at the conclusion of the child in 
need plan; the child protection plan; or the child care proceedings – at which time 
responsibility would pass either to universal service provision (for example, health 
and education professionals) or one of the CSD ‘permanency’ teams (for example, 
‘LAC’, Fostering or Adoption – see Figure 3). 
3.3.4 The sample cohort  
My sampling approach within the study assumed a mixture of ‘purposive’, 
‘convenience’ and ‘criterion’ techniques (Bryman, 2012: 418-419): ‘purposive’ in 
that I chose to focus on the CPT over other social work teams, specifically because 
the remit of the team – the implementation of child protection statutory guidance 
and legislation – made it the most pertinent focus for achieving my research aims. 
‘Convenience’ sampling, in that I utilised the social work team that was most readily 
available to me – it was the team on which I was employed (see Section 3.5.2); and 
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‘criterion’, in that I only included within the sample, those members of the CPT who 
I judged as offering me the best source of data relative to my research questions 
(see below).  
However, one of the challenges posed by the research was of the evolving nature of 
the CPT from the point that my research proposal was accepted (in 2012) through 
to the conclusion of the data collection (in 2016). This meant that the make-up of 
the team and the cohort of potential participants available to me changed 
repeatedly during the course of the study. 
For example, in May 2012, the CPT comprised three teams totalling 33 staff, with 18 
social workers. However, by May 2016, it comprised four teams, 44 staff and 25 
social workers. The reasoning for this expansion was ostensibly in response to the 
‘increasing demand’ being placed on Marketon’s CSD during this time (see Section 
6.1.1). However, the CPT also assumed different iterations after an Ofsted 
inspection labelled it as meeting only ‘minimum requirements’ in its ‘overall [child 
protection] effectiveness’; and then following the appointment of a new Assistant 
Director of Children’s Services (ADCS) who cited a further need for reorganisation 
‘in preparation for [the next] Ofsted inspection’. (For further discussion of Ofsted 
inspection as a mechanism underpinning discretionary space and choice see Section 
6.2.) 
Indeed, between May 2012 and May 2016, 112 individuals were employed on 
Marketon’s CPT, with a staff-turnover rate of more than 85%. However, I was 
fortunate that during the period of formal data collection (December 2014 – May 
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2016) the CPT experienced a period of relative stability, with a consistent 
management team, and a reduction in staff turnover rate to 45% – of the 20 social 
workers employed on the CPT in December 2014, 9 had remained in March 2016 
(when the research interviews were initiated). 
To be included within the research, staff had to satisfy two criteria: to be employed 
on the CPT as either a social worker or team manager (excluding therefore, the 
family support workers, psychologist and administrative staff); and to have worked 
in this capacity for a period of at least 6 months – my rationale being that a 
different role, or less experience, could restrict a prospective participant’s ability to 
comment on the issues that were the focus of this study. Every member of staff 
who met these criteria were invited to participate within the study. 
In total, 25 different CPT staff – comprising of 21 social workers and 4 team 
managers – participated in the focus groups; questionnaire and interviews. Whilst 
the team managers only participated within the focus group (see Section 3.7.2), 6 of 
the 21 social workers participated in two stages (for example, the focus group and 
questionnaire), but none in three stages. (For an account of the demographic 
information pertaining to these participants see Appendix 2.) 
3.4 Access 
Whilst an option available to me at the outset of this study, was to seek out a 
different research setting to that of my employer, this seemed illogical, given that 
to do so would likely prohibit me carrying out an ethnography – I simply did not 
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have the available time between work, study and family commitments to immerse 
myself within another setting.  
Besides, I considered myself fortunate to already have a ready ‘access’ to a group of 
prospective research participants, something which I knew other researchers had 
struggled to achieve (for example, Pithouse, 1998 and Pepper, 2016). However, I 
still required formal ‘permission’, not only to gain access to the CPT staff, but also 
the documents and data that would enable a ‘rich’ account of social worker 
discretionary space and choice, and an understanding of the mechanisms 
underpinning these. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) observe that: 
In formal organizations... initial access negotiations may be 
focused on official permission that can legitimately be granted or 
withheld by key personnel... Knowing who has the power to open 
up or block off access, is, of course, an important aspect of 
sociological knowledge about the setting (p. 49-50). 
As an employee of Marketon’s CSD, I had a good knowledge of the organisational 
hierarchy (see Figure 2), and I understood that the ‘gatekeeper’ of the CPT was the 
Assistant Director of Children’s Services (ADCS) (see Figure 1). However, at the time 
of submitting my research proposal, I did not have the type of relationship with this 
individual that might facilitate the requisite permissions being granted – we had 
never met, nor communicated, and I reflected that there was little reason for them 
to trust me with research access.  
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Indeed, I feared that a request for access made prematurely, or in the wrong way, 
could jeopardise the research taking place at all (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), 
and thus I felt that a ‘strategic’ approach was necessary so as to optimise my 
chances of obtaining the necessary permissions (Bryman, 2012: 435).   
My ‘strategy’ was to seek out a ‘champion’ who could advocate for and present the 
research proposal on my behalf (Bryman, 2012: 435). I decided upon a former team 
manager with whom I had enjoyed a good professional relationship, and whom was 
now acting as the ‘Strategic Lead for Early Help’ (see Figure 2) – a position that 
provided her with regular opportunities to meet directly with the ADCS, and thus, a 
platform from which to pitch the merits of my proposal. I considered that the ADCS 
might be more receptive to an approach from another senior manager, than she 
would a ‘street-level’ social worker.  
I was grateful that the Strategic Lead agreed to my request. She advised me that 
the bi-monthly senior managers meeting – where the ADCS would be in attendance 
– would provide the most appropriate forum for presenting the proposal and 
offered to take it on my behalf. This tactic was successful in that following the next 
meeting, the ADCS emailed me directly to advise that the proposal had been ‘well 
received’ and invited me to meet in order to ‘answer some supplementary 
questions’.  
Others have commented upon the lack of consistent and regulated research 
governance in local authority social services departments (see for example, 
McLaughlin and Shardlow, 2009) and in particular children’s service’s departments 
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(see Boddy and Oliver, 2010), where access is often granted by senior members of 
staff who are not necessarily research literate. Ultimately, this meeting proved to 
be the limit of the governance enforced by Marketon, and I remain unaware of the 
ADCS’ ‘research literacy’ at that time. However, she did request further information 
about how I would: ‘protect the identity of [Marketon] and its staff’; ‘respond to 
any disclosures of unethical or abusive behaviour’; and ‘manage sensitive data’. 
Whilst this suggests a commitment to ethical standards on behalf of the ADCS (and I 
address each of these areas below – see Section 3.6), Hammersley and Atkinson 
(2007) observe that on occasions, such requests arise from the gatekeeper’s 
concern about ‘the picture of the organization… that the ethnographer will paint’ 
(p. 51): 
Gatekeepers usually have practical interests in seeing themselves 
and their colleagues presented in a favourable light (p. 51). 
Nevertheless, I sought to reassure the ADCS about my professional (but also 
ethical) commitment to Marketon and its staff, by providing her with a copy 
of my draft University ethics application (and later evidence that ethical 
approval had been granted – see Appendix 15).   
Further, I agreed to her request that at the conclusion of the research, I would 
provide a written report of the main findings – understanding that ‘offering 
something in return’ could help to ‘create a sense of being trustworthy’ (Bryman, 
2012: 435). Whilst such measures also risk restrictions being placed upon that 
information which is subsequently allowed to enter the public domain (Hammersley 
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and Atkinson, 2007), no such restrictions were enforced at the conclusion of this 
study. 
It is on this basis that in the Autumn of 2013, the ADCS provided me with written 
permission to access the CPT and ‘all necessary materials’ (see Appendix 14). 
3.5 Locating myself within the research setting 
Whilst there are several different definitions of ‘reflexivity’ in regard to social 
research (see Bryman, 2012; May and Perry, 2011), in respect to ethnography, the 
concept can be understood as the process of a researcher locating themselves 
within the research setting and considering how their presence there may have 
influenced how the research took place (Brewer, 2000).  
Indeed, it is through reflexivity that a researcher is able to identify challenges born 
out of their role, thus seeking to reduce their effects and in turn improve the rigour 
of the enquiry and its subsequent findings (May and Perry, 2011). 
It is in these terms that I seek to ‘locate myself’ within the research setting, 
engaging in that which Lynch (2000: 29) refers to as ‘methodological self-
consciousness’, noting that I was both ‘intimate-insider’ and ‘relative-outsider’ 
during the course of this study. In so doing I hope to highlight those challenges 
which I encountered, my response to these, and the implications for the research. 
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3.5.1 Notions of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ 
Merten (1972) identifies the insider-outsider concept as an epistemological 
principle centred on the issue of access in ethnographic research, and the 
positioning of the researcher relative to the group being studied. He explains: 
Insiders are the members of specified groups and collectivities or 
occupants of specified social statuses; outsiders are the 
nonmembers (p. 21). 
Merten (1972) argues that a researcher acquires ‘insider’ status, either because of 
their exclusive knowledge of setting and its people, or because they have a 
privileged access to the group being studied.  This contrasts with the ‘outsider’ 
researcher who assumes the role of ‘professional stranger’, detached from the 
community under investigation: 
It is the stranger… who finds what is familiar to the group 
significantly unfamiliar and so is prompted to raise questions for 
inquiry less apt to be raised at all by insiders (Merten, 1972: 31). 
In these terms, Merton (1972) conceives ‘insiderness’ and ‘outsiderness’ as a 
dichotomy: one is either ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’, as the concepts are conceived as 
'two mutually exclusive… frames of reference' (Olson, 1977: 171). However, others 
assert that whether a researcher is ‘in’ or ‘out’ is also informed by a combination 
and intersection of a number of different factors, including: their own 
characteristics; time; location; the topic of research; and the status and power 
dynamics between the researcher and researched (see Dwyer and Buckle, 2009). 
On this basis, theorists argue that it is indeed possible for a researcher to 
experience simultaneously insiderness and outsiderness relative to different groups 
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within a research setting (Deutsch, 1981) – a notion that, as I explain below, 
resonates with my experiences within this study.   
3.5.2 Myself as ‘insider’ 
My own history with Marketon and its CSD began in July 2007, when I took a 
job with its Education Welfare Service. Then, when I returned to University to 
complete my Social Work Qualifying Master’s degree in September 2008, I 
moved to a position of ‘Family Support Worker’ on Marketon’s ‘Family 
Support Team’ (which working alongside the CPT, afforded me evening and 
weekend work so as to accommodate my studies and social work 
placements).  
I began my role as a social worker on the CPT in September 2010, and thus, at 
the time that my research proposal was accepted, I had been employed 
within Marketon’s CSD for 5 years, and with the CPT for two of these. In this 
sense, I conceived myself as an ‘insider’ both because of my knowledge of the 
setting and its people, and because of my privileged access to the group being 
studied (Merten, 1972). 
There is ample discussion within the wider literature about the advantages of 
‘insider’ research (see for example, Adler and Adler, 1987; Wolcott, 1999; 
Brewer, 2000; Edwards, 2002; Hodkinson, 2005), and these are said to 
include:  
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• There being a greater familiarity between research subjects and 
researcher – engendering a sense of improved trust and comfort for 
the former and (it is argued) a greater willingness to engage in the 
research;  
• The researcher is better able to ‘blend in’ to the environment being 
studied – thus reducing the likelihood of artificial behaviour cultivated 
by their presence;  
• The researcher holds a greater knowledge of, and familiarity with, 
such things as the ‘native speak’ of the group and the meanings 
ascribed to both situational and cultural factors of the setting; and 
• The researcher is afforded access to a wider range of data source (see 
Hammersely and Atkinson, 2007; Brewer, 2000; Labaree, 2002). 
I believe such advantages were born out within this study. For example, as a 
member of the CPT, I was party to the ‘inside’ communications (including emails 
and memos) between members of the team and team managers, senior managers 
and other social work teams; I understood the meanings assigned to the everyday 
jargon employed within the discourse of the CPT (for example, I could easily 
differentiate between an ‘IRO’; ‘PPO’; ‘ICO’ and ‘SGO’ – see Appendix 19); I did not 
require special arrangements in order to gain physical access to the setting, but 
instead simply arrived, used my own key-card and sat at my own work desk; and 
lastly, in that my colleagues knew me, certainly professionally, but also to a large 
extent on a personal level.  
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Indeed, at the time of starting the formal data collection (in December 2014), I had 
worked on the CPT for 4.5 years and had known several of the staff for an even 
longer period than this (due in part to my time with the Family Support Team). In 
this respect I considered myself more than employee of Marketon and colleague to 
members of the CPT, but as a ‘friend’ to several of the participants within this study 
– indeed, outside of work I had, for a number of years, attended the weddings, 
christenings, funerals and birthday parties of members of the CPT and their 
families. 
3.5.3 Challenges of being the ‘intimate insider’ 
Whilst pre-existing relationships between researcher and researched are not 
uncommon in ethnography, friendships with colleagues in a workplace setting are 
characteristic of a type of insiderness, which Taylor (2011) identifies as the 
‘intimate-insider’: 
The ‘intimate insider’… researcher is working, at the deepest 
level, within their own ‘backyard’… where the researcher’s 
personal relationships are deeply embedded… where the 
researcher has been and remains a key social actor… and where 
the researcher is privy to undocumented historical knowledge of 
the people… being studied (p. 9).  
Whilst Labaree (2002) identifies specific challenges of ‘insiderness’ pertaining to 
entering the field; positioning and disclosure within the field; and those which arise 
from shared and significant relationships with research participants, Taylor (2011) 
considers that these are accentuated for the intimate insider as they manoeuvre 
and negotiate a new role within an ‘intimately’ familiar environment. 
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Such sentiments resonate with me. For example, whilst ‘entering the field’ I did not 
have to contend with being a new and unfamiliar face and the associated obstacles 
that this can create (see Pepper, 2016), a difficulty that I had was how I 
communicated to my colleagues that I would be assuming an additional role within 
the CPT (that of researcher); what that would entail; and the positioning that I 
would adopt relative to the group.  
‘Researcher… does that mean that you will be experimenting on us?’ a colleague 
asked, as I broached the subject within a team meeting. ‘No’ I replied, ‘more that I 
will be observing what is said, decisions actions… that sort of thing’ (Discussion with 
Social Worker – CPT meeting, November 2014). Following the exchange of (what I 
perceived to be) nervous glances, I explained the ethical implications of my dual 
role, including the group’s rights as participants; my ethical responsibilities to them; 
and the precautions that I would take in ensuring their welfare was protected (see 
Sections 3.6.1-3.6.4). However, I still sensed that there was an underlying 
uneasiness that a colleague (even one, who for many was considered a ‘friend’) 
would be observing and recording the interactions of the group.   
Of course, one of the advantages of the insider role is that the researcher immerses 
themselves within the group of study, giving them a better vantage point from 
which to explore the social phenomenon (Brewer, 2000). This was easy for me in 
the sense that I sat at my same desk and – for large parts of the study – continued 
the same tasks that were afforded to me as a social worker of the CPT (for example, 
supporting colleagues on visits; taking my turn on the ‘duty rota’ etc). The problem I 
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encountered however, was that there was no clear distinction between me as 
‘worker’ and me as ‘researcher’, which created a number of difficulties, both for 
myself and, I believe, the participants. 
For example, like Leigh (2013), I sometimes found myself so consumed by my work 
commitments and the various child protection tasks that entailed, that I missed 
opportunities to make a note of a pertinent interaction or event in my observation 
diary. Whilst White (1997) asserts that it is unlikely that any ethnographer who 
wears the ‘two hats’ of researcher and worker is immune from such omissions, it is 
nevertheless disappointing, in the context of striving to provide a ‘rich’ account of 
the social workers’ interactions. 
However, for my colleagues the dual-role was ostensibly even more problematic 
and there were repeated occasions in which they would admittedly ‘forget’ that I 
was also a researcher, and would share something, only to realise at the point that I 
reached for my observation diary, and request ‘please don’t record that… it’s off 
the record’.  
On these occasions, I invariably complied with the request in the interests of 
‘informed consent’ (see Section 3.6.1), but was again often frustrated by the 
omission, on the basis that it impacted upon the ‘richness’ of data collected. 
There were also those occasions in which participants shared a particular account, 
only for me to agonise over whether to include it, on the basis that the disclosure 
held information so personal to that individual, that it risked them being identified. 
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One example of this, was of a colleague, who in her accounts of discretionary 
behaviour, made links to her childhood experiences of domestic abuse and 
substance misuse. On occasions such as this, it was I who would explicitly ask 
‘would you mind if I include that within my research?’ Whilst I believe that this was 
a necessary ethical safeguard, it meant that at these times, my researcher status 
intruded into those moments which until that point, had entailed naturally 
occurring conversations, only for them to instantly feel rather ‘unnatural’ (see 
Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). 
Indeed, I believe it was the intimacy of the relationship which afforded such 
detailed and personal disclosures as the one above. The challenge that I 
experienced was when these disclosures occurred away from the formal research 
setting, but in more social contexts where something would be said that I judged to 
be particularly pertinent to the research, and I would be duty bound to ask, ‘would 
you mind if I include that…’.  
Two such occasions standout. Both were social functions in the form of a ‘leaving 
meal’, and both involved colleagues sharing their frustrations of work. In each, the 
social workers became visibly irritated by my request to include their account in the 
research, especially when they realised that I had brought my observation diary 
with me – ‘you take that bloody thing everywhere’ one exclaimed. 
It was on the second of these occasions that I reconciled that my presence at these 
social functions caused a particular ethical tension: these were places and occasions 
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that my colleagues constructed as ‘away from work’, where they could relax and 
talk freely, only to again be confronted by the spectre of the researcher.  
Thus, I took the decision early on in the research to stop attending those social 
functions, realising that whilst this was often a context which served as a source of 
‘rich’ data – and was arguably an extension of the research setting in the context of 
ethnography (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007) – there was something intrusive 
about my presence there. It was important, I decided for my relationship with my 
colleagues and participants – especially in the interests of maintaining their consent 
to engage in the research – that I enforced a degree of self-control and thus 
distance when away from work. This I considered would reduce any concern 
amongst the participants that, even in their free time, they were under surveillance. 
The cost however, was not only that I missed events which could offer a source of 
valuable data, but that it impacted upon my personal relationships with colleagues, 
as on these occasions I chose my position as ‘researcher’ over ‘friend’ – something 
which I believe contributed to my transition from ‘intimate-insider’ to the ‘relative-
outsider’ (see Section 3.5.5). 
3.5.4 Simultaneously ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ 
In her account of the challenges of undertaking an ethnography as ‘intimate-
insider’, Leigh (2013) recounts how she adopted different behaviours so as to 
distinguish herself as researcher:  
I had always felt comfortable to join in with office banter as well 
as… any general gossip. But in my new role, I wanted my 
colleagues and managers to see me differently; someone that 
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they would feel able to confide in and whom they could trust… 
This new persona brought a new meaning to the notion of 
‘impression management’… and I often found myself remaining 
silent during informal discussions, wondering if anyone had 
noticed I was saying nothing at all (p. 111). 
At the point of starting my own data collection, not only did I stop attending those 
aforementioned social functions, but, like Leigh, I also made a decisive commitment 
not to engage in many of the usual office interactions which, until that time, had 
been characteristic of my identity within the CPT.  My justification for this was of 
course related to my researcher status, but not so much because I wanted my 
colleagues to see me differently (although I accept that this was perhaps an 
understandable ‘ripple effect’ of this decision), but because I considered that these 
moments offered the potential for what Leigh (2013) describes as those ‘golden 
nugget’ disclosures (p. 121), and therefore required me to assume a more distant 
and objective position. 
In her own ethnographic account of ‘espionage and encounters’, White (1997) 
describes feeling like a ‘spy in the camp’ as she listened to work colleagues ‘juicy 
exchanges’: 
keeping one's opinions to oneself in order not to disrupt a 
particularly interesting piece of dialogue (p. 330). 
This also resonates with my own experience, as often I chose to remain silent, 
observe, and listen to the interactions of social workers within the CPT office, rather 
than offer anything which might ‘disrupt’ their interactions. However, unlike Leigh 
(2013), I did not have to wonder whether my colleagues had noticed the change in 
my ‘persona’, as early in the data collection they began making remarks like ‘you 
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are much quieter than you used to be…’.  ‘I’m just listening’ I would tell them –
triggering signs of discomfiture amongst my colleagues (including, grimaced facial 
expressions and raised eyebrows). 
White (1997) concedes that it was not only her that conceived herself as ‘spy’, but 
also the social worker participants within her study, who, suspicious of her 
connections with departmental management, theorised that her motives, rather 
than ‘research’, were actually to discretely evaluate work performance. Bryman 
(2012) asserts that such occurrences are not unusual in ethnography: 
People will have suspicions of you, perhaps seeing you as an 
instrument of top management (p. 439). 
White (1997) draws from these experiences to argue that insider researchers can 
nonetheless remain in specific respects, also outsiders in their own culture.  
I reference this point particularly because during the course of the data collection, 
not only did I also simultaneously experience insiderness and outsiderness relative 
to two distinct groups within the CSD, but what is more, transitioned, I believe, 
between insider and outsider, and outsider and insider, in respect to these groups. 
3.5.5 The ‘relative outsider’ 
When my research proposal was accepted in May 2012, and I first broached the 
subject of research with my employer and colleagues, I was considered a ‘level 2’ 
social worker (as opposed to ‘level 1’ – the newly qualified social worker; or ‘level 3’ 
– the senior social worker). This meant that I held a caseload, took my place on the 
‘duty rota’ and was managed directly by the CPT manager. In this sense the social 
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workers, ostensibly saw me as ‘one of us’… ‘one of the team’ – despite my 
researcher status and, for some, trepidations about being ‘research participants’ 
(see Section 3.5.3).  
However, as a social worker I was not, I believe, considered an ‘insider’ in respect to 
the management and other senior members of staff within the CSD. This was 
especially pressed home when I attempted to access other sources of data to help 
me better understand some of the issues which were emerging from the social 
workers’ accounts. For example, on requesting the data on the number of child 
protection plans discontinued by the CSD between two points in time, the keeper of 
this information did not respond to my email, but instead himself emailed the 
ADCS, asking whether ‘as a social worker… does Ciaran really need access to this?’  
Even after the ADCS had copied me into her response, in which she gave me explicit 
consent to have access to the data, the keeper still did not forward me the material, 
but instead claimed to have ‘forgotten’ when I later telephoned him to ask for it.  
After a number of similar incidents, involving different individuals and information, I 
reconciled that such data (despite some of it later existing in the public domain) 
was considered ‘privileged’ to a select group of senior staff within the CSD. ‘As a 
social worker’, I would not ordinarily be one of these privileged few. However, this 
was to change as I would ascend the departmental hierarchy. 
Indeed, by the point of starting the formal research interviews in March 2016, I had 
been promoted three times and was serving as the CPT’s (and CSD’s) only 
‘Consultant Social Worker’. This meant that I no longer held a caseload, nor did I 
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take a share of the CPT duty rota. Instead, my position hierarchically was aligned to 
the CPT manager and entailed a number of management and strategic 
responsibilities, including being the keeper of some of that very data, which I had 
previously struggled to gain access to.  
What is more, my own line manager was now the Strategic Lead for Safeguarding 
(see Figure 2), but I also had recourse, in a number of my activities, to report 
directly to the ADCS. Thus, I considered myself ‘on the inside’ of this select group of 
‘senior staff’, especially as I attended a number of senior management and strategy 
forums, in which I was given access to data which I may not have otherwise known 
existed.  
However, despite my changing roles, I had, throughout the course of the data 
collection remained in situ at the same desk within the CPT, amongst several of the 
same social workers. As my role changed, so too did my experience of ‘insiderness’ 
with regards to this group. Like White (1997), I believe that several of my colleagues 
became suspicious of my role within the CPT as is born out in this exchange with a 
colleague during a car journey to a court hearing: 
You know they are now calling you ‘Agent Golden-Balls’? (Social 
Worker) 
Really? Why? (Researcher). 
Because, they think you are too close to management… they don’t 
trust you (Social Worker). 
Do you think they still see me as part of the team? (Researcher). 
They know you are… but I think they see you more as an outsider, 
relatively speaking (Social Worker).  
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(Discussion with Social Worker – Car journey, January 2016). 
This notion of me as a ‘relative-outsider’ was one that I came to share with the 
social work staff. Indeed, by early 2016, I accepted that the closeness and 
familiarity which I had once been afforded to many of the CPT social workers had 
dissipated in line with my conscious distancing (so as to establish a more objective 
research profile) and as a consequence of my progression to a more senior role.  
The transition to ‘outsider’ manifested gradually, and in a number of ways. Firstly, 
there were those subtle changes: for example, I was incrementally omitted from 
those ‘intimate’ email exchanges amongst members of the team. Further, a 
tendency developed amongst the social workers to cease their conversations the 
moment that I entered the CPT office. Sometimes I would ask, ‘what were you 
talking about’ only for the response to be vague and along the lines of ‘we were just 
catching up’ … ‘just discussing a case’. 
In spite of this, no social worker withdrew their consent to be observed as part of 
the ethnography, and I still encountered occasions in which the social workers, 
whilst seemingly immersed in a particularly challenging child protection task, would 
ostensibly forget the presence of the ‘relative-outsider’ and engage in exchanges 
that offered opportune moments for recordings in my observation diary. The 
difference was that towards the end of the study, these interactions were no longer 
aimed at, nor sought to include me, but took place around me, and despite of me; 
and to this extent I reconciled that my insider status had evolved from one that was 
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less ‘intimate’ (Taylor, 2011) to more ‘marginal’ (see Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007; Gerrish, 1997). 
3.6 Ethics 
McLaughlin and Shardlow (2009) assert that traditionally social care research in 
England has been left ‘relatively ungoverned by social work and social care delivery 
organizations’ (p.6). As I have outlined above, my experience of governance 
enforced by Marketon was limited to a requirement to seek the permission of the 
local ‘gatekeeper’, and to reassure her about issues that I felt had less to do with 
maintaining ethical standards and safeguards, but more with ensuring that 
Marketon would not be the subject of negative publicity (see Section 3.4).  
That such concerns form the limit of the governance offered by some local 
authorities can have negative implications for that research where the principal 
investigator is an employee of that authority and is not subject to more rigorous 
ethical standards and regulation (McLaughlin and Shardlow, 2009). However, 
because this research formed the basis of my PhD, it was subject to ethical scrutiny 
and governance by Manchester Metropolitan University’s Academic Ethics 
Committee.  
In this section I set out the ethical safeguards employed within this study, which 
formed the basis of ethical approval, granted by the Academic Ethics Committee 
(see Appendix 15). 
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3.6.1 Informed consent 
The University’s Academic Ethics Framework (AEF) (2018) states that ‘[p]articipants 
[should] be made fully aware of the true nature and purpose of the study, except 
where there is satisfactory justification’ [original emphasis]. Hammersley and 
Atkinson (2007) observe that some ethnographers justify the withholding of this 
information because they believe that only a ‘covert’ observation of behaviour is 
able to elucidate the full dynamics of a specific phenomenon, and by seeking 
explicit consent from participants it can affect their behaviour ‘in ways that will 
invalidate any conclusion’ (p. 211).  
Whilst I accepted that my role as ‘researcher’ placed upon me the requirement to 
obtain a full and rich account, I felt uneasy about the prospect of deceiving and 
intruding on the privacy of participants who were also colleagues and friends 
(Bryman, 2012). (I also considered that there were practical barriers to trying to 
covertly observe the behaviours of those with whom I shared an office space.)  
Indeed, I decided that only a ‘full disclosure’ approach would be in the spirit of my 
‘intimate-insider’ status (see Section 3.5.3), and I chose initially, to introduce the 
research, its aims and design, to the CPT during two team meetings in late 2012. 
Then, following formal ethical approval from the University’s Academic Ethics 
Committee in November 2014, I emailed each member of the CPT a written 
‘invitation’ to take part in the research; attaching to that email a ‘Participant 
Information Sheet’ (PIS) (see Appendix 3). 
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Within the PIS, I reminded the CPT staff of the study’s purpose and detailed what 
my ‘observation’ of the team would entail, as well as their rights as ‘participants’ – 
or ‘non-participants’ (if they chose not to consent) – and the ethical safeguards that 
would be maintained throughout. I also asked them to complete and return to me 
an electronic consent form, indicating that they had read and understood all 
aspects of the PIS and agreed to participate within the observation. (It should be 
noted that this process was replicated for each new member of the staff team.) 
Despite sensing a general nervousness amongst the cohort about the prospect of 
being ‘observed’ (see Section 3.5.3), I was able to acquire the consent of the full 
complement of social workers, which retrospectively, I believe can be attributed 
both to the ‘intimacy’ of my insider status at the outset of the data collection, and 
also the inclusion of a stipulation within the PIS that participants could request the 
omission of any exchange or disclosure that might be attributable to them (see 
Appendix 3).  
Whilst such an approach is unusual in ethnography given that it can preclude key 
observations from the data collection (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), I felt that 
this potential cost was outweighed by the benefit of having each social worker’s 
agreement to be observed – meaning that overall, I was able to include more 
material than I would have otherwise been able to.  
In addition to providing their consent to be observed, each participant of the focus 
groups, questionnaire, and interviews were given a supplementary PIS (see 
Appendices 4, 5 & 6) for that aspect of the study (detailing what specifically 
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‘participation’ would entail and reminding them of their rights as participants) and 
provided written consent to participate.  
In this sense each participant fully consented to their contribution being included 
within this study.  
3.6.2 Anonymity and confidentiality  
Anonymity and confidentiality are a point of emphasis in the University’s AEF. In the 
context of ethnography, Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) remind us of the risk of 
harm that can be inflicted to research participants – or any connected person – if 
information is shared which can subsequently lead to their identification. 
In respect to this study, the importance of maintaining anonymity and 
confidentiality extended both directly to the participants of the research, and also 
indirectly to those who were the recipients of their services. In respect to the 
former, I was conscious that members of the CPT were reporting on their 
experiences of working for their employer and was therefore concerned that any 
failure to protect their identity could have negative consequences for their current 
and future employment prospects.  
For the latter, I was aware that during the course of their testimonies the social 
workers would likely share anecdotal accounts of their work with service users. The 
child protection task is of course, by its very nature, a confidential process; one 
which recognises the rights to privacy of those who are in receipt of child 
protection services and the stigma that can be inflicted especially when their 
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identities enter the public domain (Munro, 2002). My concern was therefore that a 
failure to protect the identities of the research participants, could lead to their 
service users being identified from their accounts, with the risk that this would 
inflict unnecessary harm and distress upon these individuals, and contravene their 
rights to privacy and consultation before their information is shared in any public 
document.  
Therefore, I sought to protect the identities of all individuals, not only by employing 
a pseudonym in respect of ‘Marketon’, but also by ascribing anonymous identifiers 
to each research participant. In all subsequent recordings, I referred to these 
individuals, or assigned an account to them, using only this identifier.  
Furthermore, where participants used the name of a colleague or service user 
within their accounts, I omitted the name in the subsequent transcript and replaced 
it with titles such as ‘manager’; ‘social worker’ or ‘service user’.  
However, I also recognised the limits of confidentiality, and that there might be 
occasions where I would be duty bound to ‘whistleblow’ and not protect the 
identity of the individuals concerned (see Section 3.6.4).  
3.6.3 The management and storage of information 
In maintaining anonymity and confidentiality it is essential that researchers take 
steps to protect that information which they hold about their participants (Crow 
and Wiles, 2008). This is again a point of emphasis within the aforementioned 
institutional AEF, and it is particularly important consideration in respect to 
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ethnography where researchers often hold a large amount of personal information 
about their participants (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007).  
What is more, not to maintain a secure management and storage of participants’ 
data is to risk being in breach of specific data protection legislation, and on this 
basis, I have, during the course of this study, ensured that data in all formats has 
been stored in a secure and protected manner.  
For example, whilst I maintained an ‘observation diary’ throughout the period of 
data collection, I employed anonymous identifiers when referencing specific social 
worker interactions and was careful to ensure that, if misplaced, no information 
was obtained within, that could be identified as attributable to any individual.  
The diary itself was kept on my person at all times during the course of the workday 
and stored in a lockable filing cabinet at my home residence in the evenings and 
weekends. Further, I would transcribe my recordings on a weekly basis from within 
the diary onto a password protected Microsoft Word file, after which I would 
destroy the original ‘hard copy’ entry. 
In the focus groups and interviews, I employed audio recording equipment in order 
to keep an accurate record of the discussions taking place. However, I ensured that 
within three days of the recording being made, it was transcribed onto a password 
protected Microsoft Word file, and then permanently erased from the recording 
device.  
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The questionnaire was designed and stored on a secure internet-based platform. 
After completion, the generated data was downloaded onto a password protected 
Microsoft Word file and then erased from the internet platform. 
Each password protected file was stored on an encrypted hard drive, which did not 
leave my home residence, but, was secured in a locked filing cabinet, and was only 
removed for periods of data analysis.  
3.6.4 Expectations pertaining to ‘whistleblowing’  
Previous social work ethnographers have, in their consideration of ‘ethics’, often 
omitted any explicit consideration of the regulatory framework that governs the 
profession of social work, and how this impacts upon the ethical safeguards 
undertaken during the course of their study. However, I considered this a necessary 
step, recognising that despite my researcher status, I had, as a registered social 
worker, a ‘duty’ to conform with specific professional ‘standards of conduct, 
performance and ethics’ (Health Care Professions Council, 2012: 1), including in my 
interactions with the research participants. 
A particular concern of the University’s AEF is how researchers manage disclosures 
from participants that might be judged as being unethical or abusive in respect to 
third parties. I recognised my responsibilities as a registered social worker to 
‘protect service users [from] any situation [that] puts them in danger… includ[ing] 
the conduct, performance or health of a colleague’ and to prioritise their ‘safety… 
before any personal or professional loyalties’ (Health Care Professions Council, 
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2012: 8). As such, I was committed to comply with the relevant ‘whistleblowing’ 
policies of the agency and regulator; reporting any concerns of unethical behaviour.  
In the interests of ‘full disclosure’ I advised the research participants of this 
commitment within the PIS (see Appendix 3), making clear that which would 
necessitate such a course constituted any behaviour which could be conceived as 
placing ‘the health, safety or wellbeing of a service user in danger’ or in an ethically 
compromised position (Health Care Professions Council, 2012: 8).  
The social workers consented to participate on these grounds, but ultimately, no 
disclosures did arise which met the threshold for confidentiality to be broken.  
3.7 A retroductive model for data collection and analysis 
Critical realist research tends to be empirically wide-ranging as information about 
the nature of generative mechanisms can be found in many different locations 
(Ackroyd and Karlsson, 2014). Broadly speaking, critical realists would assert that by 
ensuring a sustained observation of behaviour, through different research 
techniques and methods, and by noting deviations from sanctioned beliefs and 
expected behaviours, one can develop an understanding of the specific generative 
processes underpinning human agency (Ackroyd and Karlsson, 2014).  
On this basis, advocates of critical realist-informed enquiry argue that researchers 
should strive to embed and immerse themselves in the research setting – exploring 
from the ‘inside’ a specific phenomenon – so that that they too can observe, 
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experience directly, and come to understand the social processes and structures at 
play (Rees and Gatenby, 2014).  
Ethnography is considered an appropriate means of achieving this; one which 
provides a ‘connective tissue’ between  
actions of people in a social setting and the social and political 
structures within which those actions occur (Rees and Gatenby, 
2014: 132-133). 
Further, ethnography enables both abductive and retroductive processes (Rees and 
Gatenby, 2014), which are considered essential to any critical realist enquiry 
(O’Mahoney and Vincent, 2014). 
‘Abduction’ is conceived as ‘reasoning from immersion in a scene to a verbal 
summary’ whereas ‘retroduction’ is understood as ‘reasoning about why things 
happen’; including why data appears as it does (Olson, 2007: 1). Importantly, critical 
realist research moves beyond both deductive reasoning – ‘from generality to data 
via hypothesis testing’ – characteristic of positivism; and inductive reasoning ‘from 
data to generality’ – characteristic of constructionism (p. 1); to embed abductive 
and retroductive processes within enquiry (Olson, 2009; Bhaskar, 2014; O’Mahoney 
and Vincent, 2014; Ackroyd and Karlsson, 2014). 
As Bhaskar (2014) asserts, abduction allows the critical realist researcher to move 
from the empirical to the real by enabling a ‘redescription or recontextualization’ of 
observable events – ‘most usually in terms of a characteristic causal mechanism or 
process which serves to explain it’ (p. vii). Similarly, retroduction ‘involves imagining 
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a model of a mechanism, which if it were real, would account for the phenomenon 
in question’ (p. viii) and in this sense retroduction can suggest a number of other 
causal processes which affect the mechanism observed, enabling a better 
knowledge of that mechanism and the context within which it arises (O’Mahoney, 
and Vincent, 2014).  
Therefore, retroduction is conceived as 'the central tool of critical realist inquiry' 
(Oliver, 2012: 379); one that attempts to identify causal mechanisms before also 
seeking empirical evidence as to their existence. In these terms, Rees and Gatenby 
(2014) assert that ‘ethnography… is ideally suited to facilitating the retroductive 
process’ (p. 139), and propose a three-staged model for conducting a critical realist 
ethnography: 
1. An examination of the key phenomena from within a social setting; 
2. Data analysis to identify theoretically deduced categories of factors 
influencing the said phenomenon; 
3. A process of inference (often involving movement between further data 
collection and analysis), in which the conditions for the social phenomena 
under investigation are explained – including the identification of deeper 
causal mechanisms. 
The authors explain that a commitment to this model holds implications for the 
methods of data collection and analysis selected by the researcher, and indeed, 
how these methods are employed. This includes striving to incorporate a 
combination of methods that both compliment and mutually-inform one another 
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(Rees and Gatenby, 2014); and further, implementing them in a way that is both 
‘sequential’ (see Creswell et al., 2003: 223) and ‘iterative’ (see Greene, 2007: 126). 
It is in this context that I seek to justify my design for the data collection and 
analysis within this study. 
3.7.1 A mixed methods design 
Mixed methods research has been described in different texts as the ‘third 
methodological movement’ (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003: 5); the ‘third research 
paradigm’ (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004: 14); and even as the ‘de facto third 
alternative’ to quantitative and qualitative research approaches (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2010: 2). Whereas often it is conceived as the combination of both 
‘qualitative and quantitative approaches in the methodology of a study’ (Tashakkori 
and Teddlie, 1998: ix), it can also encompass a combination of qualitative or 
quantitative methods (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2017). 
Mixed methods research increasing popularity in different disciplines has been 
ascribed both to its ability to offset some of the limitations associated with purely 
qualitative or quantitative designs (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2017); and to more 
robustly tackle the research problem, by offering a unique capacity for synergy, 
breadth, and depth (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2010).  
Indeed, theorists assert that a mixed methods approach provides a more 
comprehensive account of social reality (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2010), and there is 
certainly a growing trend towards mixed methods design in social work research, as 
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researchers seek to document change or capture a particular group of people’s 
experiences (Padgett, 2017; Menon and Cowger, 2010; Bronstein and Kovacs, 
2013).  
However, Shaw (2003: 110) cautions that mixed methods design may not always 
lead to ‘sounder consensual conclusions’ and highlights the importance of selecting 
methods which are complimentary of each other. In making this point he cites 
Trend’s (1979) observation that ‘the complementarity is not always apparent’ (p. 
83): 
Simply using [a mixture of methods] with the expectation that 
they will validate each other, does not tell us what to do if the 
pieces do not fit (Trend, 1979: 83). 
The implication is that each method should be selected carefully, and its value (and 
weaknesses) considered relative to the other chosen methods (Shaw, 2003) – a 
notion, I incorporated into my own design (see Sections 3.7.2-3.7.6).   
Further, in choosing to employ a mixed methods approach, I was cognisant of the 
strong basis for mixed methods design both from the perspective of ethnography 
(Brewer, 2000; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007) and critical realism (Ackroyd and 
Karlsson, 2014; Hurrell, 2014). 
For example, Brewer (2000) reminds us that ethnography often constitutes a 
coordinated and planned ‘process’ of research methods which are ‘blended 
together imaginatively [and] flexibly… to best achieve the end result’ (p. 56). In 
addition, Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) assert that mixed methods research 
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provides a level of depth to ethnography that cannot otherwise be achieved by a 
solitary research method. 
Similarly, for critical realists where the emphasis is on explanation (Bhaskar, 2014), 
researchers tend to employ a mixture of methods within the same project – 
wherever possible combining information from different data sources (Ackroyd and 
Karlsson, 2014) – so as to garner the most in-depth account of a social 
phenomenon and its underpinning mechanisms (Hurrell, 2014). 
It is these principles that informed my selection of a mixture of research methods; 
methods that were conducive to achieving Rees and Gatenby’s (2014) retroductive 
model for critical realist ethnography.   
3.7.2 The focus group 
A focus group can be defined as 
a group of individuals selected and assembled by researchers to 
discuss and comment on, from personal experience, the topic that 
is the subject of the research (Powell et al., 1996: 499).  
Whilst some theorists tend to conflate the terms ‘focus group’ and ‘group 
interview’ (for example, Hughes and DuMont, 1993), the former is distinct from the 
latter, in that it focuses on ‘the ways in which individuals discuss a certain issue as 
members of a group, rather than simply as individuals…’ (Bryman, 2012: 501). 
Indeed, in undertaking a focus group 
the researcher will be interested in such things as how people 
respond to each other’s views and build up a view out of the 
interaction that takes place within the group (p. 501). 
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For the purposes of this study, two focus groups were carried out between 
December 2014 and January 2015. The first was attended by six social workers – 
constituting 30% of the cohort – and the second four CPT (line) managers – 100% of 
this cohort.  
The function of the focus group was twofold: to study with the CPT staff how they 
constructed notions of ‘discretion’ and ‘discretionary space’ – developing from their 
discussions definitions of the two terms as the basis for further exploration within 
the questionnaire and interviews; and, to explore and develop with the group, the 
initial themes pertaining to discretionary space and choice. 
In selecting the medium of focus group for achieving these purposes, I considered 
that it was a suitable forum in which to explore how the CPT staff, in conjunction 
with one another, constructed the key terms and their influences (Bryman, 2012). 
Indeed, Bloor et al. (2001: 8) advocate the use of focus groups for providing the 
‘contextual basis’ in research design: 
Focus groups can be used to… ensure that terms chosen in a 
subsequent study are ones which are consistently understood (p. 
10). 
This I considered was important in the context of both abduction and retroduction, 
as without establishing with a cohort of participants a clear understanding of the 
key concepts being explored, a researcher is often unable to garner an accurate 
account of the participant’s experiences of the social structures and processes 
impacting upon a phenomena (Akroyd and Karlsson, 2014).  
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Within each group I adopted a more distant position to that which I would later 
take in the interviews. Assuming the role of ‘facilitator’ as opposed to ‘interviewer’ 
(see Bryman, 2012: 501 for an account), I sought to avoid active participation in the 
group’s discussion by providing the participants with a typed list of 6 questions (see 
Appendix 10) – derived from the research aims – with a request that they would 
‘consider and discuss each in turn’. I listened and took notes during the group 
discussion – only offering prompts when questions were directed at me – and at 
the end of each group, I summarised the main themes; asking the participants to 
comment on the accuracy of my recordings and to suggest amendments or 
additions as necessary. 
Each focus group lasted approximately 2 hours, and each was audio recorded and 
later transcribed – producing in total, more than 80 pages of typed discussion. The 
definitions to emerge (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1) were then included in the 
introduction to both the questionnaire and interviews – so as to provide clarity and 
grounding – and the identified themes were used to inform the research questions 
included within the questionnaire. 
It is important to note that the focus group was the only stage of the data collection 
in which the CPT managers participated within the study. My rationale for their 
inclusion here, was to obtain a wider variety of perspective and experience; one 
that would subsequently better inform the emerging definitions and themes.  
This I believe was a necessary step, as by including the managers at this early stage 
of the study, I was introduced to a series of additional ideas that were crucial in 
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expanding my thinking, and in shaping the subsequent direction of the research; 
contributing ultimately, to the breadth of finding and depth of explanation 
achieved.  
3.7.3 The questionnaire 
In social research, the ‘questionnaire’ is considered a method of data collection 
comprising 
a set of standardized questions… which follow a fixed scheme in 
order to collect individual data about one or more specific topics… 
administered in a standardized fashion, that is, in the same way to 
all the respondents… (Trobia, 2011: 653). 
I conceived the questionnaire as a suitable medium for offsetting some of the 
potential limitations of the focus group (for example, ‘groupthink’) (Bryman, 2012); 
one which could explore whether the emerging ideas were also shared amongst the 
wider cohort of social workers; and which could provide a convenient forum for 
offering further direction and depth of exploration at this stage of the study 
(Bryman, 2012). 
Further, the questionnaire enabled a comparative element to the analysis at an 
early stage – one which was important in the context of the retroductive process 
(Bhaskar, 2014). This was because by contrasting the findings of the questionnaire 
to those generated from the focus group, I was able to refine my understanding of 
the social workers’ discretionary space and choice, and to begin to identify some of 
the social structures and processes impacting upon these. These would then 
become the focus in the next part of the iterative design (the research interviews) 
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in which I would seek to explain the social workers’ discretionary space and choice 
in the context of deeper ‘causal mechanisms’.  
The questionnaire was ‘launched’ on an internet-based platform in July 2015 and 
remained ‘live’ for a period of 4 weeks – allowing for staff to return from their 
summer annual leave. It was completed by 18 of the CPT social workers (a 
completion rate of 80%), and comprised of two parts: the first, seven ‘open’ 
questions about the social workers’ experiences of discretionary space and choice; 
the second, seven ‘closed’ questions, focussing more on the factors underpinning 
those experiences (see Appendix 12). 
Whilst the first part sort to cultivate a continuation of the qualitative account 
achieved in the focus group, the second also included a series of quantitative 
measures and Likert scales (see Appendix 12), thereby garnering a different type of 
data to add support and context to the qualitative account (Bryman, 2012). 
3.7.4 The interview 
The research interview is 
a method of data collection… that specifically involves asking a 
series of questions. Typically, an interview represents a meeting 
or dialogue between people where personal and social interaction 
occur (Davies, 2011: 158). 
For the purposes of this study, I adopted a ‘semi-structured’ approach to the 
interviews (see Bryman, 2012: 470-471 for an account). This provided a suitable 
medium between ‘structure’ and ‘flexibility’ in focussing ‘on how the interviewee 
frames and understands issues and events’ (Bryman, 2012: 471) – again, considered 
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important in facilitating abductive and retroductive processes (Smith and Elger, 
2014). 
The interviews took place between March and May 2016, and were attended by 8 
of the CPT social workers (32% of the cohort). Their purpose was to 
comprehensively explore the conditions in which the discretionary space and choice 
of the social workers occurred, with an emphasis on better understanding the 
deeper causal mechanisms at play.  
The interviews also provided a forum in which I could ‘prompt’ and ‘probe’ the 
social workers’ responses (something which had not been possible in the focus 
groups and questionnaires); thus, enabling a greater level of depth and detail to be 
gleaned from this element of the study.   
Indeed, whilst the focus groups and questionnaire might be conceived as 
contributing mainly to ‘Stage 1’ of Rees and Gatenby’s (2014) model (i.e. they 
provided the initial examination of the key phenomena), the interviews, are better 
conceived as contributing to ‘Stage 3’ – where with an understanding of how the 
social workers’ discretionary space and choice was manifesting, I moved repeatedly 
between further collection and analysis,  so as to develop and refine an account of 
why this was the case. 
The first part of each interview comprised of an ‘open discussion’ with the social 
workers – relying on a list of prompts developed from the findings of the focus 
group and questionnaire (see Appendix 13). The second comprised of two vignettes 
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(see Appendix 13), each constituting a detailed case scenario, designed to 
‘selectively portray elements of reality to which research participants are invited to 
respond’ (Hughes, 2012: 919). These I considered to be ‘especially valuable in 
exploring the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours’ of individuals in particular 
contexts (Hughes, 2012: 919). 
Specifically, the vignettes enabled an exploration of whether social workers were 
willing to employ discretion in a defined discretionary space, and whether this 
willingness changed according to the type of information available to them. Indeed, 
in answering the vignettes, the social workers were incrementally provided with 
additional information and were asked after each, to explain how that information 
influenced their willingness to employ discretion.  
The discussions ranged from 1.22 hours to 2.46 hours, meaning that at their 
conclusion, the interview data constituted over 400 pages of typed transcript. 
3.7.5 Field note and documentary analysis 
For the purposes of this discussion, a ‘field note’ denotes those written 
observations and experiences recorded during the course of the ethnography, and 
derived from my encounters and interactions within the research setting (Emerson 
et al., 2011). In this sense I use the term ‘field note’ in both a descriptive and a 
reflective sense (see Emerson et al., 2011 for an account).  By ‘documentary 
analysis’ I mean the process of ‘reviewing’ and ‘evaluating documents’ so that they 
may be ‘interpreted… to elicit meaning, gain understanding and develop empirical 
knowledge’ about the research subject and setting (Bowen, 2009: 27). 
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The importance of the focus groups, questionnaire and interviews were that they 
allowed me to venture into those areas that would have remained otherwise 
‘unseen’, had I simply chosen to rely on the field note and documentary analysis for 
the content of this study (Bryman, 2012: 494).  
That being said, both the latter two components, whilst distinct from the sequential 
and iterative element of the design, were an integral part of the research 
methodology – offering a layer of context and pertinent examples to consider 
against the data emerging from the other sources (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007). This was important in the context of the third stage of Rees and Gatenby’s 
model (and in achieving the explanatory element of this study), where by providing 
a context and examples to support the social workers’ accounts, I was better able 
to refine my understanding of the causal mechanisms underpinning their 
discretionary space and choice (Bhaskar, 2014).  
Although the ADCS had originally provided me with permission to begin collating 
‘necessary materials’ for my study in the Autumn of 2013 (see Appendix 14), I did 
not start my collection of relevant documents (or for that matter, field notes – see 
below), until I received ethical approval from the University’s Academic Ethics 
Committee in November 2014 (see Appendix 15). However, during the course of 
the data collection, not only did I seek to assemble current/new documentation, 
but also that which had been archived. This provided a comparative component to 
the documentary analysis, where by contrasting current and past documentary 
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records, I was better able to explore how the influence of specific mechanisms had 
manifested and evolved over a period of time.  
Several of the documents that I anticipated would be integral to the data analysis 
were gathered ahead of time (for example, policy documents, emails and 
departmental memos). However, the importance of other documentary records 
only emerged after initial analysis had identified additional questions to ask of the 
research data – for example, ‘has the number of referrals to the CPT really 
increased over recent years?’ (see Section, 6.1.1). In this regard, the process of 
gathering and analysing documentation required me to move repeatedly between 
further data collection and analysis – again, characteristic of the third stage of Rees 
and Gatenby’s model. 
I had access to, and was therefore able to collect, many of the necessary 
documents during the course of my normal work duties (including the 
aforementioned policy documents, emails and memos, but also other statistical 
data, such as the number of care order applications etc). However, others had to be 
procured from third parties and teams within the CSD (for example, records on 
departmental expenditure were obtained from the Finance Team), but also other 
local authority departments (for example, figures on homelessness were provided 
by Marketon’s Housing Department).  
Overall, I drew from 118 documents during the course of the data analysis. These 
comprised of a mixture of contextual (for example, policies and emails) and 
quantitative data (for example, numbers and types of referral and open cases, and 
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statistics on local indicators of ‘need’); as well as that which was available within 
(for example, press releases), and outside of the public domain (for example, data 
on intradepartmental spending).   
Like the documents, I did not begin my collection of field notes until December 
2014, after obtaining both ethical approval from the Academic Ethics Committee 
and the informed consent of the research participants to be observed (see Section 
3.6.1). 
My approach to acquiring relevant field notes differed to that of the documentary 
data in that I did not specifically, nor explicitly, ‘seek out’ particular contexts, 
scenarios or tasks to observe, recognising that this can induce artificial behaviour in 
participants and thus impact upon the validity of the observation (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). Instead, the field notes emerged from my day-to-day practice 
experiences on the CPT and thus were more ‘naturalistic’ in nature (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007: 32) – arising from the comments, conversations and 
discussions that took place around me during the course of my normal work duties, 
but not from any interactions that occurred outside of a work context (see Section 
3.5.3).  
Whenever possible, I adopted a ‘contemporaneous’ approach in the documenting 
of my field notes – i.e. each one was written in my observation diary immediately 
following an observed event or interaction had taken place, so as to ensure the 
‘preservation of experience close to the moment of occurrence’ (Emerson, et al., 
2011: 17). However, on some occasions an interaction occurred at a time where it 
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was not immediately possible to make a note of if (for example, whilst driving), and 
thus the note was made at the next available opportunity – but always within an 
hour or two of the event occurring.  
My template for completing a field note was to record the person(s) present 
(utilising anonymous identifiers); location; and time of a particular interaction, as 
well as the main content and quotes pertinent to my research questions. At the top 
of each entry, I noted the context of the recording – i.e. whether it pertained to 
‘discretionary space’; ‘choice’; ‘mechanisms’; or a combination of these – in order 
to facilitate ease of identification of applicable field notes during the data analysis. 
In total, I drew from 85 field notes during the course of the data analysis.  
3.7.6 A critical realist grounded theory  
The analysis of the research data was, to some extent, an ongoing process 
throughout the data collection, such was my constant gathering, appraising and 
sorting of new material – including field notes and documents. However, there 
were also three distant points during the study in which I engaged in concentrated 
periods of analysis. These were: 
• After the focus groups; 
• At the conclusion of the questionnaire; and 
• At the conclusion of each interview (incorporating also, the analysis of the 
gathered field notes and documents). 
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This was important in the context of the iterative design, as the findings to emerge 
from one stage, subsequently informed the direction of enquiry in the next (see 
Sections 3.7.2-3.7.4). With that being said, there was also comparative and 
cumulative elements to the analysis – comparative in that data was compared 
between different stages, and cumulative in that emerging ideas were developed 
and expanded upon as I progressed through the iterative design.   
So as to maintain a consistency in my approach (and an efficacy in my findings), I 
relied on Grounded Theory Method (GTM) for the analysis of the qualitative data – 
recognising also its suitability in the context of an ethnographic (Charmaz, 2014) 
and also critical realist framework (Oliver, 2012; Kempster and Parry, 2014). 
However, I looked beyond traditional models of GTM – for example, the ‘classic’ 
approach advocated by Barney Glaser (1978; 1992; 1998; 2001), or the ‘evolved’ 
approach advocated by Anselm Straus (1987; Straus and Corbin, 1990; 1998) – on 
the basis that their positivistic underpinnings render them unsuitable to critical 
realist enquiry (Oliver, 2012). Instead, I adopted a model that is closer to the 
‘constructivist’ variant endorsed by Kathy Charmaz, but which Kempster and Parry 
(2014) describe as a ‘Critical Realist Grounded Theory’ (p. 109).  
This model holds that issues such as language, meaning and context are central to 
GTM, and that ‘discovery’ is an interactive process between researcher and 
participant. Moreover, it is based on the notion that 
any theoretical rendering offers an interpretive portrayal of the 
studied world, not an exact picture of it... Research participants’ 
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implicit meanings – and researchers’ finished grounded theories – 
are a construction of reality (Charmaz, 2014: 17). 
Further, whilst the model maintains features of traditional GTM – including coding, 
theoretical sampling, and an iterative design – it is distinguished by its focus on 
abductive and retroductive (as opposed to inductive) processes (Kempster and 
Parry, 2014). In this way it places an emphasis on generalisation and 
contextualisation, and thus providing a richer grounded theory, which overcomes a 
limitation of traditional models by enabling future readers and researchers to apply 
and test generative mechanisms in their own social contexts (Kempster and Parry, 
2014).   
In adopting a critical realist GTM for the purposes of my analysis, I relied on, and 
moved through, a sequence of four analytic processes, namely: 
• Initial coding; 
• Focussed coding; 
• Memo-writing; and 
• Theoretical sampling. 
I will explain each in turn. 
‘Coding is the pivotal link between collecting data and developing an emergent 
theory to explain these data’ (Charmaz, 2014: 113). It is through coding that a 
researcher is able to ‘define what is happening in the data and begin to grapple 
with what it means’ (p. 113). There are two main phases to coding in GTM 
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(including critical realist GTM): the ‘initial’ phase and the ‘focussed’ phase (see 
Charmaz, 2014). 
Initial coding involves examining a transcript of qualitative data and ‘naming each 
word, line or segment’, whilst simultaneously identifying those initial core 
conceptual ideas to pursue in future stages of data collection (Charmaz, 2014: 113). 
In this way, initial coding facilitates abductive reasoning, especially when the 
emerging conceptual ideas sit outside any pre-existing ‘theoretical lens’ (Meyer and 
Lunnay, 2012: 7), but require ‘an imaginative leap to achieve a plausible theoretical 
explanation’ (Charmaz, 2014: 341).  
Initial coding requires that the researcher ask specific questions of the data, for 
example: 
• ‘What is the data a study of?’ 
• ‘What do the data suggest? Pronounce? Leave unsaid?’ 
• ‘From whose point of view?’ and 
• ‘What theoretical category does this specific datum indicate?’ (Charmaz, 
2014: 116). 
The importance of initial coding is that it ensures the ‘fit’ and ‘relevancy’ of the 
research data relative to the focus of enquiry: 
Your study fits the empirical work when you have constructed 
codes and developed them into categories that crystallise 
participants’ experience. It has relevance when you offer an 
incisive analytic framework that interprets what is happening and 
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makes relationships between implicit processes and structures 
visible (Charmaz, 2014: 133). 
For the purposes of this study, the process of initial coding (including the 
application of the aforementioned questions – see above) was applied to each 
transcript of data generated from the focus groups, questionnaire and interviews. 
This was on the basis that new codes and ideas can emerge at any time in the data 
analysis process – even when the design of a later stage of data collection has been 
informed by the codes derived from a previous one (Charmaz, 2014). 
In producing my list of ‘initial codes’, I employed a technique of ‘line-by-line’ as 
opposed to ‘word-by-word’ or ‘segment-by-segment’ coding (see Charmaz, 2014: 
124). Although each line of text did not produce a useful code – as oftentimes it 
was based on an incomplete sentence – it did provide a plethora of ideas which 
may have otherwise escaped my attention (see Charmaz, 2014: 124-127). Further, I 
considered a ‘line by line’ approach advantageous in that it often requires less time 
than other coding strategies and it facilitates the researcher returning to earlier 
stages of analysis to check and test the relationship between ‘new’ and ‘old’ codes 
(something that I incorporated within the analysis – see below). It also enables the 
researcher to ‘see otherwise undetected patterns’ and to ‘take compelling events 
apart and analyse what constitutes them and how they occurred’ (Charmaz, 2014: 
125) – which is essential when engaging in abductive and/or retroductive processes 
(Meyer and Lunnay, 2012). 
‘Focussed coding’ is the second stage of the GTM process. It is considered a 
‘selective phase’ and ‘uses the most significant or frequent initial codes to sort, 
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synthesise, integrate and organise large amounts of data’ (Charmaz, 2014: 113). It 
requires the researcher to make ‘decisions about which initial codes make the most 
analytic sense to categorise [their] data incisively and completely’ (p. 138). What is 
more, focussed coding is said to ‘expedite’ the analytic work, ‘without sacrificing 
the detail contained in [the] data and initial codes’ (p. 138).  
The process of focussed coding involves studying and assessing initial codes, but it 
constitutes more than a researcher selecting and progressing with the codes that 
that they find most interesting (Charmaz, 2014). Instead it comprises of the 
researcher comparing and contrasting initial codes to identify meaning and 
consider how they account for the data (Charmaz, 2014). In this way the researcher 
is tasked with making judgments about the conceptual strength of initial codes – 
developing from them ‘theoretical categories’ or ideas to direct the direction of 
study (see Charmaz, 2014: 144-145) – whilst simultaneously seeking to identify gaps 
in the emerging conceptual framework. 
I engaged in the process of focussed coding after each stage of initial coding (see 
above). Furthermore, as I progressed through the iterative data collection design, I 
compared and contrasted the focus codes derived from different sources (for 
example, the codes from one interview, were compared to those from previous 
interviews as well as those from the focus groups and questionnaire). This allowed 
me to continually check, develop and refine a ‘master list’ of focussed codes to 
apply and consider against new data. This was important in the context of critical 
realist grounded theory (Kempster and Parry, 2014), in that it facilitated the 
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development of ideas whilst ensuring that my focus codes (and the ‘analytic notes’ 
that emerged from them – see below) were representative of the participants’ 
testimonies, and reflected not only a descriptive account of discretionary space and 
choice, but the explanatory element that was central to my critical realist 
framework (see Section 3.2.1). 
However, with each list of ‘focussed codes’ I also engaged in the third stage of the 
analytic process, that which Charmaz (2014: 162) refers to as ‘memo-writing’. In 
GTM ‘memos’ are the ‘analytic notes’ made about the focussed codes and their 
theoretical categories (Charmaz, 2014: 162). They require researchers to ask 
questions of themselves and the data, to identify problems and suggest 
connections and areas for further exploration (Meyer and Lunnay, 2012): 
Memo-writing therefore is meant to generate discussion and self-
dialogue which fashions a conjunction between theoretical 
reflection and the practical issues surrounding data collection and 
analysis (Layder, 1998: 59). 
Furthermore, memo-writing enables retroductive reasoning as it encourages the 
researcher to theorise, on the basis of the data, why specific phenomena appear as 
they are (Meyer and Lunnay, 2012). It is in these terms that memo-writing is 
fundamental to achieving a critical realist grounded theory (Kempster and Parry, 
2014), enabling researchers to identify ‘causal mechanisms’ through the process of 
‘counterfactual thinking’: 
Counterfactual thinking is a means of trying to understand the 
conditions under which something occurs, and requires the 
researcher to reflect on and question their interpretation of the 
166 
 
data, identifying how concepts emerged in a practical setting 
(Meyer and Lunnay, 2012: 7). 
To facilitate the retroductive process – as well as my efforts to engage in 
‘counterfactual thinking’ – I chose to follow Charmaz’s (2014) advice and keep a 
journal of my memos. This allowed me to not only maintain a record of all the 
‘analytic notes’ made during the process of the data analysis, but also the 
‘methodological dilemmas, directions and decisions’ that accompanied them (p. 
165). Moreover, the journal enabled me to organise and categorise memos, so that 
I could more easily find, compare and contrast different theoretical ideas as I 
progressed through the data analysis and developed my understanding of not only 
the nature of the social workers’ discretionary space and choice, but also the causal 
processes underpinning them.  
Indeed, in the same way that a social worker might only settle on one explanation 
for a service user’s circumstances after they have considered, ‘tested’ and ‘ruled-
out’ all other possible hypotheses (Munro, 2002), I used the journal of memos to 
continually ask new questions of the data – identifying and applying alternative 
theories for the manifestation of discretionary space and choice, and ‘testing’ these 
against new and existing memos. In this way I engaged in ‘counter-factual thinking’ 
throughout the different stages of the data collection/analysis (see above). It 
enabled me to build on, develop and refine my findings, excluding those ideas 
which were not substantiated, and seeking other evidence to reinforce that which I 
felt offered the best account of the social workers’ discretionary space and choice 
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whilst again facilitating that explanatory element that was at the heart of my study 
(see Section 3.2.1).   
The final stage of the GTM process was to engage in ‘theoretical sampling’. This 
involves ‘seeking and collecting pertinent data to elaborate and refine [the] 
emerging theory’ (Charmaz, 2014: 192). In critical realist terms it is important 
component of retroduction, as researchers test their ideas about the mechanisms 
impacting upon on a social phenomenon through additional data collection and 
analysis (Kempster and Parry, 2014): 
Writing memos has already enabled you to flag incomplete 
categories and gaps in your analysis. Engaging in theoretical 
sampling prompts you to predict where and how you can find 
needed data to fill such gaps and saturate categories [original 
emphasis] (Charmaz, 2014: 199).  
On this basis, we might conceive theoretical sampling as being best suited to the 
third stage of Rees and Gatenby’s (2014) model (see Section 3.7) and my own 
strategy was to incorporate theoretical sampling in the later parts of the iterative 
design, and in two ways. Firstly, during the interviews, where I subtly developed 
and refined the content and nature of my questioning as I moved between 
interviewees – enabling me to ‘test’ existing theories against the social workers’ 
accounts, whilst seeking additional data that would fill in gaps, or else evidence that 
could expand upon, or challenge my emerging ideas.  
Secondly, by applying the same theories to the field note and documentary data, 
looking for a layer of context that could support and solidify them. Indeed, it was in 
this stage that I became more active in seeking supplementary documentary data 
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(see Section 3.7.5) whilst asking additional questions of that data as well as my field 
notes – i.e. ‘Is there evidence that caseloads on the CPT are increasing?’ (see 
Section 6.1.1); ‘Are there any observations which might be illustrative of inter-
professional finger pointing?’ (see Section 6.3.2). 
In this sense, I employed the process of theoretical sampling to move repeatedly 
between further data collection and analysis. Again, this enabled me to continually 
‘test’, develop and refine ideas whilst addressing specific gaps in my analytic notes. 
This meant that at the end of the process I was confident that I had produced a 
series of findings that provided a robust and accurate account of the social workers’ 
discretionary space and choice, and of the causal mechanisms underpinning it 
(Kempster and Parry, 2014). 
After engaging in this series of analytic processes – and only when I was completely 
satisfied that my ideas were supported by, and representative of, the research data 
– I produced from my memos a series of ‘research finding’ extracts (incorporating 
pertinent quotes, field notes etc).  These were then carefully sorted and organised 
into the three ‘results’ chapters – each one framed according to the relevant 
research question.  
I begin my consideration of the research findings in the next chapter, where I 
present the results relative to the research question ‘Where do social workers 
encounter discretionary space?’.  
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CHAPTER 4 – WHERE DO SOCIAL WORKERS ENCOUNTER 
DISCRETIONARY SPACE?  
4.0 Introduction: Organising and presenting the findings 
This is the first of three ‘results’ chapters, each of which will set out research 
findings relating to a specific research question (as stipulated within Section 3.1). 
For this chapter I focus on the findings which relate to the question: ‘Where do 
social workers encounter discretionary space?’.   
In presenting these findings, I draw from all five sources of data collection (see 
Section 3.7). Where I cite directly from a participant’s testimony, I will indicate the 
stage of the data collection (for example, ‘FG’ [Focus Group], ‘Q’ [Questionnaire], 
and ‘SSI’ [Semi-Structured Interview]), and that participant’s identifier for that stage 
(for example, ‘SW’ [Social Worker] or ‘M’ [Manager] 1). Where I have included an 
observation field note or cited a local authority document, I indicate the date and 
either my location at the time of the observation (i.e. ‘Office – June, 2014’) or the 
source (i.e. ‘Corporate Spending Strategy – January, 2014’).  
The chapter is divided into three parts: I begin by identifying the definitions of 
‘discretion’ and ‘discretionary space’ used within the data collection. Secondly, I set 
out the practice areas in which the social workers stated that they did not have 
discretionary space. Thirdly, I consider the practice areas in which the social 
workers felt that they did encounter a discretionary space.   
Throughout the discussion I will comment upon the types of space that I 
understood the different examples to pertain to.   
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4.1 Defining ‘discretion’ 
As noted in both Chapters 1 and 2, there is a tendency within the wider literature 
not to define ‘discretion’, and yet this is problematic in the sense that the term can 
mean different things in different contexts (Evans, 2010). Therefore, it is prudent to 
elucidate, at an early opportunity, the conception of discretion that forms the basis 
of enquiry (Molander, 2016). 
I have outlined that my interest is in the structural discretion (discretionary space) 
and less so the epistemic discretion (discretionary reasoning) of the social worker 
(see Section 1.2.1). However, I am also cognisant of Smith’s (1981) 
recommendation that to enhance the efficacy of results, a researcher should 
identify and incorporate the participants’ understanding of the term ‘discretion’ 
within their study’s design. In this regard, an explicit aim of the focus group was to 
establish how the social workers in my study understood the concepts of 
‘discretion’ and ‘discretionary space’ (see Section 3.7.2). They identified ‘freedom’ 
and ‘action’ as key features of the former: 
It’s freedom not just in forming a decision about a suitable action, 
but then in carrying it out (SW2, FG). 
It’s about being free to decide and act according to what you 
judge is best (SW3, FG). 
These propagated into their collective definition of the term, whereby 
‘discretion’ is  
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the freedom to decide upon and take a course of action, 
independently from the oversight, and direction of others (for 
example a manager)5.  
With regards to ‘discretionary space’ the social workers outlined this could be 
conceived as ‘the space, area or opportunity to employ discretion’. 
These two definitions formed the basis of enquiry and were explicitly referenced in 
each stage of the formal data collection. 
4.2 Where social workers said that they did not have discretionary 
space 
It was the preference of the social workers to begin discussions about discretionary 
space, by outlining where they felt they were unable to employ their discretion. I 
theorised that they may have felt more strongly about these areas or else, found it 
easier to recount them – perhaps because they were more prevalent in their mind.  
In recognition of this tendency, I have also chosen to begin where the social 
workers began, and repeatedly returned to: ‘where [they] did not have 
discretionary space’ (SW6, FG). I have organised the findings of this section under 
four headings – derived from specific ‘memo titles’ (see Section 3.7.6): 
• Outcome decisions of Child Protection Conferences, Legal Planning 
Meetings and Final Care Planning Meetings; 
• [De jure] decisions to spend money; 
                                                        
5 Of course, this is not to say that the discretionary choice is not influenced or informed by another 
(including the manager or agency). 
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• Workflows and content; and 
• Must-do timescales and deadlines. 
I will consider each in turn. 
4.2.1 Outcome decisions of Child Protection Conferences, Legal 
Planning Meetings and Final Care Planning Meetings 
The social workers highlighted a ‘lack of freedom’ to use their discretion in respect 
to the ‘outcome decision’ (SW2, FG) of three types of decision-making forum: the 
‘Child Protection Conference’ [CPC] (SW6, FG); the ‘Legal Planning Meeting’ [LPM] 
(SW11, Q); and the ‘Final Care Planning Meeting’ [FCPM] (SW7, SSI). 
To understand the type of decisions being discussed, I asked the social workers to 
elucidate whenever the term ‘outcome decision’ (or some similar iteration) was 
used. The type of ‘outcome decisions’ identified comprised of:  
• Whether a child would be made subject to, continue to be subject to, or no 
longer be made subject to, a child protection plan (CPC);  
• Whether the local authority would initiate pre (care) or care proceedings in 
respect to a child (LPM); and  
• The proposed permanent placement of a child in a ‘care plan’ for Court (for 
example, a return to the birth family, a foster placement or adoption) 
(FCPM). 
The social workers felt that there was a general misconception (ostensibly by those 
not familiar with the actual process) about how these ‘outcome decisions’ were 
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made. They explained that, at least locally, they were not necessarily the result of 
the ‘collective’ opinion of the group of professionals present (HM Government, 
2018: 82).  Instead, they reported that it was the local culture (I noted an absence 
of defined policy on this issue) to cede power to the chair of these forums – an 
Independent Reviewing Officer (IRO) for the CPC, or a senior manager in the other 
two contexts – enabling them to make the decision ‘independently’ of the group of 
professionals, ‘if that [was] their preference’ (SW11, Q). 
The social workers understood that their own role was to ‘advise’ (SW4, FG), 
‘inform’ (SW7, SSI) and ‘make recommendations’ (SW2, FG), based on their 
‘knowledge of the case’, the individual child and family (SW5, FG). However, it was 
not within their ‘power… to decide or action the final… decision’ (SW3, SSI), and it 
was their repeated experience that the forum chair would make decisions contrary 
to the social worker’s recommendations:   
I advise, but the chair doesn’t have to agree. In fact most often 
they don’t; they make decisions in opposition to my suggestion… 
[laughs] (SW8, SSI). 
Despite the laughter in this last account, this was understood to be a source of 
great ‘frustration’ for the social workers in this study, where they described feeling 
‘disheartened’ (SW5, FG) by the reported ‘tendency’ within these forums to 
‘undervalue' their rather ‘unique’ (SW6, Q), and perhaps ‘superior’ (SW2, SSI), 
knowledge of the specific child and its family: 
I do get frustrated with how little my opinion is valued by some 
chairs… I mean I have the best knowledge of the child, so 
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wouldn’t you want to know my opinion on how best to proceed? 
(SW4, Q). 
I have been in many of these types of meetings where I am not 
even asked what I think should happen (SW17, Q). 
Thus, whilst the social workers did not advocate increasing their own discretionary 
space in respect to these ‘outcome decisions’ – expressing that such ‘potentially life 
changing’ (SW5, FG) decisions should be part of a ‘rigorous and transparent’ 
decision-making process (SW8, SSI), and ‘not within the individual power of the 
social worker’ (SW4, SSI) – they did feel that local processes required improvement 
to better incorporate the social worker’s knowledge of the child, in that child’s best 
interest: 
Ultimately, I think that it is right that there is a chair and that they 
have final say over the decision. However, their positioning [in the 
organisation] and different job expectations, means that they are 
unlikely to ever acquire the type of knowledge of that child that I 
hold as the child’s social worker. Therefore, I do think that there 
needs to be improvement in how my knowledge is used to inform 
those types of decisions… (SW8, SSI). 
My own reflection was that a process of making these ‘outcome’ decisions, 
ostensibly without incorporating the social worker’s knowledge of the child, did not 
compliment Munro’s (2011b) notion for decision-making within a more ‘child-
centred’ system (p. 1). However, a limitation of the study was that I was not able to 
compare the experiences of the social workers with the accounts of the chairs, or 
observations of the decision-making in these specific forums, and thus I remain 
unclear as to the validity of this claim (see Section 8.2). 
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4.2.2 [De jure] decisions to spend money 
A second area where the social workers identified a restriction on their 
discretionary space was in respect to financial decisions, or, as they repeatedly put 
it: ‘decisions to spend money’ (SW2, FG).  
The social workers reported that this restriction was not limited to large financial 
expenditure, for example, ‘paying for an independent expert assessment’ (SW4, SSI) 
– which could cost up to £8,000; or ‘decisions about costly residential placements’ 
(SW10, Q) – where costs could exceed £12,000 per week; it also extended to, what 
they considered to be, relatively ‘small amounts of money’ (SW3, FG), for example, 
‘purchasing food, gas or electric in an emergency’ (SW4, FG); buying ‘second hand 
furniture or white goods’ (SW3, SSI); and paying for ‘a new school uniform for a 
child whose parents [could] not afford it’ (SW1, FG).   
The participants explained that in the then current (but ostensibly continuing) 
climate of ‘shrinking budgets’ and ‘closure of services’ (SW3, Q) (see also Section 
6.1.3 for further discussion), ‘every penny had to be accounted for’ (M4, FG), which 
meant that even decisions about ‘relatively small amounts of departmental 
expenditure… had to have management oversight and approval’ (SW10, Q). 
Indeed, the ‘official’ position was that there was ‘no discretion[ary space] for any 
front line staff… to agree to spend money’ (Chief Executive – Public Consultation on 
Spending Cuts, May 2016). This was explicitly set out in a new ‘Corporate Strategy 
on Expenditure’, published in August 2016, which also imposed a ‘complete freeze’ 
on ‘purchasing stationary… office equipment… overtime… external training [with 
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associated cost]… and the recruitment of agency staff’ – resulting in a requirement 
that social workers even had to ‘trade-in’ their ink-less pen, before they could be 
issued with a new one.  
As such, the social workers recognised the ‘realities of financial restriction’ (SW2, 
FG) facing their employer. However, the ability ‘to spend money in the interests of 
the child’ (SW5, FG), was, they considered, ‘an important freedom in enabling 
effective practice’ (SW10, Q), as this exchange indicates: 
I understand that there has to be limitations, especially now with 
austerity. But really the space to decide to spend, you know, small 
amounts of money, I think that it is vital in allowing social workers 
to be innovative and flexible in their approach to children (SW6, 
FG).  
I agree… for example, you go to a house and find that the child 
has no duvet. It’s cold, mum has no money… so you go to Asda 
and buy one… it’s like £5… we are not talking fortunes here (SW3, 
FG). 
The same applies with gas and electric… It is frustrating when you 
are assessing a parent and find that they have run out of both gas 
and money, but those are the realities of the families that we are 
working with… I need to be able to say ‘OK here is £10 to get you 
through the weekend’… (SW2, FG). 
It was in this context that I found that social workers were continuing to exercise 
their discretion in respect to ‘decisions to spend money’, despite the restriction of a 
formally recognised and sanctioned (de jure) discretionary space.  
The social workers’ strategy in overcoming the restrictions imposed, was to rely on 
a discretionary space available to them outside of the ‘official’ strictures of 
departmental policy; one where, ‘in the interests of the individual child’, but also 
‘the absence of departmental [monetary] support’, they could choose to ‘spend 
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[their] own money’ (SW2, FG), whilst accepting that this would neither be ‘officially 
sanctioned’, nor reimbursed:  
I tend to buy children a McDonalds after a foster placement 
move… I don’t expect to get the money back (SW2, SSI).  
I wouldn’t advertise this, but on two occasions I have decided to 
purchase a new set of school trousers for a child out of my own 
pocket… I knew that although ‘officially’ I shouldn’t, if I didn’t, 
then they would go without (SW8, SSI).  
Yes, I give them my own money if I have to… it’s only £10… what 
choice do I have? (SW2, FG). 
As indicated within these accounts, the quantity of money spent was relatively 
small, but nevertheless, such actions were understood to contravene ‘official’ 
policy, which stated that social workers should not ‘make discretionary payments or 
purchases under any circumstance’ (Corporate Strategy on Expenditure – August 
2016). To do so was to potentially ‘confuse the boundaries of the professional 
relationship’ and could ‘result in disciplinary action’ (Policy Document – ‘Receiving 
and Giving of Gifts’, August, 2016).  
However, the social workers believed that their ‘managers [knew] about’ (SW2, 
SSI), ‘accepted’ (SW17, Q) and even ‘condoned’ (SW1, SS8) this behaviour in the 
context of being ‘pragmatic in the face of service user need’ (SW17, Q). I 
understood this to mean, that the discretionary behaviour was accepted, on the 
basis that it could be seen to be in the interests of the child, whilst avoiding any 
direct cost to the CSD: 
Oh yeah, the managers know about it… in fact my own manager 
saw me dip [sic] into my purse last summer to buy a child a new 
school bag … she didn’t object because we both knew that she 
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couldn’t offer to reimburse me… it’s just what we have to do in 
this age of cuts… the children’s needs don’t go away, so either we 
pay out of our own pocket or they go without (SW8, SSI). 
Here I considered that the notion that managers would support social workers to 
break with official policy contradicted the accounts of the domination 
managerialism theorists, who assert that managers, as ‘creatures of the 
organisation’ (Evans, 2010: 41), sole focus is the enforcement of organisational 
policy (for example, Howe, 1986; 1991). Rather, these accounts support the 
‘discursive’ notion that managers can ‘grant’ informal discretionary space, on the 
basis of shared goals and values (Evans, 2010; 2011) – in these terms to ensure that 
a child did not ‘go without’.  
Thus, whilst the social workers of this study reported a lack of discretionary space 
‘to spend money’ in an officially sanctioned, or ‘de jure’, sense, they also indicated 
that they could still choose to spend money – albeit their own – in contexts outside 
of the ‘officially sanctioned’ domain. This included occasions where the manager 
was ignorant of their behaviour – best conceived as a ‘de facto’ discretionary space 
(see Section 2.4.1); or (and applicable here) where the manager was knowledgeable 
of the social worker’s behaviour, but ‘turn[ed] a blind eye’ (SW17, Q) under the 
premise of promoting effective service provision, and thus, affording a discretionary 
space in an ‘entrepreneurial’ sense (see Section 2.4.3).  
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4.2.3 Workflows and content 
The third area in which the social workers reported ‘minimal discretionary 
freedom’, was in respect to the ‘workflows and content’ (SW2, SSI) of the 
Integrated Children’s System (‘ICS’) (see Section 2.6.1 for an overview of the ICS).  
Whilst the wider literature discusses that the ICS can both restrict but also offer 
new opportunities for discretion (for example, Shaw et al., 2009; Wastell et al., 
2010), the social workers in this study generally felt that the ICS was restrictive of 
their discretionary space: 
No, I don’t think that I have any discretionary space when it 
comes to [the ICS]…  especially in what I record and the order that 
I record it in (SW3, FG). 
This was an area observed to cause the social workers a great deal of vexation, 
which I aligned, in part, to the CSD’s decision to commission a new variant of the 
ICS in April 2013 (see Section 7.2.2 for further discussion). This new variant was 
described as being ‘more restrictive’ (SW1, FG) and offering ‘less opportunity for 
discretion’ (SW17, Q) than its predecessor; especially because of its embedded 
‘workflow’ element (absent in its predecessor), which, as one social worker 
succinctly stated, ‘stops me doing what I want, when I want’ (SW6, Q). 
The nature of this problem was elucidated by another participant who described 
her ‘repeated’ experience of encountering ‘hold-ups’ in the system, caused by the 
workflow:  
I sit down to write my [child protection] conference report – I’ve 
got two hours to write it, and it has to be in today... I log onto 
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[ICS], go to start writing, and I find that the core group minutes 
have not been approved, so there is a hold-up in the workflow. I 
can’t start writing until they have been approved, and the 
workflow updated. It can take me the two hours to get that 
sorted out – depending on the availability of managers – at which 
point the free time that I had, has been taken up resolving the 
workflow issue (SW6, SSI). 
As suggested within this extract, the cause of workflow ‘hold-ups’ was often that 
other parties (usually managers) were responsible for either approving the social 
worker’s work before the workflow would progress, or else, for completing a 
separate task that was also embedded within the workflow stream. This point was 
illustrated in an example given by one social worker who described the (then) new 
process of ensuring that a child was recorded as ‘looked after’ on the ICS 
immediately after they had come into local authority care:   
Previously, with the old system if a child became looked after, I 
would fill in a change form, give it to admin, and they would fill in 
a box on the system… Now with the new system, I have counted 
up the different stages and tasks… there are ten, and six people 
involved… It can take days to get the child recorded as ‘looked 
after’, depending on where other people are and if they are busy 
(SW6, FG)6. 
Such experiences were symptomatic of the ‘increased bureaucracy’ (SW3, FG) 
associated with the new variant of the system. (I discuss in Chapter 7 how the social 
workers were aware of the critique of ICS workflows and the bureaucracy 
associated with them within the Munro Review, and comment, in this context, 
upon the decision to procure such a variant.) However, another area where the 
                                                        
6 See Appendix 17 for an illustrative comparison of this process between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ variants 
of the ICS. 
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social workers felt that they did not have discretionary space, was in respect to the 
‘content of [their ICS] recordings’ (SW7, Q).  
The social workers described that a ‘cultural expectation of compliance’ (SW2, FG) 
existed within the CSD, exemplified by ‘strict policies’ and ‘monitoring’ of what was 
included in ICS submissions (SW15, Q) (see Section 6.2 for further discussion). They 
associated the departmental appointment of a new ADCS in the autumn of 2012 
with an upsurge in the ‘focus on performance management’ (SW3, FG) (see Section 
6.2), which, in respect to their ICS recording, was experienced in the form of an 
‘increasing series of rules’ for such things as: ‘how to record a statutory visit’ (SW5, 
SSI), ‘the content of core group minutes’(SW4, SSI) and ‘areas to address in a child 
protection conference report’ (SW7, SSI).  
They also outlined that it was the culture of managers not to ‘approve’ ICS 
submissions where an exemplar box or question ‘[had] been left blank’ (SW6, Q). 
Instead, the task tended to be returned to the social worker (via the virtual 
workflow) for ‘remedial action’ (SW9, Q). I was advised that this occurred ‘even on 
those occasions when it made more sense not to fill in the box’ (SW14, Q), as the 
following extract illustrates: 
I’ve had [ICS recordings] sent back because I haven’t filled in the 
box that asks for ‘the child’s opinion’, even though that child is, as 
of yet, unborn… seriously [bemused expression] (SW2, SSI). 
What do you do by way of response? (Interviewer). 
I just write ‘the child is not born yet’ and that usually does the 
trick [laughs] (SW2, SSI). 
It is approved with that addition? (Interviewer). 
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Yes [still laughing] (SW2, SSI). 
Despite the practitioner’s laughter in this account, the social workers generally 
expressed irritation with the level of bureaucracy that they associated with both 
the ICS workflow and the local recording culture. Their frustration was indicated in 
typical accounts describing ‘increasing and onerous paperwork’ (SW17, Q), and of 
‘time wasted resolving unnecessary problems’ (SW6, FG).  
Indeed, the social workers felt that the workplace culture in respect to the ICS 
compelled them to spend the largest portion of their time at their desk (see Section 
6.2.2), but ‘at the expense of spending time with children’ (SW1, FG) (see also 
Broadhurst et al., 2010a; 2010b; Wastell et al., 2010). This was something that they 
subsequently identified as impacting upon their willingness to employ discretion – 
which I discuss further in Chapter 5.  
4.2.4 Must-do timescales and deadlines 
The final area identified as one where there was ‘limited freedom’ to employ 
discretion was in respect to ‘timescales and deadlines’ (SW9, Q). However, given 
the extensive nature and variety of departmentally prescribed timescales 
encountered during the course of the study, I asked the social workers to be explicit 
in setting out those which they understood to be ‘must-do’ (Evans, 2016: 609) and 
which they specifically associated with a dearth of discretionary space. Four specific 
tasks emerged:   
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• Child protection statutory visits – ‘to be completed every 28 days’ 
[and recorded on the ICS ‘within 1 working day’ of the visit – see 
Appendix 16];  
• Core Group Meetings – ‘to be held every 28 days’ [and recorded on 
the ICS ‘within 3 working days of the meeting’ taking place – see 
Appendix 16];  
• Child protection conference reports – ‘to be submitted [onto the 
ICS] 1 working week before conference’ (see Appendix 16); and 
• Children and family [‘single’] assessments – ‘to be finalised [on the 
ICS] 28 days from point of referral’ (see Appendix 16).   
I was able to ratify the stated ‘necessity of compliance’ with each of these 
timescales in local policy documents (see Appendix 16). What is more, I was advised 
that they served as key indicators on the CSD’s ‘Annex A’ audit tool (named after 
the ‘performance data’ section of the external inspection framework (see Ofsted, 
2019: 62-69), comprising of a list of weekly generated, quantitative data taken from 
the ICS.  
Importantly, the managers conceded that they used the information detailed within 
the ‘Annex A’ to monitor compliance and adjust a social worker’s ‘granted freedom’ 
(see Hupe et al., 2015) accordingly: 
The Annex A is where I take my information on social worker 
performance… I can see where the social worker is performing 
well – complying with expectations, meeting timescales etc – and 
where they are not performing so well. Depending on what I see, I 
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might increase or relax the scrutiny that I give to the social 
worker’s work as well as the freedom that I afford them (M1, FG). 
Thus, the implication was that a failure to evidence compliance with these ‘must-
do’ timescales could lead to a reduction of formally granted (de jure) discretionary 
space in other areas of the social worker’s practice. (This I considered could be 
conceived as a motivating factor in the social worker’s approach to their discretion 
– see Section 6.1). However, also evident within the social workers’ accounts was 
the perception that non-compliance with these timescales was accompanied by 
level of ‘personal risk’ to the social worker (SW9, Q); both in the sense that one was 
more liable to be ‘blamed’ (see Section 6.3), and that it could result in formal 
‘disciplinary action’: 
Definitely; it is risky not showing that you have stuck to timescales 
(SW4, FG). 
Yeah, it’s that if you don’t comply [with timescales] you can be 
blamed if something goes wrong (SW3, FG). 
… and punished (SW4, FG). 
What do you mean by ‘punished’? (Facilitator). 
Urm, you know… disciplinary action (SW4, FG). 
Of course I understood that one might expect ‘disciplinary action’ to be initiated in 
situations where a social worker had seemingly failed to fulfil their statutory ‘duty’ 
with respect to certain timescales (for example, the timeliness of the core group or 
the convening of a child protection conference – see HM Government, 2018: 52): 
It is the expectation of [Marketon CSD] that social workers will 
undertake their statutory responsibilities without fail… On those 
occasions in which [Marketon CSD] has reason to believe that the 
social worker has knowingly failed to carry out their statutory 
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responsibilities… [Marketon CSD] will consider the suitability of 
disciplinary procedures (Policy Document – ‘Social Worker Duties 
and Responsibilities’, August, 2016). 
However, I was also advised, that it was a departmental culture to initiate 
disciplinary action for missed deadlines that were locally, rather than nationally, 
set:  
You know [manager] put me on an ‘action plan’ right? (SW1, FG). 
No, I didn’t know that (Facilitator). 
Yeah, I was disciplined basically because I wasn’t completing my 
assessments ‘on time’ [gesticulates with hands to indicate that 
this is a quote]. They said that it has become a ‘repeated problem’ 
[again, gesticulates]… I have not been completing them within 28 
days... not because I don’t want to, but because I am too busy; I 
have too much work to do… In any case I said ‘but the statutory 
guidance says 45 working days’ and I was told ‘well that’s the way 
we do it round [sic] here’… (SW1, FG). 
In this extract, the disparity between statutory guidance (see HM Government, 
2018) and local policy in respect to timescales for completing assessments of a child 
and its family is striking; as is the account of the social worker being ‘disciplined’ 
despite adhering to the former. 
However, whilst this disparity was acknowledged by the social workers, they 
generally accepted it as part of the local culture, in the context of ‘that’s the way 
we do it round here’:  
Yeah, the assessment timescales… it is odd that we have only 4 
weeks to complete the assessment but the statutory guidance 
says 45 working days [laughs]. It’s just how things are… 
[employer] does things their own way… it doesn’t bother me, I 
just make sure that I meet my deadlines (SW4, SSI). 
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Would you ever choose not to meet those deadlines? 
(Interviewer). 
No way [laughs]… it’s just not worth it (SW4, SSI). 
Indicative in this exchange is the level of compulsion that the social workers 
generally felt towards evidencing their compliance with departmentally set ‘must-
do’ timescales (it was also in contrast to the social workers’ general willingness to 
break with official policy with respect to spending their own money in the interests 
of the child – see Section 4.2.2). 
Indeed, whilst the wider literature suggests that any timescale, like other rules, 
provides an ingrained de facto discretionary space, where social workers can decide 
whether and how to conform (see Dworkin, 1977; Evans and Harris, 2004; Taylor 
and Kelly, 2006; Shaw et al., 2009), this was not an area in which the social workers 
of this study were generally willing to employ their discretion: 
Timescales… has anyone used the expression ‘comply or die’ yet? 
(SW5, SSI). 
Yes, I have heard that. What do you think it means? (Interviewer). 
It’s a moto we have in the office; a joke… we say you better stick 
to those deadlines or else [laughs]... It’s basically recognising the 
fact that the potential cost of not sticking with timescales is too 
high… for me personally, compliance is the only logical option 
(SW5, SSI). 
4.2.5 Summary 
In summary, the social workers identified four areas in which their discretionary 
space was restricted. These pertained to the ‘outcome decisions’ of Child 
Protection Conferences, Legal Planning Meetings and Final Care Planning Meetings; 
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‘decisions to spend money’; the ‘workflows and content’ of the ICS; and with 
regards to specific ‘must-do’ timescales and deadlines.   
That being said, this restriction pertained to the ‘de jure’ discretionary space, and 
there were areas in these examples in which the social worker remained able to 
exercise discretion in a ‘de facto’ (for example, timescales and deadlines) or else 
‘entrepreneurial’ sense (for example, decisions to spend their own money). In these 
situations the issue therefore became whether the social worker was willing, and 
indeed chose, to employ their discretion, and this is the context of discussion in 
Chapter 5.   
In the next section I consider in more detail those areas in which the social workers 
believed that they were afforded a discretionary space; again framing the 
discussion in terms of these different types of discretionary space. 
4.3 Where social workers said that they did have discretionary space  
Generally, each social worker was able to identify only one or two areas in which 
they thought that they were afforded a discretionary space, as opposed to multiple 
areas in which they felt that they did not have discretionary space. Interestingly, 
two participants, in responding to the questionnaire, went as far as to state that 
they did not have any discretionary space and a weakness in the methodological 
design here was that I was not able to further explore these sentiments with these 
participants.  
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Although the social workers accounts differed in terms of language used, I 
identified what I believe to be the four distinct domains (again developed from 
specific ‘memo titles’ – see Section 3.7.6) where they believed that a discretionary 
space existed. These are as follows:  
• Management of own time – Diary management; 
• Logistical decisions in day-to-day case management; 
• Implementation of the child in need (but not necessarily the child 
protection) plan; and 
• Emergency time-sensitive decisions. 
I will consider each in turn.   
4.3.1 Management of own time – Diary management 
The area in which there was most consensus about the availability of discretionary 
space was in respect to the social workers’ ‘diary management’ (SW4, SSI). Indeed, 
the social workers outlined that they were generally able to ‘organise [their] own 
day’ (SW5, SSI), ‘manage [their] own time’ (SW3, SSI), decide on ‘the order in which 
[they] completed [their] tasks’ (SW5, FG), and, for the most part, determine ‘what 
work [they did] when’ (SW17, Q) – workflow ‘hold-ups’ notwithstanding.  
However, the social workers also recognised that this freedom was not absolute, 
and that the management of their time was also influenced by their ‘negotiation of 
both departmental expectations and the general demands of the child protection 
task’ (SW2, Q).  
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I understood these ‘departmental expectations’ to include: ‘adherence to [must-do] 
procedures and timescales’ (SW6, Q) (see Section 4.2.4); the need to ‘negotiate the 
demands of the ICS workflow’ (SW2, Q) (see Section 4.2.3); the expectation of 
‘conformity with process’ (SW3, FG) and ‘complying with specific management 
requests’ or instructions (SW1, SSI). The ‘demands of the child protection task’ was 
more difficult to decipher, but I settled on the idea that this referred to the need to 
‘respond to unexpected events’ as one managed the human element of public 
service provision (Lipsky, 2010), that is, the ‘unpredictability’ of ‘service users’ 
(SW12, Q).  
Examples of these ‘unexpected events’ included: ‘an injury to a child’ (SW8, SSI); ‘an 
allegation of abuse’ (SW12, Q); or the ‘emergency visit’ (SW5, SSI). Such 
occurrences were accepted as ‘the norm’ but meant that at certain points in time, a 
social worker was compelled (as one might expect) to ‘dispense with everything 
else that [they were] doing, and respond accordingly’ (SW5, SSI). This extract taken 
from my field notes illustrates this point: 
I accompanied [social worker] today to attend an emergency, and 
thus unplanned, paediatric medical assessment for a child on her 
caseload. We were at the hospital for four hours. [Social worker] 
reflected that she had a lot of other tasks planned in her diary for 
today, and that she would now have to find the time elsewhere to 
complete these. She explained that the freedom that she 
sometimes had to organise her own day, could be ‘undone in an 
instant’ by an emergency or unexpected event. I asked her if she 
could ever use her discretion and choose not to prioritise the 
‘emergency’ over her other planned tasks. Her response was 
unequivocal – ‘no’ (Discussion with Social Worker – Paediatrics 
Ward, November, 2014). 
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In part because of the requirement to respond to these ‘unexpected events’ (SW12, 
Q), but also because of a ‘limited time availability brought on by high work demand’ 
(SW6, FG) (see Section 6.1.1 for further discussion), the social workers explained 
that even the availability of discretionary space in respect to diary management did 
not enable them to accommodate all of the differing needs of the individual 
children on their caseload. Indeed, more often, their limited time and capacity 
compelled them to choose between different children’s needs: 
This happens all the time; I need to decide between which piece 
of work takes priority… it does mean choosing between the needs 
of different children (SW1, SSI). 
I found that some social workers, in responding to this ‘human tension’ (see Lipsky, 
2010) would choose not to employ their discretion for ‘fear of making the wrong 
choice’ (SW4, SSI) – or perhaps to avoid the ‘discomfiture’ (Evans, 2010: 62) of 
‘prioritising [the needs of] one child over another’ (SW5, SSI). Instead, they tended 
to seek instruction from, or delegate a decision to, their line manager: 
I always ask my manager for advice as to which work to 
prioritise… I mean it’s so hard when what you are effectively 
doing is saying ‘right I’m going to prioritise this child’… I hate that 
aspect of it (SW5, SSI).  
Alternatively, other social workers chose to respond by maximising their 
discretionary freedom; for example, organising their time so that they would 
complete administrative work at home in the evenings or at weekends; or arranging 
to visit families ‘out of normal working hours’ (SW15, Q): 
This freedom lets me arrange my visits around the family’s 
circumstances. So I visited a father last week after he finished his 
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shift at 9pm… I’ve also gone to see children before school… (SW2, 
SSI). 
How early might you visit? (Interviewer). 
6.30am or 7am, depending on how I can fit into their routine 
(SW2, SSI). 
I considered that a number of safety and ethical tensions arose in these accounts. 
For example, the risks associated with lone working late into the evening and the 
potential for 6.30am visits to be construed as oppressive if not arranged in full 
agreement with families. Further, I noted that taking certain documents out of the 
office contravened policy on data protection and privacy. However, the social 
workers explained that these types of behaviours were not only tolerated, but 
sometimes ‘expected’ by managers, albeit on an ‘unofficial’ or else ‘informal’ basis: 
There is this culture where managers expect you to get the visits 
done and complete the paperwork ‘in whatever way possible’ 
[social worker uses hands to indicate this is a quote] but will never 
officially say ‘yes you should work at home in the evenings and 
weekends’ [again, use of hand gesture]. They just expect you to 
do it; it’s like an unofficial policy. When I first started [social] 
work, I’d say, ‘there isn’t the time’, only to be told to ‘find’ or 
‘make time’. That time can only come from one place… home 
time [grimaces] (SW6, SSI).  
This description of indirect encouragement to complete work at home, constructed 
as ‘unofficial policy’, was, I realised, again characteristic of an ‘entrepreneurial’ 
discretionary space (Evans, 2016: 609). However, I considered that this differed 
from that entrepreneurial space available in ‘decisions to spend one’s own money’ 
– as with that example managers ‘tolerated’, as opposed to indirectly encouraged, 
social workers to break with official policy. Yet, I understood both to be examples of 
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where an informal space was afforded on the pretext of achieving a more effective 
service provision in real terms (see Evans, 2016).  
I theorised that choosing to employ discretion in this ‘entrepreneurial space’ could 
pose a risk to the social worker, as the external perception would invariably be that 
they had chosen – rather than been encouraged – not to comply with formal policy 
(Evans, 2016). However, several social workers indicated that they felt ‘compelled’ 
to visit families out of hours or take office work home: ‘it’s just part of the job’ 
(SW5, Q), ‘something that I’ve come to expect’ (SW6, FG), they told me. What is 
more, some saw it as beneficial ‘in the wider scheme of ensuring better services for 
children’ (SW2, FG) as this extract indicates:  
As a practitioner, I choose to visit children more regularly than is 
prescribed – that’s my preference… But then the paperwork still 
has to be done, so I organise my time so that I can move the 
[administrative work] into my personal time… yes this means that 
I am often working at home, but it allows me to spend more time 
with children during the working day, and in this respect, I think it 
is worthwhile (SW8, SSI). 
In this sense, I reflected that the discretionary space afforded to social workers in 
respect to their time and diary management, could be perceived as enabling them 
to practice in accordance with the individual needs of the child (as advocated in the 
Munro Review – see Chapter 1). However, I also noted that Munro’s image of a 
more ‘effective’ system was one in which this freedom was formally recognised and 
not one where social workers felt compelled to exercise an informal and unofficial 
discretionary space (see Chapter 7 for further discussion).  
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4.3.2 Logistical decisions in day-to-day case management 
The second area in which the social workers identified that they had discretionary 
space pertained to those ‘day-to-day’ (SW3, SSI) and ‘logistical’ (SW5, Q) decisions 
and actions ‘taken in the course of managing cases’ (SW5, FG). The social workers 
considered these to be ‘low risk’ in nature (SW6, SSI), and ‘falling outside of the 
interests of management’ (SW6, FG). In this sense they tended to exclude anything 
to do with departmental expenditure – although I considered that the decision to 
spend one’s own money might fit into this category. Also, they excluded those 
decisions which, to use Evans’ (2016: 609) terms, might impact upon the ‘external 
perceptions of performance’ – thus, anything that might be construed as indicators 
of ‘good practice’ in respect to inspection (for example, adherence to timescales 
and evidence of a complete and coherent ‘child’s file’ on the ICS – see Section 6.2).  
In this regard, this discretionary space could be conceived as a freedom in the ‘the 
style and manner of practice’ observed by Howe (1991: 219) or as the ‘task 
discretion’ outlined by Taylor and Kelly (2006). Indeed, it extended to ‘what’ the 
social workers said and did, and ‘how’ and ‘when’ they said and did it:  
I guess you could think about that [discretionary space] as the 
freedom to decide what I discuss in a meeting or the content of 
an email (SW2, SSI). 
I’m free to decide on what I say to a child, for example, in 
explaining my role, and the work we might do together (SW4, SSI). 
An[other] example might be how I choose to conduct a home 
visit, or the content of a direct work session (SW7, SSI). 
It could be in decisions about the tasks that I set for parents, or 
those that I allocate to other professionals to complete on behalf 
of the group (SW1, SSI). 
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It was apparent that this type of freedom was one that the social workers valued, 
and associated with their status of being a professional practitioner: 
For me personally, that space relates to those professional 
capabilities that we are expected to undertake as social workers… 
It’s something that I enjoy and am proud of; being able to decide 
‘right this is how I think I should do this task’ and then actioning it 
without checking with anyone else (SW8, SSI). 
I think it’s about that trust and autonomy of being a professional… 
trusting me to know what to say to a child, how to run a difficult 
meeting… how to console a grieving family member... It can be 
tough, but I suppose it’s also an area of the job that I enjoy the 
most (SW1, SSI). 
It was also evident that on this basis the social workers expected to be afforded a 
‘logistical space’ (SW9, Q): 
It’s also that I expect to have this freedom. Like I said it’s part of 
being a professional… being trusted to decide how to manage 
yourself and your interactions with others. I can cope with all the 
bureaucracy and prescription, being told what money can and 
cannot be spent, or what procedure to follow. But if you took that 
[logistical space] away, then the job wouldn’t be worthwhile 
(SW8, SSI).  
Yes, I expect that [discretionary] space… having some freedom, 
albeit in a logistical sense, it goes to the heart of being a 
professional doesn’t it? It’s part of your professional identity 
(SW3, SSI). 
However, not all of the social workers reported being afforded this freedom, and 
some described a management style that encroached into their ‘logistical space’ 
(SW4, Q), where the manager sort to ‘micro-manage’ and ‘be involved in even the 
smallest of [logistical] decisions’ (SW6, SSI):  
I can’t walk in the office now without her asking me where I have 
been, what I’ve seen, what I’ve said, what did they say?… I don’t 
need that… I don’t have the time to repeatedly sit and have a 
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conversation about a conversation that I have just had with a 
family (SW2, SSI). 
Having over six years of child protection social work experience, the social worker in 
this last account was one of the most experienced practitioners to participate 
within the research (see Appendix 2). The context of her lament was in describing 
the difficulties that she was experiencing with a ‘new manager’ (both ‘new’ to the 
CPT and the CSD); especially in terms of this manager’s purported tendency to limit 
the social worker’s ‘day-to-day [logistical] space’ (SW2, SSI).  
Thus, it is noteworthy that within six weeks of participating in the research 
interview, the same social worker submitted her notice of resignation. As indicated 
in the extract below, her rationale for this decision manifested from a feeling of 
being ‘disempowered’ and ‘de-professionalised’ which she associated with the 
restriction of her logistical freedom: 
[Social Worker] approached me today to say that she had handed 
in her notice of resignation. She wished to discuss and explain her 
reasons for this decision… She told me that she had become 
‘disillusioned’ by her lack of freedom ‘even to make day-to-day 
case decisions’... and the loss of her ‘logistical’ freedom… She 
explained that ‘for someone of [her] experience to become so 
suddenly disempowered and de-professionalised in this way’, 
meant that she could ‘no longer continue to work for’ [the 
employer] (Discussion with Social Worker – Office, May, 2016). 
Whilst this account emphasises the importance that the social workers placed on 
this area of discretionary space, it also again highlights the role that other members 
of the CSD could have in deciding the social worker’s level of discretionary freedom; 
a theme that propagates into the following section. 
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4.3.3 The management and implementation of the child in need 
(but not necessarily the child protection) plan 
The third area in which the social workers felt that they had discretionary space, 
was in the ‘management and implementation of child in need plan’ (SW7, Q).   
The ‘plan’ tended to be informed by the social work assessment of the child’s 
circumstances. However, the organisational design (see Figure 3) determined that 
the first assessment after referral was usually completed by a different social work 
team (see Section 3.3.3). Recognising the ‘propensity for changing needs to emerge 
as a case progresse[d]’ and the ‘requirement for the social worker to be flexible 
when encountering a change in circumstance’ (Policy Document – ‘The 
Management of Child in Need Cases’, August 2016), the policy and culture was to 
afford the case holding social worker the power to ‘alter the plan as they judge[d] it 
necessary’. 
In practice this meant that social workers had a de jure space to add or remove 
stated interventions from the plan (although there was an expectation that they 
would communicate and agree this with both the family in receipt of services and 
the connected professionals). The social workers felt that this provided them with a 
degree of freedom to ‘be innovative and adapt to the individual needs and changing 
situation of the child and family’ (SW7, Q): 
I can respond to the unique circumstances of the family… change 
the support offered to make sure that it is the right type for their 
situation… (SW6, SSI). 
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The formally granted nature of this space was endorsed by the manager 
participants who advised that – like that space afforded in diary and (for the most 
part) logical case management – this freedom was provided on the basis of the 
social worker’s professional status: 
I would want social workers to use their discretion in… the 
management of both child in need and child protection plans (M2, 
FG). 
I agree, that’s another area where, as a professional social 
worker, I would expect them to manage their work with minimal 
intervention from me as their manager (M3, FG). 
Similarly, policy documents outlined that the social worker, ‘as the lead 
practitioner’, should be afforded discretionary space in respect to the management 
of the child protection plan, emphasising their ‘freedom’ to 
add to, and remove from, the child protection plan… according to 
their assessment of the changing family situation and the child’s 
needs (Policy Document – ‘The Management of Child Protection 
Cases’, August 2016). 
However, noteworthy within this policy wording was the absence of mention of the 
Independent Reviewing Officer (IRO), who the social workers believed held the 
most power in deciding both the content of the child protection plan and on 
whether the social worker would be afforded a discretionary space in respect to its 
content: 
Because the IRO has final say over the making of the plan, they 
have a lot of power to control what goes into the plan… If the 
social worker is to be given the space to decide on the content of 
the plan, then it is because the IRO made that decision (SW6, SSI). 
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Indeed, the social workers explained that the IRO had the capacity to either enable 
or restrict the social worker’s discretionary space in respect to the child protection 
plan. Moreover, they believed that the local culture was for IROs to restrict, what 
was otherwise, a de jure space: 
I think in general this group of IROs seeks to limit the 
discretion[ary space] that we have in terms of the child protection 
plan. My own experience is that they tend to decide-upon and 
manage the content independently of [the social worker’s] efforts 
and recommendations (SW8, SSI).   
A limitation of this study was that it did not facilitate discussions with the IROs (and 
this remains a potential area with which to extend the enquiry – see Section 8.2). 
However, I questioned some participant’s assertion that the IRO could have ‘total 
control’ (SW12, Q) over the social worker’s discretionary space in this regard, on 
the basis that the social worker, as ‘lead practitioner’ and ‘case holder’, was likely 
to encounter a degree of innate (de facto) freedom (Evans and Harris, 2004) – 
something that had been noted in other areas of their practice (see above), and 
which, arguments suggested, was ‘inevitable’ in street-level work (Lipksy, 2010; 
Baldwin, 2000) (see Section 2.2.1).  
Several social workers accepted this point, recognising their ability to change the 
content of the child protection plan if they chose to. However, they also outlined 
that because the plan existed in written form on the ICS, and that it could be freely 
accessed by the IRO under the premise of ‘monitoring progress’ (SW3, FG), any 
changes that were made by the social worker, were therefore easily identified, and 
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further, had more recently become the basis on which IROs had raised ‘formal 
expressions of concern’ to CSD managers about social worker practice decisions.  
Thus, again ‘fearing’ that the exercise of their de facto discretion would result in 
specific ‘negative personal consequences’ (SW5, SSI) (see above and Section 5.1), a 
number of social workers in this study adopted a position of compliance and 
conformity on this issue – choosing not to employ their discretion with respect to 
the content of child protection plans. 
That being said, there were others who described engaging in an ‘active resistance’ 
of the IRO’s ‘control’ (SW2, SSI). Here ‘resistance’ was understood in the same 
sense as that described by Lipsky (2010) and Baldwin (2000), that is, seeking out 
and maximising informal discretionary space, and thus ignoring ‘personal 
concerns… in the interest of the individual child’ (SW1, SSI): 
Yeah, the IRO has a lot of control of the child protection plan, but 
they are not working with the family everyday… I am not afraid to 
make changes to the plan and then justify them later given that it 
is what I think is best for the children… (SW2, SSI).  
Whilst the social worker in this last extract expressed a ‘confidence’ in making 
changes to the child protection plan, based on their judgment of ‘what… is best for 
the child’, her counterpart outlined that on occasions, decisions to ‘resist’ an IRO’s 
control over the plan had, in her mind, resulted in more costly consequences for 
the child:  
In the past I have made changes to the plan believing that was the 
right thing to do for the individual child. But then I have got to the 
child protection conference and the IRO has said, ‘right, because 
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you changed the plan, and that specific intervention which I think 
is still really important remains incomplete, means that I can’t 
agree that the plan should end’… so they keep the child on the 
plan for another six months… This can feel really oppressive for 
the child and their family… that’s why I won’t use my discretion 
with the child protection plan anymore (SW1, SSI). 
Two pertinent points emerge here. First, is the assertion that when encountering a 
discretionary space, the social worker’s willingness to employ their discretion was 
influenced not only by their judgment of the potential impact upon themselves (as 
indicated above) but also the assessment of impact upon the service user – in this 
account the prospect of a child experiencing a negative outcome on the basis of the 
social worker’s discretionary behaviour was said to dissuade that social worker 
from employing their discretion (this forms the context of a wider discussion in 
Chapter 5). 
Second, this highlights the dilemma faced by the social workers in this study, they 
could choose to exercise their discretion within the de facto discretionary space, 
and thus change a child protection plan believing that it would enable a ‘better 
service response to the family’s individual or changed circumstance’ (SW6, SSI). 
However, by doing so, this could also result in a negative consequence, not only for 
themselves (for example, in the form of IROs raising concerns with CSD 
management about a social worker’s practice – see above),  but also for the child or 
family concerned – for example, necessitating that the child remain subject to the 
child protection plan for an ‘unnecessarily elongated’  (SW12, Q) and thus 
‘oppressive’ period of time. 
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This I considered highlighted the difficulties of restricting the social worker’s de jure 
discretionary space in this area of their practice. Whilst, their intention in choosing 
not to employ discretion, was ostensibly to avoid ‘oppressive’ outcomes for 
children, they were thus not able to demonstrate the type of ‘flexibility’ and 
‘responsiveness’ to the individual child’s needs and circumstances that was 
ostensibly afforded to them in respect to the child in need plan, and which, they 
believed improved the ‘effectiveness’ of their practice, as advocated by the Munro 
Review (see Chapter 1).  
This was an area in which the social workers favoured change, indicating that if the 
space afforded to them was of a de jure as opposed to de facto nature, then they 
would be more willing to employ their discretion: 
Absolutely, if I felt that the IRO trusted me to make those 
changes, and would endorse them, then I would be much more 
likely to use my discretion (SW1, SSI). 
This becomes an area for further discussion in Chapter 5. 
4.3.4 Emergency time-sensitive decisions  
The final area in which the social workers identified a discretionary space was in 
respect to ‘time -sensitive decisions’ (SW7, Q). These were understood to be 
‘decisions requiring a quick’ (SW7, Q) or ‘timely response’ (SW3, SSI) so as ‘to 
reduce the risk of harm’ (SW9, Q) or else of ‘negative short… or long-term 
consequences occurring’ (SW5, FG).  
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I asked the social workers who this concern (of being ‘harmed’ or the recipient of 
‘negative consequences’) pertained to. Most often they responded as one might 
expect: ‘the child’ (SW2, FG); ‘family’ (SW6, SSI) or ‘service user’ (SW2, SSI). 
However, they also explained that on occasions it could extend to include 
themselves; their ‘employer’ (SW6, FG); ‘other professionals’ (SW4, SSI) or indeed, 
‘members of the public’ (SW8, SSI). 
Mostly, this discretionary space was understood to exist in a de facto sense, where 
opportunities to employ discretion emerged because of ‘unexpected’ (SW3, FG) or 
‘unforeseen’ (SW11, Q) situations and scenarios (the ‘inevitable’ source of 
discretionary space according to Lipsky, 2010). However, it was also the 
understanding of the social workers that in specific contexts (see below) they had 
explicit permission from their employer to exercise their discretion ‘in the interests 
of reducing the chances of harm occurring’ (SW4, SSI), and thus, in these 
circumstances I considered that this discretionary space could also be conceived in 
the de jure sense of the term (although I noted a lack of formal policy setting out 
these nuances). 
For the social workers, their ‘location’ at the time of a decision, was an important 
influencing factor in cultivating this discretionary space. In elucidating this point, 
they explained that the general expectation within the CSD was that ‘any high-risk 
decision should have oversight of a manager’ (M1, FG). Thus, when the social 
worker encountered a ‘time-sensitive’ decision whilst in the social work office, they 
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were expected to discuss the circumstances of the decision with a manager (the 
assumption being that the manager was available): 
Yes, I would expect the social worker to come to me in that 
context and tell me what is going on, so I can have some oversight 
of the response (M4, FG). 
However, if a ‘time-sensitive’ decision arose ‘in the field’ or in circumstances in 
which managers were not easily obtainable, then the decision changed from one 
that the social worker would not normally make independently, to one in which the 
use of discretion was not merely expected, but ‘required’ (SW8, SSI) – ‘especially 
when necessary to safeguard a child from the threat of harm’ (SW4, SSI). This 
assertion was supported by the managers: 
It’s more when they are away from the office and encounter that 
high risk situation where I would want them to use their 
discretion (M4, FG). 
Absolutely, to delay a decision and risk harm being suffered to a 
child, merely to consult with a manager, could never be justified 
after the fact (M1, FG). 
However, I considered that the notion of a ‘time-sensitive’ decision was rather a 
relative one, and that a social worker might encounter a decision in the field, in 
which a timely decision was required, but where they still had the time, and 
opportunity, to consult with a manager or colleague: 
Yes, it is relative because the decision might be time-sensitive but 
there might also still be the time to call a manager and ask for 
advice. In fact really, I would want to do that, if I had the chance, 
and I think that they would expect that of me also (SW5, FG). 
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The manager participants agreed that, given the opportunity, they would prefer 
social workers to consult with them: 
However, if [the social worker] assesses that there is time to delay 
a high-risk decision and seek advice from me or one of the other 
managers, then I would want them to do that… in the interests of 
ensuring a more rigorous decision is arrived upon… (M3, FG). 
Thus, I considered that what decided the discretionary space was more the 
immediacy with which the decision was required and less the social worker’s (or 
indeed the manager’s) location at the time of the decision. This point was made by 
a social worker who differentiated between those ‘emergency’ and ‘non-
emergency’ time-sensitive decisions: 
I guess you could separate them into emergency and non-
emergency… Both are time-sensitive, but the emergency decision 
needs a response straight away, without delay, or the chance to 
go and get direction… (SW6, SSI).   
This distinction is an important one. Whilst a ‘non-emergency’ but ‘time-sensitive’ 
decision enabled a de facto discretionary space, it also allowed for time to consult 
with, and seek direction from, managers – and it was the expectation of managers 
that social workers would maximise this opportunity. Conversely, in those 
‘emergency’ time-sensitive decisions, managers expressed that ‘delay… could [not] 
be justified’, and thus social workers were afforded a de jure, as opposed to de 
facto, space. 
Again, this influenced the social workers’ willingness to employ their discretion. 
They explained that they would be more willing to employ discretion in an 
‘emergency’ time-sensitive sense, not only on the basis that this was their 
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‘professional duty’ (SW8, SSI), but because the formally acknowledged discretionary 
space meant that they felt ‘supported and encouraged’ by their managers to do so 
(see Section 5.1 for further discussion). However, they were also less willing to 
employ discretion in the ‘non-emergency’ de facto discretionary context, as to do 
so would contravene that expectation that their decision would be informed by 
consultation with a manager: 
No, I wouldn’t choose to use my discretion if it wasn’t an 
emergency… I would check with a manager first… that is what we 
are expected to do (SW4, SSI). 
In Chapters 5 and 6 I further elaborate on the social workers’ rationale for this, but 
the pertinent point to highlight again here, is that the tendency amongst the social 
workers was to favour exercising their discretion in a de jure as opposed to de facto 
space, with the knowledge that such behaviour was formally recognised and 
‘endorsed’ (see Section 5.1). 
4.3.5 Summary 
In summary four areas in which the social workers stated that they were afforded 
discretionary space pertained to their ‘time’ or ‘diary’ management; their ‘logistical’ 
and ‘day-to-day’ case management; the management and implementation of the 
child in need plan; and in those ‘emergency’ ‘time-sensitive’ decisions. Again, these 
examples were understood in the ‘de jure’ sense, as the social worker’s 
discretionary freedom tended to be formally acknowledged by managers and, on 
some occasions, in formal written policy. 
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The social workers also identified that the management and implementation of the 
child protection plan was an area in which the IRO restricted a discretionary space 
that had been formally acknowledged in policy documents. Here however, they 
retained a de facto space which allowed them to make changes to the child 
protection plan if they judged it necessary and appropriate.  
Similarly, a de facto space existed in the context of those ‘non-emergency’ time-
sensitive decisions.  However, what became apparent was that the social workers 
were generally less willing to employ discretion in these de facto contexts, than 
they were in a de jure or even the entrepreneurial ones, and this is a point that 
forms the basis of wider discussion in Chapter 5.  
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to elucidate that which I understood to be the areas where 
the social workers encountered discretionary space, but also, where their 
discretionary space had been restricted. In doing so, I cited examples where 
discretionary space might be thought of as ‘curtailed’ (Howe, 1986; 1991; Wastell et 
al., 2010), or else ‘eroded’ (Munro, 2005; 2010b; 2011a; 2011b), but asserted that 
this was only in officially granted and recognised (‘de jure’) terms. Indeed, I outlined 
that in a number of these areas, social workers continued to encounter a 
discretionary space, albeit in a de facto or entrepreneurial sense. 
Further I have, throughout the chapter, observed that the reason why the type of 
space encountered was important, was because it served to inform whether the 
social workers were willing to employ discretion in that particular context. This 
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forms the basis of discussion in the following chapter where I seek to present the 
research findings relative to the research question: ‘When do social worker’s choose 
discretion?’. 
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CHAPTER 5 – WHEN DO SOCIAL WORKERS CHOOSE 
DISCRETION?  
5.0 Introduction: ‘willingness’ over ‘choice’ 
The previous chapter’s focus was on elucidating those findings which addressed the 
research question: ‘Where do social workers encounter discretionary space?’.  
Within this chapter I turn to consider those findings relating to the second research 
question: ‘When do social workers choose discretion?’. 
As previously noted (see Section 2.5.1), my interest here extends from that critique 
of the supposition that to have a discretionary space is to engage in discretionary 
behaviour (for example, Howe, 1986, 1991).  Theorists have countered that it is as 
much about the social worker’s ability to choose whether to engage in discretionary 
decision-making and/or action-taking as it is about encountering a discretionary 
space itself (Evans and Harris, 2004; Lipsky, 2010; Evans, 2010; 2013; 2016).   
However, my preference throughout the chapter will be to use the term 
‘willingness’, rather than ‘choice’ or ‘choose’, and my reasoning for this is twofold. 
Firstly, because this is the language with which Munro made recommendations for 
reform: Finding that social workers were choosing not to employ discretion on the 
basis that it had become a ‘risky’ option in the child protection system’s ‘culture of 
blame’ (Munro, 2010b: 38) (see Section 1.4.2), Munro (2011b) made specific 
recommendations with the aim of improving the social worker’s ‘willingness’ to 
employ their discretion (p. 43). 
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Secondly, because within my study, the social workers repeatedly used the term 
‘willingness’ to denote their ‘read[iness] to employ’ (SW1, Q), and indeed, to 
‘choose’ discretion (SW3, FG): 
If it’s about choice and whether a social worker chooses to use 
discretion then we are talking about willingness… (SW3, FG). 
Thus, my own use of the term ‘willingness’ within this chapter denotes the social 
worker’s ‘propensity to choose discretion’, on the basis that I understood that those 
social workers who described themselves as ‘willing’ were inclined towards 
employing their discretion in a given context, whereas the social worker who 
described themselves as ‘unwilling’ had a disinclination towards discretionary 
decision-making and/or action-taking. 
I divide the chapter into two main parts: Firstly, developing the discussion of 
Chapter 4, I consider how notions of ‘manager endorsement’ and ‘personal risk’ can 
help to explain the social workers’ tendency to be willing within the de jure and 
entrepreneurial space, but unwilling within de facto discretionary contexts. 
Secondly, I consider some of the other nuanced factors which the social workers 
asserted could also influence their willingness to employ discretion; factors, which 
can elucidate certain deviations from the identified tendencies.  
5.1 Explaining the general tendency: Willingness on the basis of a 
manager’s ‘endorsement’ and by association a reduced ‘personal-risk’ 
As described in Chapter 4, the general tendency was for social workers to be 
‘willing’ to employ discretion in the ‘officially recognised’ and ‘formally granted’ de 
jure discretionary spaces (for example, diary management; ‘logistical’ case 
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management; and in the management and implementation of the child in need 
plan). However they were also generally ‘unwilling’ to employ discretion in the ‘de 
facto’ spaces that, it might be said, ‘innately’ emerged from their ‘street-level’ 
practitioner role (see Lipsky, 2010; Baldwin, 2000) (for example, non-compliance 
with departmental ‘must-do’ timescales; and ‘time-sensitive’ but ‘non-emergency’ 
decisions encountered in the field). 
In explaining these preferences the social workers emphasised that the ‘official’ and 
‘formal’ nature of the former gave them a ‘confidence’ to employ discretion: 
Because it is recognised in official policy, I am confident that I can 
use discretion (SW6, SSI). 
Conversely, the ‘unofficial’ and ‘informal’ means with which a de facto space 
emerged was aligned to a general ‘unwillingness’ to employ discretion: 
No I wouldn’t use my discretion in that [de facto] context… 
because that opportunity has not been officially recognised... I am 
not willing to [employ discretion] until I have a manager say: ‘ok 
you can…’ (SW4, SSI).  
However, as intimated in this last account, the social workers’ willingness was 
closely aligned to what they described as the manager’s ‘endorsement’ (SW6, FG) 
of the discretionary space – which I understood to mean their manager’s 
willingness to ‘grant’ (see Section 2.5.1) the social worker the space to employ 
discretion. Indeed, I found that the social workers were generally willing to employ 
their discretion whether this ‘endorsement’ existed in the ‘official’ and ‘formal’ 
sense, or the ‘unofficial’ and ‘informal’ contexts which constituted those 
‘entrepreneurial’ discretionary spaces. In this regard, I found that the manager’s 
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‘endorsement’ of the discretionary space was a greater influence on the social 
worker’s willingness than whether the space had been ‘officially’ and ‘formally’ 
recognised in policy documents:   
For me the important issue is not so much what the policy says, 
but my manager’s position… (SW1, SSI). 
So if the manager were to say that you could use discretion, but 
you understood that to be a contradiction of formal policy? 
(Interviewer). 
Yeah, I would use discretion on that basis… it’s different… don’t 
get me wrong, I would prefer that [discretionary] freedom to be 
set out in the official policy, but it’s about understanding the 
realities of practice. Both my manager and I know that discretion 
is needed not just in those official [discretionary spaces], but the 
unofficial ones… we know it’s the only way that we can work 
effectively (SW1, SSI). 
As suggested here, the social workers generally believed that the manager’s 
endorsement of the space emerged from a shared understanding that social worker 
discretion could enable more ‘effective’ service provision (see also Lipsky, 2010; 
Evans, 2016). Furthermore, they indicated that their willingness to employ 
discretion in these contexts was on the understanding that the manager’s 
‘endorsement’ served as an ‘informal contract’ (SW3, SSI) between manager and 
worker that the former would ‘support’, or advocate for, the latter, if in a future 
situation others called into question their discretionary decision-making or action-
taking:  
I think that there is that understanding between us that I am 
prepared to go the extra mile and use discretion but only because 
my manager would support me if others later questioned my 
decisions (SW8, SSI). 
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In contrast to those assertions that the risk of discretion lies in the propensity for 
‘blame-shift’ – particularly in the entrepreneurial space (Evans, 2016) – the social 
workers in this study generally expressed a sense of ‘trust’ in their line manager to 
‘have their back’ on occasions where discretion had been used in discretionary 
spaces ‘granted’ by the manager: 
I think that we have the type of relationship where I can trust him 
to have my back if we have agreed that I can use my discretion… if 
that was to change for whatever reason then I probably would be 
less willing to use discretion (SW7, SSI). 
Further, the social workers explained that it was their belief that through 
‘endorsement’ (‘granting’) of a discretionary space, a manager would, by 
implication, be willing to ‘share accountability’ (SW8, SSI) (which I understood in 
the sense of a preparedness to take some responsibility) for the outcomes which 
emerged from the social worker’s subsequent discretionary decision-making and 
action-taking. This was something which the social workers generally considered to 
be ‘fundamental’ (SW3, Q) to their willingness to employ discretion: 
It comes down to that knowledge that the manager will share 
some accountability for that decision… without that knowledge 
then I wouldn’t choose to use discretion… it’s essential (SW4, SSI). 
Indeed, the social workers aligned their general ‘unwillingness’ to employ discretion 
in the de facto discretionary contexts, to the understanding that without a 
manager’s ‘endorsement’ they were liable to be held ‘individually accountable’ 
(SW4, SSI) (and thus responsible) for any negative outcome which might emerge 
from a discretionary decision or action:   
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In those situations I am solely accountable for my decisions and 
actions, and that is the basis of [my unwillingness]… there is too 
much personal risk (SW5, SSI). 
Notions that discretion in the de facto space constituted a degree of ‘personal risk’ 
to the social worker appeared throughout the participants’ testimonies. I 
understood that this ‘personal risk’ referred to ‘the potential for formal disciplinary 
procedures being instigated’ for failure to comply with formal policy (see Section 
4.2.4) or else ‘being individually blamed for negative outcomes’ arising from 
discretionary decisions or actions on the basis that the discretionary behaviour had 
not been ‘endorsed’ by a manager and/or in formal policy documents (see Section 
6.3).  
In this context, the social workers’ account held hallmarks of the Munro Review 
finding outlined in the introduction to this chapter. However, a critique of Munro is 
of course that she failed to distinguish between the type of discretionary space 
available to the social worker (see Section 2.6.3). Thus, whilst in this study the social 
workers’ testimonies ostensibly supported Munro’s finding that discretion was 
conceived as ‘risky’, this was more in respect to the de facto discretionary contexts 
identified, and on the basis that that discretionary space had not been – either 
formally or informally – endorsed by a manager; thereby explaining why they were 
generally more willing to choose discretion within those de jure and 
entrepreneurial contexts.  
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5.2 Other factors influencing the social worker’s willingness to employ 
discretion 
The above section sought to set out the importance of a manager’s ‘endorsement’ 
for cultivating a social worker’s willingness to employ discretion within the 
discretionary space, and, in this regard, to explain the aforementioned tendency to 
be willing within those de jure and entrepreneurial contexts but unwilling within 
the de facto examples. 
However this tendency notwithstanding, the social workers repeatedly identified 
other factors – separate from the type of discretionary space encountered – which 
they asserted also influenced whether they were willing to employ discretion within 
the discretionary space. It is these factors which are the focus of this section, and I 
divide the ensuing discussion under three headings:  
• A knowledge of the child, its family and situation; 
• Experience of, and in, similar decision-making scenarios; and 
• Other personal influences. 
5.2.1 A knowledge of the child, its family and situation  
A recurring theme within the social workers’ accounts was that their willingness to 
employ discretion was, in specific contexts, influenced by the knowledge that they 
held about the child and its family: 
I would say that before deciding whether I will use discretion I 
think about my knowledge of the child, its family and situation, 
and whether in that context I have enough, or the right type… to 
be willing to make a decision (SW4, Q). 
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In that scenario, I would ask myself what do I know about this 
family? Do I know enough about the specifics of the case to 
decide whether that would be best for the child?... If the answer 
is ‘not a lot’ and ‘no’, then I am less inclined to use discretion… 
(SW7, SSI).  
In this regard, I understood that the ‘type of knowledge’ which the social workers 
considered valuable for informing their willingness, included: of the different 
‘personalities, characteristics and history’ of the family members concerned (SW2, 
SSI); of the ‘wishes and feelings’ (SW1, FG) or else the ‘needs of the individual 
children’ being considered (SW16, Q); and of the ‘risks, strengths and protective 
factors’ that were understood to be specific to the case: 
I think I need to know about the different actors… mum, dad, 
grandparents… I want to know what the children’s wishes are… 
what the risks are, that kind of thing… (SW6, SSI). 
The social workers explained that at a basic level, their willingness to employ 
discretion tended to improve the more that they knew about a child, its family and 
situation, on the basis that they felt ‘better equipped’ to make decisions ‘in the 
interest of the child’ (SW2, Q): 
But if I know what the children want, what they need…. the risks, 
the history… that kind of thing, then yes, I would be more willing 
to use discretion because I know the case don’t I… I am in a better 
position to decide what is best for the child (SW7, SSI). 
If I have a good knowledge of the child and family, then I am 
better prepared to make decisions in the best interest of the child 
and therefore I would be more willing to use discretion… (SW11, 
Q).  
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However, in some of the more nuanced accounts I found that the emphasis placed 
on this knowledge differed according to the context of the social work task and 
decision required: 
Let’s say it’s a decision about whether a father can have contact 
with his children… I can make the decision, but I would only be 
[willing] to do so when I know more about the father and his 
relationship with the children (SW3, FG). 
Knowing about the family can be useful and make you more 
willing to employ discretion I think, but it’s not always necessary… 
for example, walking into a house and meeting a family for the 
first time. I don’t necessarily know that much about them, but I 
don’t need to… I know that the house is too cold; that mum says 
that she has no money to heat the property; and that the children 
will suffer if I don’t give her some [money] (SW2, SSI). 
Further, I found that it was not only whether the social workers possessed this 
knowledge, but also the ‘type’ (SW3, Q) or ‘nature’ of the knowledge held (SW4, 
SSI) that influenced the social worker’s willingness: 
It might be that I know loads about the family but for certain 
decisions I am still not prepared to use discretion… For example, 
the knowledge was that a child had epilepsy and was prone to 
fits… the decision was about whether they could travel alone to 
another part of the country… I wasn’t willing to use discretion, but 
instead deferred that decision to the specialist doctor as their 
expertise made them better placed to decide (SW4, SSI).  
In addition, I found that the type of knowledge held could also inform the type of 
discretionary decision or action taken: 
If you knew that there had not been any domestic violence 
incident for 9 months, would this effect your willingness to 
employ discretion in that context? (Interviewer). 
Yes definitely… and I think on that basis, I would be more likely to 
say to him that he could come home for Christmas… (SW8, SSI). 
217 
 
What if you knew that whilst there had been no violent incidents 
for 9 months, there is a history of violence on Christmas day? 
(Interviewer). 
Oh [laughs], ok well yeah, I will still make the decision, but now 
the decision is different… I would have to say ‘no’, he can’t come 
home (SW8, SSI). 
Ultimately, I found that how the social worker interpreted their knowledge of the 
child, its family and situation, could explain why on some occasions the willingness 
to employ discretion, differed to that which I understood to be the general 
tendency of the group:  
Does it matter if the time sensitive decision is an emergency one 
or not? (Interviewer). 
For me personally no. If I have a really good knowledge of the 
case, then I don’t need to wait and check with a manager (SW2, 
SSI). 
But there is the expectation that in non-emergencies that you 
would do that? (Interviewer). 
Urm, well yeah, my manager wants me to check everything with 
her. But I know the case better than her, so I choose to use 
discretion… (SW2, SSI). 
Personally I can feel pretty uncomfortable being in charge of 
designing the [child in need] plan when I don’t have a good 
knowledge of a child and their circumstances… Sometimes I have 
asked that other professionals – who have worked with the family 
for longer – to design the plan… because they have a better 
knowledge… and are in a better position to decide how to move 
the case forward (SW4, SSI). 
5.2.2 Experience of, and in, similar decision-making scenarios  
Another factor which the social workers identified as influencing their willingness to 
employ discretion was a previous experience of using discretion ‘in similar decision-
making scenarios’ (SW7, Q): 
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One thing that I am mindful of, is if I have experience of making 
similar decisions previously (SW16, Q). 
I’m thinking have I used discretion in a situation like this before? 
…That can impact on my willingness (SW1, FG). 
A number of social workers felt that if they had the experience of previously using 
discretion under ‘similar circumstances’ (SW4, FG), then this generally increased 
their ‘confidence’ and therefore ‘willingness’ to employ discretion again when 
encountering a comparable discretionary space: 
There is a confidence that comes from the knowledge that you 
have made [discretionary] decisions like that before… that 
impacts on [my willingness] (SW13, Q). 
I know that I have been in that situation previously and used my 
discretion, so I have a confidence to do so again… (SW1, SSI). 
However, I considered that it was less whether the social workers had experienced 
using discretion in similar scenarios, but more the type of experience encountered 
that held the greatest influence upon their willingness. This finding emerged from 
more subtle accounts, where social workers explained that a ‘positive past 
experience’ (SW1, SSI) of using discretion in a similar decision-making context 
increased their willingness to employ discretion again; whereas conversely, a 
‘negative past experience’ (SW4, SSI) reduced their willingness: 
For example, if I have used my discretion in a similar situation 
previously and there was a positive result, then I think I would be 
more willing to use my discretion again. However, if that 
experience had been a negative one, then I think that would leave 
me less willing to employ discretion next time, does that make 
sense? (SW8, SSI). 
I’m thinking ‘yeah, I’ve used discretion here in the past and it all 
worked out well’, so I’m more [willing] to use discretion again… 
(SW4, FG). 
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As intimated in these accounts, it was my understanding that the social workers 
constructed the type of experience encountered – either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ – 
according to the ‘outcomes’ which they associated with their past discretionary 
behaviour. For example, if a discretionary decision or action had, after the fact, 
been aligned with some benefit – especially to the service user but also the social 
worker – then the discretionary behaviour was constructed as a ‘positive 
experience’: 
When I think back, those situations where I have used discretion 
and it worked out really well, they are the ones where I am more 
likely to use discretion again… you know those times where I can 
clearly see a positive outcome for the child (SW1, SSI). 
I remember being commended by other professionals for my use 
of discretion in a difficult meeting… that experience meant a lot… 
it would definitely lead me to use discretion again in a similar type 
of circumstance (SW3, SSI). 
Alternatively, if the discretionary behaviour had, after the fact, been associated 
with some form of ‘cost’ – either to the service user or social worker – then it 
tended to be constructed as a ‘negative experience’, and thus, to dissuade the 
social worker from employing their discretion again: 
I know others do, but I wouldn’t spend my own money even if I 
thought that was what [the service user] needed at the time… I 
see the value in it and actually I’ve done it before… but on that 
occasion it was a really negative experience… I got in a pickle 
because that particular service user then expected me to give 
them money again... When I didn’t, they made a complaint about 
me, and it had to be investigated… because I’d broken the policy, I 
was given a formal warning (SW4, SSI). 
This last account is noteworthy both on the basis that, in contrast to the general 
tendency of the group, the social worker was not willing to employ discretion in the 
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entrepreneurial context identified; and because this unwillingness was associated 
with the ‘negative experience’ of being reprimanded for past discretionary 
behaviour within a similar discretionary context.  
In a similar account a social worker described her ‘reluctance’ to employ discretion 
in a de jure discretionary space, again in contrast to the general position of the 
group, and again on the basis of a ‘negative outcome’ arising from past 
discretionary behaviour in a similar decision-making scenario: 
I’m generally pretty reluctant to use discretion in emergencies, 
even though I know the expectation is that is what we should do… 
I’ve had a really bad experience of using discretion in those 
situations before… [where] previously I arranged for a child to 
stay at a family member’s house as we couldn’t locate his mum… 
it was after hours and the child was upset… afterwards my 
manager said this was the right thing to do. However, the child 
got an injury… and mum threatened to sue the local authority… 
There was an investigation… I came out alright, but it has made 
me so fearful of using my discretion in those types of situations 
(SW5, SSI).  
Clearly, these last two accounts help to elucidate how past discretionary 
experiences could dissuade a social worker from choosing to employ discretion. In 
addition, they can explain why some social workers’ willingness to employ 
discretion in a particular discretionary space contrasted with the identified general 
tendencies (above); something that was also attributable to a positive past 
experience:  
Others have said to me that they would not be willing to use 
discretion in respect to assessment timescales. Why do you think 
that you take a different position? (Interviewer). 
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There are a few reasons I think.  One being… that in the past 
positive outcomes have been achieved by me taking that position 
and using my discretion (SW2, SSI). 
5.2.3 Other personal influences 
Also throughout their testimonies, the social workers recognised particular 
‘personal influences’ (SW5, FG) upon their willingness to employ discretion. These 
were described as a series of factors drawn from the ‘personal’ rather than 
professional life, but which could impact upon their professional discretionary 
behaviour: 
I think there are those things which affect just me… they are 
personal to me because of my life and experiences outside of 
work (SW1, SSI). 
You must also consider those personal factors… you know how 
experiences in your personal life influence your discretion as a 
social worker (SW4, SSI).  
I considered these factors an important consideration, especially as previous 
explanations for a contrasting willingness amongst social workers have been limited 
to professional (see Evans, 2013) and situational factors (see Ellis, 2011; 2014).  
I understood that the ‘individual nature’ (SW1, SSI) of these ‘personal influences’ 
meant that whilst two social workers could cite the same factor as influencing their 
willingness, that was not to say that that this factor was interpreted, and therefore 
influenced, their willingness in the same way:  
I think others might have similar influences from their private life, 
but we all have different experiences, and so I guess the same 
factor could influence you differently, depending upon the 
individual experience that you have of it (SW2, SSI). 
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On this basis, the social workers asserted that these ‘personal influences’ could 
elucidate why, in specific contexts, they would deviate from that which might be 
considered the general tendency of their peers: 
I think the influence of those factors that come from the personal 
life can help explain why sometimes we choose to use discretion, 
or we don’t choose discretion, but this is in contrast to what we 
might expect of the other social workers on the team (SW8, Q).  
By way of example, an often-cited ‘personal influence’ was that of ‘parenthood’ 
(SW3, Q) or ‘of being a parent’ (SW2, FG). As one social worker explained, her 
‘status as a mother’ had become a ‘prism’ through which she appraised, not only 
'the circumstances of the families that [she] work[ed] with’ but also the 
‘discretionary spaces available’ to her. More so, it had become ‘one of the means 
with which [she] decide[d] whether to use discretion or not’ (SW4, SSI): 
It's not only am I willing to use discretion as a social worker, but 
am I willing as a parent? (SW4, SSI).  
This social worker explained that ‘as a parent’ she had ‘come to understand the 
potential long-term impact of certain decisions’, and aligned this with a general 
‘reluctance’ to employ discretion in particular contexts: 
It’s not only decisions like should a child be subject of a child 
protection plan, or should they be removed from their parent’s 
care, where I wouldn’t use discretion, but others where I do have 
the discretionary space… for example, the outcome of 
assessments, whether a child can have contact with family 
members that kind of thing. I don’t like using my discretion… it’s 
just I could totally get those decisions wrong… it could really 
damage a child (SW4, SSI).  
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Conversely, another social worker suggested that her own experiences of 
parenthood had, she believed, increased her general willingness to employ 
discretion, including in discretionary spaces that were not formally granted to her: 
In some situations I have thought to myself ‘oh God, that could be 
my child’ and I think, yeah, I chose to use my discretion because 
of that… for example, spending my own money… decisions to 
extend timescales… changing the child protection plan… it all 
comes down to the influence of being a parent and thinking ‘I 
would want someone to do the same for my child’ (SW2, SSI). 
The same social worker also cited her experiences of ‘childhood’ as an influence 
upon her willingness to employ discretion: 
I am quite happy to use discretion generally I think… it comes 
from my childhood… I mean I grew up in a complicated home with 
alcoholism, domestic violence and terminally ill children… so I 
know first-hand how those things impact upon families… It does 
allow me to understand about the [different] make-up of families 
[and] the complexity of family life and to view risk differently; and 
I think that that makes me more willing to use discretion... (SW2, 
SSI). 
Likewise, another social worker identified not only the ‘influence of childhood’, but 
more specifically, of being in receipt of social work services as a child, as an 
influence upon her willingness – indeed, more so than the type of discretionary 
space encountered: 
I had a social worker when I was younger, and I learnt that most 
often it was them and not their manager, the IRO or the Guardian 
who knew the most about me and my situation… However, my 
personal experience was that decisions were made about me by 
these people who didn’t know me, and they were often not good 
decisions… I’ve taken those experiences into my own practice and 
I think that I choose whether I use discretion more on the basis of 
am I best placed to make a decision for a child, than whether my 
manager or [others] say that I can… (SW14, Q). 
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On a similar basis, a colleague of this social worker aligned her experiences as an 
adoptive parent as having the ‘greatest influence’ upon her willingness to employ 
discretion: 
I have adopted children and they have a social worker. I think that 
experience has impacted upon whether I choose to use 
discretion… for example, sometimes I think to myself, ‘what 
would my son want from his social worker here?’ the answer 
could be ‘to use their discretion’ and then that makes me more 
likely to [use discretion]… the context of the decision is not the 
important issue… (SW1, Q). 
More broadly, these ‘personal influences’ were not limited to experiences of/from 
childhood and/or parenthood, but also included such things as one’s ‘religious faith’ 
and cultural disposition:   
A big influence for me is my religious faith… I think others worry 
about using discretion because they worry about being blamed. I 
admit that I feel the same sometimes, but instead of choosing not 
to use discretion on that basis, I put my faith in God that it will 
turn out right (SW3, SSI). 
I think another factor that is hard to get away from are those 
cultural influences… In my culture the preference is for family 
problems to be resolved within the community, and traditionally 
that community is suspicious of social workers… that is partly why 
I became a social worker, but I do wonder whether there is some 
part of me, where this still impacts upon my [willingness] to use 
discretion (SW16, Q). 
In contrast, to these last two assertions another social worker explained that whilst 
her religion was ‘important’ in her ‘personal life’ she was ‘determined’ not to allow 
the influence of this to impact upon her practice, including in her discretionary 
behaviour towards children and their families: 
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Whilst I am strongly influenced by my religion… this is something 
which I don’t let impact my work with children. I think there is 
potential for me to judge situations differently because of my 
religion, but I think it is important that I don’t let those biases 
effect my use of discretion… (SW15, Q). 
Whilst this account again illustrates the propensity for ‘personal’ factors to 
influence individuals differently, it also highlights that ethical tension which is 
important to consider in discussions around choice within the discretionary space 
(Evans, 2013); namely, that bias can emerge (Lipsky, 2010). Whilst this forms part of 
the wider critique about the value of practitioner discretion within public service 
provision generally (see Molander, 2016), my concern here is less the ethical 
implications of these influences, but more so, how they could explain the social 
worker’s discretionary behaviour.  
Ultimately, for the social workers in this study, those ‘personal influences’ were 
often aligned with whether they were willing to employ discretion. Further, the 
variety of personal influences identified, and the different manifestations of these, 
help us to understand why, in a particular discretionary space, one social worker 
was willing to employ discretion, but another was not.  
5.3 Conclusion: More than the type of space encountered 
It is prudent to note that whilst we can ascribe a general tendency to this group of 
social workers to be willing/unwilling to employ discretion within specific types of 
discretionary space, that is not to assert that their willingness was solely 
determined by the type of space encountered. On the contrary, evident within this 
study is that willingness could also be informed by a plethora of other nuanced 
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factors specific to the social worker – for example, their knowledge of the child, its 
family and their situation; the experience of using discretion in similar decision-
making scenarios; and the impact of influences derived from the ‘personal’ rather 
than the ‘professional’ life. The pertinent point therefore, is that in order to 
understand whether a social worker will choose to employ discretion within a 
discretionary space, one must also understand the specific factors influencing their 
willingness at that moment in time; something that the social workers considered 
might be difficult to achieve: 
Really, I can say that I am generally [willing] to use discretion 
here, and generally not willing there… but there are so many 
factors that can influence whether I decide to use discretion, that 
I can’t be certain of my position until I’m actually in the scenario… 
I think that as a social worker, you can never truly say that I will 
defiantly use discretion in that context… only that it is likely or 
unlikely… (SW8, SSI).   
Adopting these terms to conclude the chapter: it is right to say that other 
influencing factors notwithstanding, the social workers within this study were 
more likely to choose to employ discretion within a de jure and 
entrepreneurial discretionary space, but less likely within a de facto 
discretionary space. 
Within these first two result chapters, I have sought to address the research 
questions: ‘Where do social workers encounter discretionary space?’ and, 
‘When do social workers choose discretion?’. Within the next chapter I seek to 
move beyond notions of when and where to further elucidate why the social 
workers discretionary space and willingness within that space manifested as it 
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did. In doing so, I will seek to answer the research question: ‘How are 
systemic factors impacting on social worker discretion?’.  
 
  
228 
 
CHAPTER 6 – HOW ARE SYSTEMIC FACTORS IMPACTING ON 
SOCIAL WORKER DISCRETION? 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter will elucidate the social mechanisms – or causal processes and 
structures – that I understood to be underpinning the social workers’ discretionary 
space and choice. In this sense, it seeks to answer the research question: ‘How are 
systemic factors impacting on social worker discretion?’ 
The chapter is organised under three headings:     
• Too much to do – Increasing demand and decreasing resources; 
• Ofsted Anxiety Disorder – The spectre of external inspection; and 
• Fear of being blamed – The influence of media, politician and inter-
professional finger pointing. 
Each of these topics will be considered in turn. 
6.1 Too much to do – Increasing demand and decreasing resources 
A reoccurring theme in the social workers’ accounts was that an unwillingness to 
employ discretion could be cultivated by an inadequate or unsatisfactory 
knowledge of the child and/or its circumstances (see Section 5.2.1). They identified 
the inability to spend satisfactory time with children as a major obstacle to 
obtaining this knowledge, reporting that the practice environment was one which 
frequently prohibited them from spending time with the child. Indeed, the social 
workers in this study estimated that they spent less than 15% of their working week 
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with children (which is less than general estimates of 20-25% provided elsewhere – 
for example, Garrett, 2003; Holmes et al., 2009; Baginsky et al., 2010; Holmes and 
McDermid, 2013; White et al., 2010). 
The social workers identified two contributing factors to this. The first – discussed 
in detail in the following section – was an organisational emphasis on completing 
paperwork and of evidencing compliance with local processes and timescales in 
preparation for external inspection. The second, was that over a period of time, an 
increasing demand had been placed on the CPT, leaving the social workers feeling 
‘overstretched’.  It is this latter notion, which is the focus of this section. 
6.1.1 Evidence of increasing demand  
The social workers considered that the size of their allocated caseload (i.e. how 
many cases were assigned to them) served as an indicator of the ‘demand’ being 
placed on them as practitioners. Indeed, there was a general sentiment that, ‘in 
recent times’, caseloads had become ‘too high’ (SW8, SSI), leaving the social 
workers with a sense of being ‘overstretched’ (SW4, Q) or else ‘spread too thinly’ 
(SW11, Q): 
The biggest problem I think is the size of caseloads on this team… 
they have been rising steadily for years… we are now spread so 
thinly that, outside of the minimum statutory tasks, we just don’t 
have enough time to spend with children (SW1, FG). 
The Department for Education (2017) estimates that in England in 2016, the 
average statutory children’s social worker caseload was 16 cases. In providing this 
estimate, the DfE fails to define what a ‘case’ constitutes (for example, a single child 
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as opposed to a group of children belonging to the same family). However, the 
figure is nevertheless noteworthy, as it contrasts with the average number of cases 
(defined as the number of children) held by the social workers of the CPT during 
this time7.  
Indeed, the data shows that whilst in May 2010 the average number of cases 
allocated to the CPT social worker was 22, by May 2016 (the point of ceasing data 
collection) the figure had risen to 34 – which is despite a 30% increase in the 
number of social workers employed on the CPT during the same time period. 
(Figures obtained from the CSD Finance Team show that the CSD increased its 
spending on social work – including child protection – by 567% from 2008-2009 
[£0.96m] to 2015-2016 [£4.5m] whilst making substantial savings elsewhere – see 
below.)  
Of course, there is a debate to be had about whether 34 cases is too much for a 
single social worker to effectively manage (it is noteworthy that the 2009 ‘Laming 
Review’, commissioned after the death of Peter Connelly, recommended that those 
working in child protection should have no more than 13 cases allocated to them), 
but this is not my focus here. Instead, it is to illustrate the level of work that the CPT 
social workers were undertaking during the course of this research, and further, to 
                                                        
7 I note here that focussing on case number says nothing of the complexity of cases held. However, 
the social workers who participated within this study, explicitly cited the number of cases as a 
measure of the ‘demand’ placed upon them. Thus, my rationale in citing number, as opposed to 
complexity of case here, is in acknowledgment of that emphasis. 
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highlight the increase in the number of families requiring a service from them, over 
a relatively short period of time. 
Indeed, supporting the social workers’ assertion that the demand for their services 
had been increasing, I found that despite only a nominal rise in the local child 
population between 2008 and 2016, the CPT had encountered: 
• a 38% increase in child protection referrals; 
• a 52% increase in the number of local children categorised as ‘in need’;  
• a 72% increase in children subject to a child protection plan; and  
• a 41% increase in the number of childcare proceedings. 
Whilst similar trends have been reported nationally (see for example, Department 
for Education, 2016; Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, 2016; 
Bywaters et al., 2016; 2018; Bilson and Hunter Munro, 2019), this data specifically 
supports the notion that the social workers of this study were working with more 
children and, by implication, that they had less time available for each. For the 
remainder of this section I will consider two ideas proffered by the social workers as 
an explanation for this, beginning with the suggestion that the increase in demand 
was, in part, a consequence of a continuing ‘Baby P effect’. 
6.1.2 A continuing ‘Baby P effect’ 
It has been argued that the ‘politics of outrage’ which accompanied the death of 
Peter Connelly (see Section 1.3), led childcare professionals to become both 
hypersensitised and hypervigilant to the prospect that other children were not 
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suffering in the same way that Peter had (see Parton, 2014; Jones, 2014; Warner, 
2015).  
This hypersensitivity and hypervigilance was seen in and epitomised by that which 
Shoesmith (2016: 18) refers to as the ‘Baby P effect’ – understood as a national 
upsurge in child protection referrals, plans and care proceedings immediately after 
the public awakening to Peter’s case (see also, Hall and Guy, 2010; Brooks et al., 
2012; and Cooper, 2013). However, it was the belief of many of the participants in 
this study, that the ‘Baby P effect’ had not diminished in the years since Peter’s 
death, but was continuing to impact upon the demands being experienced by them 
as child protection practitioners: 
I think the Baby P effect is ongoing… I can’t count the number of 
times that I have had a discussion with another professional about 
the motivation for a referral, or for increasing our level of 
intervention, and they have said ‘well we don’t want another 
Baby P’ (SW6, SSI). 
For me, the demand can continue to be tied back to Peter 
Connelly, and everyone’s efforts to ensure that a case like that 
does not happen again (M4, FG). 
Succinctly put, the social workers believed that what had manifested since Peter’s 
death was a ‘more cautious approach to child protection’ (SW2, SSI) – one which 
had become embedded within, and extended to, ‘all parts of the system’ (SW11, Q). 
This included partner agencies (for example, health, education and police), who, 
the participants felt, had adopted lower thresholds for intervention – ‘leading 
directly to more referrals and recommendations for interventions such as child 
protection plans and [care proceedings]’ (SW9, Q) (see also, Jones, 2014).  
233 
 
It also included senior managers and IROs, who, the participants argued, had 
become more ‘defensive’ in their decision-making – ‘safer to keep a child on a plan 
or put the matter before the Court’ (SW7, SSI). However, the social workers also 
accepted that they too had played a part: 
I admit myself, when I think about closing a case, I often go back 
to Baby P, and find a reason to keep [the case] open for a bit 
longer… just to make sure that the extra niggle or worry doesn’t 
come to anything… it’s less risky (SW5, FG). 
Linked to these accounts of it being ‘safer’ or ‘less risky’ to continue to work with, 
rather than close a case, several of the participants theorised that what was 
underpinning this ‘more cautious approach’, was a ‘fear’, not only for a child who 
might be the recipient of abuse, but for the social worker, manager or other 
professional who might miss, or fail to act, on the signs of abuse: 
I think all of us – all professionals – are aware that if a child under 
your care suffered in the way that Peter did, there would rightly 
be a lot of questions to answer… and potentially some very 
negative consequences for you as an individual… it’s definitely a 
worry that you always have (SW4, SSI). 
As a social worker, you are naturally anxious that you might miss 
something and that could result in something bad for the child, 
and even for you… we saw it with Baby P (SW5, SSI). 
In section 6.3 I reflect on the participants’ assertion that the legacy of reductionist 
media and political portrayal (including in the context of the Connelly case) and a 
continued culture of inter-agency ‘finger-pointing’ was, at least in part, driving this 
fear. However, the pertinent point here is that the social workers considered that 
the fear for oneself as well as the child was an important feature of the ‘Baby P 
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effect’ and was continuing to directly impact upon the demand being placed on 
their services: 
For me the legacy of Baby P has been the increased fear that each 
professional now has for themself [sic]… a fear that it could be 
you and your practice which is under the spotlight… being 
discussed in the newspapers, on the radio or in Parliament… it’s 
definitely linked to the amount of work that we see (SW15, Q). 
Further, there was a feeling that the longevity of the ‘Baby P effect’ meant that 
Peter’s case (and the fallout from it) had provided a more long-lasting ‘impact’ on 
the child protection system than the Munro Review: 
If you were to ask me now which has had the most impact on the 
system, and which is still affecting our daily work… I would say 
Baby P… we rarely hear, or think about Munro anymore, but we 
continue to see the impact of Baby P every day (SW4, Q). 
This last account is a point of discussion in Chapter 7, where it is framed as a 
continued challenge to the realisation of Munro’s image for a more ‘child-centred’ 
system. However, the point of emphasis here is that the participants of this study 
considered that the ‘Baby P effect’ was continuing to negatively impact on the high 
demand for child protection services, their sense of being ‘overstretched’, and thus 
their willingness, in particular contexts, to employ discretion.  
6.1.3 The cost of austerity 
For some of the participants of this study, the continued ‘Baby P effect’ had 
produced, what was in essence, an ‘artificial increase in demand’ for child 
protection services (SW15, Q) – brought on by the ‘more cautious approach’ to the 
task of protecting children (see Section 6.1.2).  However, they did not think that the 
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increase in demand was a result of the ‘Baby P effect’ alone, and also pointed to the 
impact of ‘years of government cuts’ (SW8, Q) and, what they saw as, ‘the cost of 
austerity’ (SW16, Q).   
Whilst ‘austerity’ remains a ‘slippery’ concept, one which is ‘hard to define’ (Mort, 
2017: 312), The British Association of Social Workers consider it  
[an] economic and social policy… result[ing] in reduced public and 
welfare spending, lower taxes, a smaller state… (2017: 1). 
Similar definitions position ‘austerity’ as an economic theory (or a ‘flawed economic 
theory’ according to the International Federation of Social Workers, 2016: 1 – see 
also UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, 2018; 2019) 
leading to the notion that economic difficulties justify a reduction in the citizen’s 
standard of living (see Blyth, 2013 for elaboration and further discussion).  
However in respect to the UK, Jones (2018a; 2018b) argues that austerity is better 
conceived as a politically-chosen strategy fostered by the Conservative Party, and 
underpinned by their desire to create a smaller welfare state. This point is 
supported by the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights 
(2019), who, following an eleven-day investigatory visit to the UK, observed: 
The bottom line is that… [despite] a booming economy, high 
employment and a budget surplus [the UK Government] have not 
reversed austerity, a policy pursued more as an ideological than 
an economic agenda (p. 1). 
This adds weight to Jones’ (2018a; 2018b) assertion that, irrespective of arguments 
to the contrary, austerity in the UK is not the ‘necessary’ and ‘inevitable’ step to 
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‘economic recovery’ (Osborne, 2009: 1) that the Conservatives have consistently 
purported it to be (see also Osborne, 2010). 
In this study, the participants theorised that as public spending had continued to be 
reduced (including welfare benefits) under the mantel of ‘austerity’, the services 
that had sustained families, had increasingly been closed, which, in the social 
workers’ opinion, had served to ‘force more families into the child protection arena’ 
(SW5, FG) (see also The British Association of Social Workers, 2017; Bywaters et al., 
2018).  
There was certainly evidence that the number of the services offered by Marketon’s 
CSD had been reduced over a relatively short period of time. For example, between 
2010 and 2016 the CSD had closed its ‘Family Support Team’ (whose remit had 
been ‘to support children at risk of entering the [public] care system’); its Youth 
Service; and its provision for asylum-seeking families. It had also reduced the 
number of local children’s centres by 75%; its Youth Offending Team by 80%; and 
had temporarily disbanded its Children with Disabilities Team (this service was 
reintroduced – albeit at 40% its previous size – after a sustained protest by local 
families and the public critique of the decision by a local MP). What is more, under 
the auspices of a new ‘Corporate Spending Strategy’, the CSD no longer 
commissioned support services from local private or charitable providers – 
including for issues such as homelessness, substance misuse and domestic violence.  
These changes were understood to be a consequence of the local authority’s efforts 
to save £65m over a six-year period (from 2010 to 2016) as it sought to adjust for a 
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53% reduction in funding received from the national government. As one manager 
explained, such services were seen as ‘luxuries’ and ‘non-essential’ in the context of 
needing to make ‘immediate savings’ and ‘when compared to other areas of 
essential provision… including child protection’ (M1, FG).  
Whilst I considered that such sentiments were unlikely to be shared by the families 
that used these services, the local data did estimate that by closing or ‘downsizing’ 
services in this way, it had saved the CSD close to £25m between 2010 and 2016 – 
constituting 83% of its 2009-2010 total budget (excluding school spending).  
However, the social workers felt that these changes were short-sighted, and the 
savings achieved only ‘a short-term fix’ (SW14, Q), effectively serving to ‘move the 
problem elsewhere’ (SW4, FG): 
You are just shifting the problem, because whereas you might 
save some money now, more families will inevitably end up 
needing more from you in the future, as their difficulties become 
more acute… for example, it is a lot less costly to support a child 
within the family home, than it is to fund an alternative 
placement for him due to familial breakdown (SW1, Q). 
Intriguingly in the context of this last account, Marketon’s ‘looked after child’ (LAC) 
population had indeed increased by almost 50% between 2010 (with an average 
monthly number of 209 LAC) and 2016 (an average monthly number of 307 LAC) – 
which had contributed to a near 300% increase in costs incurred for private foster 
care and residential provision, as the local authority struggled to recruit enough 
local foster carers to meet the demand.  
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Whilst these figures might be partly attributed to the ‘Baby P effect’ (with ‘cautious’ 
professionals referring more children into the system and finding ways to keep 
them there), the social workers also argued that they were indicative of the 
increasing levels of deprivation and need brought on by the 
continued cost of austerity… [as seen] in the closure of [local] 
services… meaning more families are being tipped over the edge 
(SW16, Q). 
As one social worker argued ‘the formula [was] a simple one’: 
Local authorities are being squeezed, they are responding by 
making savings and closing important services… and families are 
suffering as a result (SW2, SSI).   
The statistical data did highlight that there had been an increase of instances of 
poverty (with an 18% increase in applications for free school meals; and a 112% 
increase in use of the local foodbank); unemployment (a 13% increase in 
applications for the ‘Job Seekers Allowance’ benefit); and homelessness (with the 
number of recorded ‘rough sleepers’ up 240%) amongst the local Marketon 
population between 2010 and 2016. Further, child protection records highlighted 
that there had been a 181% increase in children made subject to a child protection 
plan for instances of ‘neglect’ or ‘emotional abuse’ during this time, where it was 
also recorded that ‘alcohol/substance misuse’; ‘domestic violence’ or ‘familial 
breakdown’ (including divorce, separation or imprisonment) had been a 
contributing factor.  
In these terms, the data did suggest increasing instances of difficulties amongst the 
local population, and could theoretically, help to explain the increase in demand 
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being experienced by the CPT (see Section 6.1.1) (others – notably Munby, 2016 – 
would also attest that the increase could be explained by reducing thresholds or 
professionals becoming better at identifying need in the post ‘Baby P’ era). Whilst it 
is beyond the remit of this study to ascribe this to the national Government’s 
programme of austerity, there is certainly now an extensive literature linking 
austerity with many of these issues (see for example, Main, 2014; UK Children’s 
Commissioners, 2015; Pemberton et al., 2016; Garthwaite, 2016; Loopstra et al., 
2015; 2016; International Federation of Social Workers, 2016; Jones, 2018a; 2018b; 
British Association of Social Workers, 2017; Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2017; Bywaters et al., 2018; Association of Directors of Children’s 
Services, 2018; UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, 2018; 
2019).  
The pertinent point however, is that the participants of this study believed that 
there was a direct link between the prolonged period of government cuts and the 
high level of demand being placed upon them as child protection practitioners. 
Further, that the reduction to other services was increasing the number of families 
that needed the support of the CPT, leading to a sense of being ‘overstretched’ or 
else ‘spread too thinly’ – thus, limiting the time social workers felt they had to 
spend with children, and by extension, their willingness, in particular contexts, to 
employ their discretion.   
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6.2 Ofsted Anxiety Disorder – The spectre of external inspection  
The Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) 
mandate includes the right to:  
Inspect… [and] regulate children’s social care services… making 
sure they’re suitable for children and potentially vulnerable young 
people… help providers that are not yet of good standard to 
improve… monitor their progress… and publish reports of 
findings… (Ofsted, 2016). 
Marketon had last received an inspection of its CPT in April 2012, at which point the 
inspection team had concluded that the CSD had achieved only ‘minimum 
requirements’ in its ‘overall [child protection] effectiveness’, and that the services 
offered to ‘children in need of protection’ were, at best, ‘adequate’. 
This explicitly positioned the CSD in the third tier of Ofsted’s inspection judgments 
(see Appendix 18). Whilst, it meant that the CSD had effectively ‘passed’ the 
inspection, at a local level, this conclusion and the report itself, were perceived as 
being ‘extremely negative and critical’ of Marketon’s child protection arrangements 
(M4, FG). It was in this context that in the aftermath of the 2012 inspection, the 
CSD and CPT underwent a period of reorganisation, in which several senior 
managers – including the then ADCS – resigned from their post, and there was a 
high turnover of frontline social work staff (see Section 3.3.4). 
Perhaps as a consequence of this, the spectre of future inspection loomed over the 
CPT for the entirety of the data collection, where, throughout their testimonies, the 
social workers used the term ‘Ofsted Anxiety Disorder’ (SW5, FG) to describe the 
degree of apprehension that they sensed had permeated the CSD in respect to 
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external inspection – an apprehension which they believed, was creating obstacles 
to their use of discretion.    
6.2.1 The inspectors will soon be here – Ofsted anxiety and the 
focus on inspection preparation 
One of the features of ‘Ofsted anxiety’ was the focus placed, within the CSD, on 
preparation for the next inspection: 
I think the constant worry about being inspected is driving our 
work… also the need to be better prepared for the next inspection 
(M2, FG). 
Underlying everything is that we are ready when the inspectors 
return (SW7, Q). 
This was apparent in the perpetual stream of communications from senior 
management that I observed during my time with the CPT. The purpose of these 
was ostensibly to ‘update’ the CPT staff about their ‘performance’ and how this 
might be judged in the context of future inspection, but they frequently concluded 
with explicit assertions that ‘it is essential that we are Ofsted-ready’ and ‘prepared 
for when the inspectors arrive’. 
Whilst these communications often took the form of emails or ‘departmental 
memos’, one of the other forums within which they would regularly occur was at 
the monthly CPT meeting, where it was not unusual to find a senior manager in 
attendance, talking to the team about ‘performance’ in the context of inspection.  
I noted that most often it was the ADCS herself that would attend this meeting, and 
that she would provide a PowerPoint presentation (incorporating several graphs 
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and tables) identifying ‘areas for concern’ in relation to the CPT’s ‘performance’ 
relative to the managerially endorsed ‘standards of good practice’ (see Appendix 
16) – for example, where the CPT social workers were purportedly not recording 
the ‘required information’; were not adhering to ‘necessary procedures’; or were 
missing ‘important timescales’ (Messages from ADCS – Team Meeting, June 2015). 
Indeed, the ADCS and other senior managers were quite open about their position 
that ‘good performance’ in the context of inspection preparation should be 
understood as ‘evidence of compliance’ with departmental processes and 
timescales and the ‘maintenance of a detailed written record’ of the social worker’s 
work (see Section 6.2.2 below for a broader discussion of this). 
Also noteworthy within the senior managers’ communications with the CPT, was a 
tendency to predict when the next inspection would take place: ‘The inspectors will 
soon be here’ they would say – regularly asserting that ‘an inspection [was] likely 
within the next three months’. However, significantly, four years passed between 
the 2012 inspection and when the inspectors next returned. 
Although some social workers thought that the senior managers propensity to send 
reminders about ‘upcoming inspection’ and to predict when the next inspection 
might take place, was just a manifestation of their own inspection anxiety, others 
conceived it as an intentional strategy: 
I’m suspicious [senior management] do it on purpose… they know 
how worried the staff are about inspection and the consequences 
of that… so they send these emails and come to meetings where 
they predict that Ofsted will be here in the next few weeks… and 
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the result is that staff rush away to make sure that all their 
paperwork is up-to-date (SW2, SSI). 
Whilst the design of the study prohibited me from questioning senior managers 
about the motivations for their respective ‘inspection’ communications, other social 
workers agreed that this behaviour was a trigger for their own anxiety: 
It just makes me really nervous; you know we are always hearing 
that the inspectors will be here soon, and then there is this push 
to get everything up-to-date in case they do actually arrive (SW4, 
Q). 
Last year [manager] told me that [senior manager] had 
guaranteed that Ofsted would be here the following Tuesday. This 
definitely made her anxious which we knew because she asked us 
to get our files in order as a matter of urgency. I must admit 
seeing her [anxiety] gave me the same feeling, so I worked at 
home all weekend, and cancelled my annual leave on the 
Monday. And guess what? It was all for nothing – the inspectors 
still haven’t arrived (SW7, SSI). 
I think inspection anxiety is contagious… you see it when new 
staff join the team… a few weeks of being bombarded with emails 
about performance and when the inspectors will be here, and 
they are like ‘Oh God, Ofsted’… it becomes the focus of your work 
(SW6, FG). 
The notion within these accounts that inspection anxiety could be passed along the 
management hierarchy to the social workers, and of inspection preparation 
becoming ‘the focus’ of the child protection social workers’ work, were important 
in the context of the social workers’ use of discretion. As the following extract 
identifies, on occasions ‘discretion in the best interests of the child’ was considered 
a secondary concern to ensuring that social workers were ‘Ofsted compliant’: 
I know that you want to hear that we are using discretion in the 
best interests of the child, but I don’t think that is our main 
focus… I mean, honestly, I am more concerned with making sure 
that I am Ofsted compliant than anything else (SW5, FG).  
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For the social worker in this account, a desire to be ‘Ofsted compliant’ – or more 
pertinently, ‘compliant’ with what senior managers said Ofsted wanted to see – was 
conceived as directly impacting upon her use of discretion. However, I also 
identified subtle ways in which the anxiety of inspection was indirectly impacting 
upon the social workers’ discretionary space and choice, perhaps best understood 
in the context of the ‘bureaucratic burden’ of inspection anxiety. 
6.2.2 If it’s not on the system then it hasn’t been done – The 
bureaucratic burden of inspection anxiety 
In her review of the English child protection system, Eileen Munro (2011b) cited the 
‘bureaucratic burden’ of ‘inspection preparation’ (p. 46) as a barrier to social 
worker discretion (see Section 1.4.2). I believe that this ‘burden’ was also evident 
within this study, and had seemingly been cultivated by the notion – perpetuated 
by senior management in their communications with the CPT (see Section 6.2.1) – 
that a ‘good’ inspection report could only be obtained if the CSD could evidence 
detailed written records of the work undertaken, and that social workers were 
following procedures and meeting timescales. 
Whether this was an accurate belief is somewhat beside the point; more pertinent 
to my study is that it had led to an emphasis within the CSD on completing 
‘paperwork’ and evidencing ‘compliance’: 
Everywhere you look there are these reminders that we need to 
keep up to date with our paperwork and complete our tasks ‘on 
time’ if we are going to be ready for inspection… (SW2, FG). 
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Just look around the office… you’ll see the importance of the 
paper trail… there are reminders everywhere… and our files are 
constantly being audited so there is no avoiding it (SW7, SSI). 
I noted in my observations of the CPT how their office walls were adorned with a 
number of charts and tables detailing the required timescales and processes for 
completing tasks, as well as several posters which posed questions like ‘Have you 
recorded your visit?’, ‘Are your [meeting] minutes up to date?’, ‘Would your file pass 
the inspection test?’ (Notes on office décor – CPT office, September 2015). 
The largest of these (in 72-point font and stretching the length of the office wall) 
declared: ‘If it’s not on the system, then it hasn’t been done!’ – which I understood 
to mean 
that if you haven’t made a written record of your work on the 
[ICS], then you might as well not have done the work at all (SW2, 
SSI). 
This statement and its status as a favoured expression of the ADCS (but which was 
also regularly cited by other senior and non-senior managers) highlights the high 
importance placed on the ICS file as a measure of social worker ‘performance’ 
within the CSD:  
I think that the social workers understand that management often 
view their work via the ICS file, and make decisions based on what 
they find there (M3, FG). 
The specific variant of ICS procured by Marketon had a feature that would alert 
managers whenever an embedded timescale had not been achieved or a document 
had been left ‘incomplete’ (these would appear as flashing red notifications). This 
was important as it enabled management to ‘identify where work remain[ed] 
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outstanding’ (i.e. not completed), and was often used as justification for returning 
an item of work – via the ICS workstream (see Section 4.2.3) – to the social worker 
for ‘remedial action’ before it could be ‘signed-off’ (M1, FG). 
Further, under the guise of carrying out ‘quality assurance’ of the social worker’s 
work, a subgroup of experienced managers within the CSD had been tasked with 
undertaking periodic audits of the ICS file – ensuring that individual cases were 
‘Ofsted-compliant’ (see Section 6.2.1). Invariably, the focus of this group was on 
those files which were regularly identified by ICS alerts as needing ‘remedial action’ 
– ‘because’, as one of the group told me, ‘those are the cases we would worry 
about most during an inspection’ (M3, FG).  
In these terms, the social workers conceived the ICS as more than a catalogue of 
the work undertaken with a child and it’s family, but as a ‘tool for audit and 
surveillance’ (SW3, FG) used by managers to ‘identify those [social workers] who 
[were] not compliant’ with the expectations pertaining to ‘inspection-readiness’ 
(M1, FG), and as justification for their visits to the team, and emails citing a need to 
‘improve… before inspection’. 
It was also understood within the team that any social worker who was regularly 
identified as having an ‘incomplete [ICS] file’, risked being placed on a remedial 
‘action-plan’, in which they would be required to evidence a level of ‘improvement’ 
in their ICS recordings (for example, ensuring that all work was recorded on the 
system within a specific time period, and that there was an evidence of timescales 
met and procedures followed); or else be liable to the instigation of capability 
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procedures (see Section 4.2.4) – which would be recorded on the individual’s 
personal work file, and (if not successfully negotiated) could result in the 
termination of their contract of employment. 
It was on this basis, that many of the social workers experienced a ‘compulsion’ to 
ensure that their paperwork was completed expediently and that their ICS files 
were ‘up-to-date’ (SW6, Q) (notions of ‘comply or die’ were applicable here). 
However, they explained that as a consequence, the largest portion of their time 
was often spent on the written account of their work (the social workers estimated 
that at least 70% of their work week was dedicated to ‘paperwork’) as opposed to 
time spent with the child – which they felt, was impacting upon their readiness to 
employ discretion: 
The job has become one where we now spend more time 
evidencing what we have done than actually doing it… that level 
of paperwork does reduce what time you have to be with the 
child… meaning that sometimes we just don’t know them in the 
way that we would like… to be comfortable enough to use 
discretion (SW4, FG). 
Ironically, with all the emphasis on inspection preparation, I think 
that the child suffers… because we are spending most of our time 
on the paperwork side, and less time with the child, actually 
getting to know them and their needs… (SW8, SSI). 
In addition, I understood that the onus placed on achieving ‘compliance’ had 
limited the de jure discretionary space available to the social workers in areas such 
as departmental timescales and the content of their ICS recordings (see Sections 
4.2.3 and 4.2.4); furthermore, what de facto space remained available to the social 
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worker, was construed as ‘risky’, as to exercise discretion here was to do so without 
manager ‘endorsement’ (see Section 5.1): 
It’s too risky… if an inspector were to question my use of 
discretion [in a de facto space] then I wouldn’t be able to say that 
I did so with the support of my manager… (SW4, SSI). 
It is much safer to just write everything down, fill in every box and 
[at least attempt] to ensure that your paperwork is complete 
(SW7, SSI). 
It is in these terms that I understood that the anxiety caused by the spectre of 
inspection – one which had led to a focus within the CSD on inspection preparation 
and of evidencing compliance with what senior managers construed as measures of 
‘good performance’ – was impacting upon the CPT social workers’ use of discretion. 
6.3 Fear of being blamed – The influence of media, politician and 
inter-professional finger pointing 
In the previous chapter (Section 5.1) I noted how the social worker’s tendency to be 
willing to employ discretion in the de jure and entrepreneurial space, but unwilling 
in the de facto space, was aligned to the notion that by ‘endorsing’ a discretionary 
space, a manager would be willing to share some responsibility for the decision-
making/action-taking that took place there. 
The social workers outlined that without this endorsement, they felt exposed to 
potential blame for any negative consequences that could be linked (rightly or 
wrongly) to their discretionary behaviour – thus explaining the degree of ‘personal 
risk’ associated with the de facto space. 
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Indeed, a ‘fear of being blamed’ (SW3, FG) was an ever present throughout the 
social workers’ accounts, and was also associated with specific exceptions to the 
general tendencies, where social workers would for example, choose not to employ 
discretion within a specific de jure or entrepreneurial space.  
It is on this basis that this section seeks to elucidate the factors underpinning this 
fear. There are two strands to the discussion: first, that the social workers believed 
that a ‘reductionist’ media and political portrayal of child protection work had 
cultivated unrealistic expectations about what they as social workers could achieve; 
the second, that within the inter-professional and inter-agency child protection 
forum, there was an ingrained culture of finger pointing, in which social workers 
were often identified as the most suitable ‘fall-guy’. 
6.3.1 I don’t want my face on the front page of the Sun – A legacy 
of reductionist media and political coverage  
There was a strong feeling amongst the social workers of this study that a 
continued obstacle in their practice was what they saw as ‘unrealistic expectations’ 
(SW13, Q) placed on them as child protection professionals, particularly in respect 
to their ability to protect children from harm and to intervene in a family’s life: 
There is still this narrative that we encounter, which is that as 
child protection social workers we can stop all harm being done to 
children… sometimes it doesn’t matter if the child is an open case, 
people hear ‘child protection’ and say well that’s your job isn’t it, 
protecting children… but the children weren’t protected, so you 
failed… (SW9. Q). 
I’ve had extended family members approach me on a number of 
occasions after some particularly upsetting disclosures come to 
light and say ‘why didn’t you get those kids out sooner?’… I try to 
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explain that it is not as simple as that and there are systems in 
place… but they don’t understand… (SW2, SSI). 
The social workers considered that in part, these ‘unrealistic expectations’ could be 
explained by, what they considered to be, a ‘legacy’ of ‘reductionist’ media and 
political coverage (SW6, Q) of their profession (see also, Ayre, 2001; Munro, 2011a; 
Stafford et al., 2012; Warner, 2013; 2015): 
I think that it can be traced back to the history of newspapers and 
politicians saying ‘why didn’t these social workers stop this child 
being harmed, that is what they are paid to do’… they encourage 
this idea that all children can be protected and when they are not 
they label us as ‘failures’… but they underplay the complexity of 
the situations that we are dealing with (SW4, Q). 
The papers only tell half of the story… they sensationalise and 
leave out the important facts about why decisions were being 
made as they are… (SW8, Q). 
Further, the participants felt that both the media and politicians were continuing to 
champion the notion that social workers should not only be appropriately ‘held to 
account’, but more so, inappropriately ‘blamed’ and even ‘punished’ when a child 
had been harmed: 
The public read it in their newspapers and see it on their 
televisions… [newspaper] editors and politicians saying these 
social workers are failing our children… we need to punish them 
(M1, FG). 
Look at this idea being floated by [the Conservative 
Government]… that social workers should be sent to prison when 
a child on their caseload has been abused… it’s scary, honestly 
(SW11, Q). 
Whilst the participants accepted that criticism of some social workers was 
reasonable and to be expected in particular contexts, they also felt that specific 
messages which had emerged from the media and politicians – for example, that 
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social workers could be imprisoned8 – were cultivating the idea that many social 
workers were incompetent and deserved to be the subject of scorn and ridicule: 
I think the damage is that the public are being fed the idea that 
we are crap at our jobs and when a child dies it is because we are 
lazy or stupid… (SW4, SSI). 
However, the social workers felt that this was unfair, as such sentiments 
overlooked the complexity and uncertainty involved in their work. They provided 
several examples (often referring to Peter Connelly’s case) in which they perceived 
that the media or politicians (or both) had ‘unreasonably’, or at least ‘over-
simplistically’, blamed social workers in the face of a tragedy or perceived failure: 
For example, the coverage of Peter Connelly in the Sun… we know 
now that they only told half of the story… the half that would sell 
papers… as it fitted their narrative of failing social workers (SW8, 
Q). 
The social workers also theorised that not only did this have the effect of increasing 
the unrealistic expectations on them by the wider public, but it exacerbated the 
fear that they (and other child protection professionals) experienced, as they 
observed how colleagues within the profession had been publicly ‘named’ (SW4, Q) 
‘blamed’ (SW5, SSI) and /or ‘shamed’ (SW15, Q) (see also Ayre, 2001; Warner, 
2015): 
I previously worked with a social worker who had been identified 
in the media after a child was injured. Her position was that she 
                                                        
8 A notion stemming from David Cameron’s (2015) proposition at the time, that social workers had a 
‘duty to act’ and protect children from abuse, or else face being charged with ‘wilful neglect’ and the 
prospect of up to 5 years in prison. Whilst the idea was dismissed by the Department for Education 
in July 2016, at the time of conducting this study, the prospect of imprisonment remained a real, and 
‘frightening’ threat to the social workers concerned. 
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had only picked up the case after the injury was sustained, but the 
way it was reported afterwards was that she had let down the 
child, and in some way, been culpable for the harm suffered… she 
was devastated (SW2, SSI). 
I was working in [another local authority] when [a politician] 
wrote… his book about child sexual exploitation in the city… his 
criticism of the professionals involved ruined a lot of lives… and 
there was no opportunity to respond to his accusations (SW15, 
Q). 
The social workers thought that another consequence of the approach taken by the 
media and politicians in respect to child protection, was that it provided members 
of the public with a sense of justification for abusing social workers: 
It’s like members of the public read about social workers in the 
newspaper and realise that it is ok to attack them, so they 
replicate that behaviour and… feel vindicated doing so (SW15, Q). 
Indeed, it was in this context that the social workers relayed a number of 
upsetting personal accounts: 
My own children were targeted by internet trolls last year when I 
was identified as a social worker on a Facebook thread… the 
author said ‘look at this one, her lot killed Baby P and she’s 
allowed to keep her kids’… someone was able to identify my 
daughter’s social media account and send her abusive messages… 
(SW6, SSI).  
I’ve had a really nasty experience where I was shopping with my 
children and a former service user spotted me… he approached 
me in the supermarket with about four other people and started 
shouting about how he keeps reading how social workers are 
letting kids be abused… One of his companions spat in my face… it 
really upset my children and I was shaking for days afterwards… 
(SW7, SSI). 
The consequence was that many of the social workers in this study associated being 
publicly named either in the press or by a politician as an outcome that should be 
avoided – ‘almost at any cost’ (SW5, SSI). ‘It makes you liable to public attack’ (SW2, 
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FG) they told me (repeatedly citing the example of Maria Ward – one of Peter 
Connelly’s social workers – in making this point). 
This was understood to impact upon their use of discretion within particular 
contexts: 
That is why it is so important that a manager has approved the 
discretionary space… because then you know that they will 
support your decision and you won’t be alone in any criticism that 
might be directed at you afterwards (SW3, SSI). 
Sometimes it doesn’t matter what type of [discretionary space] it 
is… sometimes it’s a matter of thinking ‘I don’t want my face on 
the front page of the Sun’ and so I just don’t want to use my 
discretion (SW5, SSI). 
Further, the social workers suggested that what they sensed to be a tendency by 
politicians and the media to drive both the ‘unrealistic expectations’ and the ‘fear’ 
that existed, not just within child protection professionals, but also the wider public 
(namely that children were being harmed and social workers were ‘failing’ in their 
protection of them), was not merely a direct contributor to their reluctance to 
employ discretion in particular contexts, but indirectly contributed to a number of 
the other mechanisms that were impacting upon their use of discretion: 
I also think that the tendency of the media and politicians to 
publicly shame ‘failing’ Children’s Services Departments increases 
the anxiety that senior managers have about an Ofsted 
inspection, which in turn leads to more focus and emphasis on 
[inspection] preparation (SW16, Q). 
I think that the way the media and politicians responded to Baby 
P, really put a fear in the public and other professionals… meaning 
that they now refer in any case that they are even slightly 
concerned about… increasing the demand that we experience 
here at the front line (SW2, FG). 
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6.3.2 It’s like they need a fall-guy – Continued experiences of 
inter-agency finger pointing 
In the social workers’ minds, the wider (‘unrealistic’) expectations for what could be 
achieved in protecting children from harm, also extended to the other professionals 
and agencies working within the child protection system: 
I know that it is not just social workers… other agencies can be 
subject to the same standards (SW1, SSI). 
Yes, other professionals can get blamed too… not as often as 
social workers, but it does happen (SW3, FG). 
It was in this context that the participants explained that which they considered to 
be an ‘ingrained culture’ (SW2, SSI) within the system, of ‘inter-agency finger 
pointing’ (SW1, Q): 
It’s like the idea that we can stop children being harmed has 
meant that when a child is injured, everyone rushes to blame 
each other for it (SW2, SSI). 
I’ve seen it a few times, a child is hurt and then it becomes dog-
eat-dog… each agency is looking to blame the next for what has 
happened (M4, FG). 
I understood that underlying this notion of child protection practitioners being 
ready to blame one another, was, a perhaps unsurprisingly desire to avoid being 
identified as culpable in a child’s suffering – with the social workers accepting that 
‘we are all afraid of seeing our names in newspaper print’ (SW7, Q). Nevertheless, 
the social workers felt that it was they who were most liable to criticism and/or 
blame from their inter-agency colleagues: 
It’s just part of the culture… the social worker is the one that 
other agencies look to when something goes wrong (SW11, Q). 
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Well I think that any professional involved in a case risks 
becoming the subject for criticism from other agencies, but when 
something bad has happened it’s usually the social worker that is 
targeted… it’s like they need a fall-guy and the social worker fits 
the bill (SW2, SSI). 
Whilst I considered that the social workers’ role as ‘lead practitioner’ (see HM 
Government, 2018: 31) perhaps cultivated the notion that they held most 
responsibility for the protection of the child amongst their statutory partners 
(Munro, 2011b), the design of the study prohibited me from exploring this with 
representatives from other agencies. I was however able to document (within my 
fieldnotes) particular instances in which a group of other professionals, seemingly 
‘en masse’, openly challenged a social worker about their practice, and further 
sought to blame them for some negative occurrence. 
One such occasion took place during a child protection conference: 
I attended a child protection conference today in support of 
[social worker]. The meeting had been earmarked as a potentially 
difficult one, given a perceived level of disharmony amongst some 
of our inter-agency colleagues. I was shocked by the level of 
hostility on display and some of the language used in relation to 
[social worker]… with one representative shouting and 
aggressively pointing her finger… but most concerning was that it 
took place as a collective with four professionals (across two 
agencies) seemingly seeking to blame [social worker] for an injury 
sustained to the child whilst in the care of his mother… 
(Observation of Child Protection Conference – Conference offices, 
November, 2015). 
Of course, it is appropriate (and sometimes necessary) for child protection 
professionals from different agencies to challenge one-another in the best interests 
of the child (Munro, 2002). What troubled me about this encounter was the 
apparent animosity and distain with which this challenge took place; and more so, 
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the seeming eagerness of the collective to blame the social worker for harm 
suffered by a child whilst in the presence of the very parent who had ostensibly 
been in charge of him when the injury was sustained.  
This I considered cultivated the wrong impression (namely that a social worker who 
was not present was more blameworthy than the parent who was apparently 
present and charged with caring for the child) and was perhaps indicative of those 
‘unrealistic expectations’ that the social workers had complained about. 
I did not have the opportunity to interview the social worker involved in this 
account after the event, noting only in my field notes her experience that ‘they 
were angry and it’s normal they wanted someone to blame… I guess in this instance 
it had to be me’ (Discussion with Social Worker – Conference offices corridor, 
November 2015). However, I also observed another encounter which was attended 
by one of the interviewees of this study. This multi-agency forum was labelled as a 
‘learning conference’ and took place after a teenage boy had allegedly sexually 
assaulted one of his peers – there was strong evidence in support of this allegation, 
but the case did not go to trial, and thus the allegation was not proven. 
My attendance at the conference was again in a supportive capacity, and again I 
noted the readiness of the collective to single out the social worker as 
‘blameworthy’ (although this time the ‘collective’ comprised of four separate 
agencies). Their reasoning was that in her earlier assessment of the child, 
commissioned after he had admitted sexually assaulting a younger child, the social 
worker had nevertheless concluded that he was ‘low risk of reoffending’.  
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The social worker chose to reflect on this experience in our interview together: 
I mean you were there weren’t you… you saw it… as soon as we 
walked in the room, you got the feeling that they wanted blood 
(SW1, SSI). 
Whilst the social worker had, I believe a good rationale for why she concluded her 
earlier assessment as she did, this is not my focus here. Instead, it is the level of 
discomfort that she admitted experiencing when  
confronted with a group of other professionals set on criticising 
me for failure to foresee another child might be harmed (SW1, 
SSI).  
Further, it is to outline her assertion of the importance of a discretionary space 
being endorsed in such a context: 
I said to them, listen I can only work with the information that I 
have at the time… that is why it is so important that in making 
that decision, I knew that my manager would back me up… like he 
said afterwards, ‘I expect you to have to make hard decisions, and 
I trust you to do a good assessment… I will support your 
conclusion, whatever it may be’… without the knowledge that I 
would have his support, I honestly don’t know how confident I 
would be in using discretion (SW1, SSI). 
Indeed, this was a position shared by other social workers, who outlined that the 
‘personal risk’ of not having a discretionary space endorsed by a manager, provided 
a sense of being more ‘exposed’ when they became the target for blame within an 
inter-agency forum: 
That’s the problem… because you cannot bank on your manager’s 
support you feel much more exposed when other professionals, 
or even parents or family members, seek to criticise you for 
something that you did, or didn’t do (SW1, Q). 
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This also helps to explain the tendency of some of the social workers not to be 
willing to employ discretion in those aforementioned de facto discretionary spaces:  
It’s because at those times, some other professionals sense that 
there may be questions asked about the work in a case, and they 
say ‘look it’s the social worker you need to talk to, not me’… and 
you find yourself alone trying to explain your actions… without 
the support of your manager or the other agencies involved... 
(SW9, Q). 
Ultimately, I understood that contributing to the social workers’ reluctance to 
employ discretion in particular contexts was this sense that they might become the 
target for blame by their inter-agency child protection colleagues. However, I also 
understood that this fear emanated from a belief that in being singled-out as a 
suitable ‘fall-guy’ from within the child protection system, it left a practitioner more 
liable to blame and the associated negative consequences from outside the system: 
Family members sit there and listen to other professionals say 
‘well I think the social worker is at fault, and if they had done 
better, this child would never have been abused’… I mean, what 
are they supposed to do with that… I’m surprised there aren’t 
more civil suits… (SW4, FG). 
Can you imagine what would happen to you if a child was 
seriously harmed and the media got hold of a story that the other 
professionals in the case were blaming you for it… it doesn’t bear 
thinking about (SW5, SSI). 
6.4 Conclusion: A myriad of factors 
Throughout this chapter I have sought to answer the research question ‘How are 
systemic factors impacting on social worker discretion?’ In so doing, I have drawn 
from the social workers’ accounts to identify causal structures and processes 
related to: the ‘Baby P effect’; the government policy of ‘austerity’ and the cuts that 
it has engendered in local service provision; the anxiety created by the possibility of 
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a negative external inspection report; a legacy of ‘reductionistic’ media and political 
coverage of child protection; and a culture of inter-agency finger pointing within 
the child protection system. 
It is clear from this discussion that the social workers believed that a myriad of 
systemic factors were continuing to impact upon both their discretionary space and 
choice, and indeed apparent within the study were a series of continued obstacles 
to social worker discretion. In the next chapter I seek to build on these assertions as 
I discuss how these factors and their impact can be considered in the context of the 
wider literature, especially as it pertains to the Munro Review of Child Protection.   
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CHAPTER 7 – DISCUSSION 
7.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the research findings relative to the existing 
literature; identifying implications both for contemporary social work practice and 
future enquiry; and commenting specifically on how the results might be 
interpreted in the context of the Munro Review of Child Protection.  
I begin with an analysis of the research findings in the broad sense, contrasting key 
messages from the wider social work literature with the results from two of my 
research questions - ‘Where do social workers encounter discretionary space?’ and 
‘When do social workers choose discretion?’ Secondly, I consider, in the context of 
the child protection literature, the findings relating to the question ‘How are 
systemic factors impacting on social worker discretion?’. 
Finally, I take a more detailed approach and explore Munro’s image of a ‘child-
centred’ child protection system, and whether key features of this system were 
apparent in the findings of this study. I conclude the chapter with a discussion 
about the ‘messiness’ of social worker discretion and the suggestion that further 
reform may be required if child protection social workers are to more consistently 
employ their discretion in the interests of the individual child. 
7.1 Where do social workers encounter discretionary space, and when 
will they choose discretion? 
Key findings that emerged from my review of the wider social work literature (see 
Chapter 2) included: 
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● The tendency of authors to conflate different notions of discretion (for 
example, Lipsky, 1980; Munro, 2009); 
● The inherency of the ‘continuation debate’ and for researchers to focus on 
discretionary space in the binary sense (for example, Howe, 1986; 1991; 
Munro, 2005); 
● The idea that the level of freedom afforded is determined by the type of 
discretionary space available (Evans, 2010); and 
● The assertion that, upon encountering a discretionary space, social workers 
are able to choose whether or not to employ discretion (for example, Evans, 
2013; Ellis, 2014). 
These informed a number of my aims for this study (see Section 3.1) and led to two 
specific research questions: ‘Where do social workers encounter discretionary 
space?’, and ‘When do social workers choose discretion?’ 
This section analyses the research findings relative to these questions in the context 
of the wider literature. It is organised under four headings: 
• Conceptualising discretionary space; 
• A curtailed and continuing discretion; 
• Types of discretionary space encountered; and 
• Whether to choose discretion. 
Each will be considered in turn. 
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7.1.1 Conceptualising discretionary space 
The first aim of this research was to establish some understanding of how social 
workers construed notions of ‘discretion’ and ‘discretionary space’ (see Section 
3.1). This arose from my observation that throughout the wider literature, theorists 
had repeatedly failed to ground their discussions about discretion in some formal 
definition of the term (for example, Lipsky, 1980; 2010; Howe, 1986; 1991; Baldwin, 
2000; Munro, 2004; 2005; 2009). This was problematic given the concept’s 
chameleon-like nature and its propensity to mean different things in different 
contexts (Evans, 2010). 
Mindful of the contrast between discretion in the structural sense and the 
epistemic sense (see Molander, 2016), I sought to identify and incorporate the 
participants’ definitions of both ‘discretion’ and ‘discretionary space’ into the 
study’s design. In so doing, I was able overcome the aforementioned limitation 
associated with much of the wider literature, whilst also improving the efficacy of 
my own findings (Smith, 1981). 
I outlined that concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘action’ were seen as key features of 
‘discretion’, which was conceived as 
the freedom to decide upon and take a course of action, 
independently from the oversight, and direction of others (for 
example, a manager).  
Whereas, ‘discretionary space’ was understood as ‘the space, area or opportunity 
to employ discretion’. 
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These conceptualisations complemented the few formal definitions that appear 
within the wider social work literature, such as ‘freedom within the work role’ 
(Evans, 2010: 33), and ‘the space for [discretionary] decision-making and action-
taking’ (Molander, 2016: 10). 
Both terms were referenced explicitly at each stage of formal data collection, the 
significance of which is that readers can be confident that meanings ascribed to 
them throughout the chapter are the same as those offered by the child protection 
practitioners participating in the study. 
7.1.2 A curtailed and continuing discretion 
My second research aim was to explore the degree that contemporary child 
protection social workers were experiencing discretionary space within their 
practice (see Section 3.1). This arose from the inherency of the ‘continuation 
debate’ within the wider literature, where theorists have argued for and against the 
pervasion of discretionary space in the context of statutory social work (see Section 
2.3). 
This argument has centred on the extent that managerialism has encroached into 
social work teams, with authors such as Howe (1986) arguing that this is a 
completed process (thereby assuming a ‘domination’ perspective – see Section 
2.1.4) and that discretionary space has been ‘curtailed’ (see Section 2.3.1). Others, 
such as Baldwin (2000), counter this argument, asserting that discretionary space 
continues to be available to the statutory social worker because the encroachment 
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of managerialism remains incomplete (thereby adopting a ‘discursive’ stance – see 
Section 2.1.4). 
The findings emerging from this study highlight two important points relative to this 
argument. The first is in relation to the extent to which discretionary space was 
available to the statutory social worker in this study (and here it is important to 
highlight the fact that I chose not to say ‘whether or not’ discretion was available). 
In this regard the data supports both positions. For example, though the social 
workers’ discretionary space had been restricted in certain areas, such as decisions 
pertaining to whether a child would be made subject to a child protection plan; 
whether to initiate care proceedings; and the proposed ‘care plan’ for a child at the 
conclusion of care proceedings (see Section 4.2.1), they continued to encounter 
discretionary space in a number of areas, from the management of their diary to 
the decision to spend their own money (see Sections 4.3.1 & 4.2.2). These will be 
differentiated according to type of space encountered in the following section. 
The second point relates to the encroachment of managerialism. Here, it was clear 
that despite the obvious presence of managerialist techniques for restricting social 
worker discretionary space – for example, through control of hierarchical power 
structures, control of budgets and procedures, and efforts to enforce compliance 
through surveillance and audit (Howe, 1986) – these were often only successful in 
constricting the officially recognised (de jure) discretionary space, whilst other 
forms persisted. (I note later in the chapter that these techniques purportedly had 
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more of a pervasive influence on the social workers’ ‘willingness’ to employ 
discretion within the discretionary space.)  
Indeed, in contrast to the assertions of Howe and others favouring the domination 
perspective, discretionary space was observed to exist both because of the 
continued complexities associated with the political (i.e. disparity between policy 
and provision) and human (i.e. the complicated, unpredictable and varied nature of 
the individual citizen) elements of public service provision (see Lipsky, 2010; 
Baldwin, 2000); and because in recognising these complexities, managers (in this 
study, more the local manager than senior manager) sought to provide informal 
discretionary space to the social workers in the interest of maintaining effective 
service provision (see Evans, 2016; Evans and Harris, 2004). 
7.1.3 Types of discretionary space encountered 
In reviewing the literature (see Chapter 2), I observed that the view of discretion as 
binary (i.e. that a social worker has or does not have discretionary space), as 
displayed by some theorists, was reductionist and failed to acknowledge those 
different ‘degrees’ or ‘gradations’ of freedom that may be available to the social 
worker (see Baldwin, 2000; Evans and Harris, 2004). 
On this basis an additional aim of the study was to explore whether the 
discretionary space available to the social worker could be identified and 
categorised, and if so, how these different types of discretion might be understood, 
relative to the assertions made within the wider literature (see Section 3.1). 
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Ultimately, the findings of this study supported the notion that the type of 
discretionary space available to a social worker can change according to the 
practice context and task encountered (see Baldwin, 2000; Evans and Harris, 2004), 
and further, that types of space can be differentiated according to the level of 
official recognition and formality with which they are granted, or indeed, whether 
they are granted at all (see Evans, 2010; 2016).  
For example, whilst the social workers within this study identified areas of practice 
in which they exercised discretion in an officially recognised and formally 
sanctioned discretionary space (such as managing their diary), they also highlighted 
examples where this ‘de jure’ space (see Evans, 2010) was permitted only when 
certain criteria were met (such as in the ‘emergency’ time-sensitive decision). Other 
examples were also reported where the de jure space was restricted by third 
parties – specifically, the Independent Reviewing Officer in respect to the task of 
managing and implementing a child protection plan – despite formal policy 
documents advocating the space for social workers to use their discretion. 
However, in those areas where the restriction of de jure space was reported – 
either informally (as above) or formally (for example, in policy documents 
advocating compliance with timescales and a restriction on monetary expenditure) 
– the social workers agreed that their practitioner status often afforded them a 
continued ‘de facto’ discretionary space (see Section 2.4.1). This was not granted 
formally or informally, nor was it officially recognised or sanctioned, but occurred 
as circumstances dictated, through an absence of control mechanisms which would 
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otherwise restrict the social worker’s power to choose their own course of action 
(Evans, 2010).  
Furthermore, the evidence suggested that local managers afforded social workers 
an ‘informal’ and ‘unofficial’ discretionary space on the pretext of achieving a more 
‘effective’ and ‘pragmatic’ service provision. Here, social worker discretion was not 
only generally accepted, but was, on occasion, found to be covertly promoted in 
order to achieve a desired outcome (see Evans, 2016). This supports the discursive 
managerialist argument that managers are able to exercise their own professional 
discretion and resist official policy positions in the pursuit of achieving goals (see 
Evans, 2010). 
Indeed, the social workers described examples in which managers were willing to 
‘turn a blind eye’ to discretionary behaviour (for example, in cases where the social 
worker decided to spend their own money in supporting the service user), or else 
where the manager implicitly encouraged the social worker to employ discretion 
(for example, completing work tasks outside of ‘normal office hours’). In such cases, 
a shared commitment to achieving a specific objective was key (see also Evans, 
2010), and in this sense, the position of managers and social workers within the 
organisation was not as distinct as the domination perspective or street-level 
bureaucracy theory would suggest (Evans, 2016).  
These findings provide support for the argument that the social work community 
should seek to move away from binary terms such as ‘curtailment’, ‘erosion’ and 
‘continuation’, to describe discretionary space. Likewise, the findings offer evidence 
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contradicting the assertion that the ‘managerialisation’ of social work departments 
is a completed process, where managers and social workers consistently work in 
opposition to one another.  
Indeed, the findings suggest that discretion is more nuanced than binary arguments 
can accommodate and further that to understand the level of freedom available to 
a social worker in any given situation, it is helpful to consider the circumstances 
within which the discretionary space has occurred. 
7.1.4 Whether to choose discretion 
Another message emerging from the literature was the level of agency available to 
the social worker on encountering discretionary space, and that they are able to 
choose whether or not they employ discretion within the discretionary space (see 
Hupe et al., 2015; Evans and Harris, 2004; Evans, 2010; 2013; Ellis, 2011; 2014). 
This was an important observation in relation to my research, suggesting a need for 
greater critical analysis beyond whether discretionary space exists – and indeed the 
type of discretionary space experienced – and leading me to my stipulated aim of 
exploring whether, on encountering a discretionary space, social workers would 
choose to employ their discretion, and further, what factors informed this choice 
(see Section 3.1). The term ‘willingness’ was used to denote the social worker’s 
‘propensity to choose discretion’ within the discretionary space (see Section 5.0). 
While the evidence provided no uniform rule for when a social worker would or 
would not choose to employ discretion, a number of tendencies were apparent 
within the group. 
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For example, there was a tendency for social workers to be willing to use their 
discretion in the ‘de jure’ (such as ‘logistical’ case management, and in the 
management and implementation of the child in need plan) and ‘entrepreneurial’ 
space (for example, decisions to work outside of contracted hours). However, it was 
also evident that the social workers tended to be ‘unwilling’ to exercise discretion 
in the ‘de facto’ space (for example, non-compliance with departmental ‘must-do’ 
timescales; and ‘time-sensitive’ but ‘non-emergency’ decisions encountered in the 
field). 
It should be noted here that whilst the wider literature accepts that social workers 
are able to make different choices within the discretionary space, it is not robustly 
discussed relative to the type of discretionary space encountered. Instead, the 
focus of the research centres on notions of professionalism (for example, Evans, 
2013); entry to service provision (Ellis, 2011) or the allocation of resources (Ellis, 
2014); and in this sense this is a significant finding with implications for 
understanding how and why, in any given situation, a social worker may, or may 
not, choose to employ their discretion (see below).  
Indeed, with regards to the aforementioned tendencies, I understood that 
underlying them was the notion that by ‘endorsing’ a discretionary space – either 
formally (i.e. de jure) or ‘informally’ (i.e. entrepreneurial) – a manager would be 
seen to advocate for the social worker, if at some future juncture, others came to 
scrutinise and question the decision-making or action-taking that took place within 
the discretionary space. Without this ‘endorsement’ (as in the example of the de 
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facto space) the social worker felt more vulnerable to blame for any negative 
outcomes that might be attributed to their discretionary decision/action. 
It was in these terms that the social workers associated contrasting levels of ‘risk’ 
with different types of discretionary space, explaining that where they sensed that 
a discretionary space posed an increased ‘risk’ to themselves (i.e. of being labelled 
as individually culpable for some negative outcome), then they were generally less 
willing to employ their discretion. 
Also significant was the fact that the social workers in this study did not associate a 
high degree of ‘personal risk’ with the entrepreneurial space, especially given the 
propensity of the wider literature to assert that any discretionary space which is not 
formally sanctioned exposes the social worker to potential blame (see for example, 
Evans, 2016; Munro, 2009). Indeed, Evans (2016) argues that the manager benefits 
from the informally afforded space in the sense that they are protected from 
accountability for a social worker’s discretionary behaviour, and because they are 
able to ‘shift’ the blame for any perceived fallibility in decision-making/action-
taking onto the social worker.  
Yet the practitioners within this study stressed that their willingness to employ 
discretion within the entrepreneurial space was on the understanding that 
managers would share accountability for discretionary behaviour and would not 
seek to shift the blame onto a social worker after the fact. Any suspicion that a 
manager was not willing to acknowledge their endorsement of the entrepreneurial 
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space was said to limit the social worker’s propensity to employ their discretion, 
thereby rendering the informal space redundant.  
It was in these terms that the social workers felt that they had some power to 
compel managers to enter into an informal contract to support the social worker if 
their discretionary behaviour within the entrepreneurial space was later 
questioned, or else be left to resolve the political and human tensions of public 
service provision (see Section 2.2.1) without the support of the social worker. 
The implication is of course that the social workers of this study were not the 
powerless or passive practitioners purported by advocates of a domination 
managerialist account (for example, Howe, 1986; 1991). However, it is also that it is 
as much the level of risk associated with the discretionary space, as it is the type of 
space encountered, which informs a social worker’s willingness to choose 
discretion.  
That being said, the other significant finding arising from the study was the range of 
factors, beyond the type of discretionary space, or the associated risk assigned to 
that space, which were said to influence whether or not a social worker chose to 
employ their discretion.  These factors were understood to be particularly relevant 
in explaining those exceptions to the general tendencies (for example, to be 
unwilling to employ discretion in the de jure space, but willing in the de facto 
space), and included such things as the social worker’s knowledge of the child, its 
family and their circumstances; the experience of using discretion in similar 
272 
 
decision-making scenarios; and the impact of influences derived from the ‘personal’ 
rather than the ‘professional’ life.  
As I have already discussed (see Section 5.3), the pertinent point that arises here 
with respect to our understanding of how discretionary choice might manifest in 
practice, is that at any given time, a social worker can be affected by myriad factors, 
and the unique nature of how these interact and are interpreted – and the impact 
that they have on the individual – make it difficult to know with any degree of 
certainty whether a social worker will choose to employ their discretion within a 
discretionary space (thereby linking to critical realist assertions as to the 
‘multiplicity’ and ‘indeterminacy’ of causal powers – see Section 3.2.1)   
Instead, it is more prudent to think in terms of a ‘likelihood’ and ‘tendency’ to 
employ discretion (again, see Section 3.2.1). In the context of this study, social 
workers were more likely to choose to employ discretion within the de jure and 
entrepreneurial space but tended not to choose discretion within the de facto 
space.   
7.2 How are systemic factors impacting on social worker discretion? 
A principal theme throughout the child protection literature is how systemic factors 
have historically impacted on both the space for, and value placed in, social worker 
discretion (Munro, 2004; 2005; 2009; 2010b; 2011a; 2011b).  
This theme, in addition to my critical realist framework for enquiry (which has 
sought to move beyond descriptive, and towards explanatory accounts – see 
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Section 3.2.1), informed my research aim of exploring why social worker 
discretionary space and choice was manifesting in the way identified (see Section 
3.1).  
In this regard, the section considers the research question: ‘How are systemic 
factors impacting on social worker discretion?’ However, in discussing these factors 
in the context of the wider child protection literature, the section also assesses the 
evidence of change relative to the Munro Review recommendations for reform (see 
Section 1.4.3).  
The section is organised under the following headings: 
• The ‘ripple effect’ of unannounced inspection; 
• A more (not less) restrictive ICT system; 
• The perpetuation of unrealistic expectations and the continued risk of 
discretion; and 
• How a high demand for services can inhibit social worker discretion. 
7.2.1 The ‘ripple effect’ of unannounced inspection 
The existing literature considers how an increasing managerial approach to 
statutory social work provision – one which demanded more accountability and 
transparency (Munro, 2004) – has impacted upon social worker discretionary space 
and choice in a child protection context (Shaw et al., 2009; Wastell et al., 2010; 
Pithouse et al., 2011; Wastell and White, 2014; Munro, 2009; 2010b; 2011b). One 
area in which this influence has been most notable is in relation to the inspection of 
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children’s services departments (Munro, 2004; 2011b). Indeed, the literature 
asserts that with a more punitive approach to inspection accompanying the rise of 
managerialism, where inspectors can publicly name and shame departments 
considered to be ‘failing’ in their duties to children, local employers and staff have 
become more defensive in their approach to practice (see Munro, 2004). This 
defensiveness is said to have resulted in a reduction in the value placed in, and 
therefore space for, social worker discretion (Munro, 2009; 2011b).  
The findings of this study, based on one local authority, support this assertion, 
suggesting that in the aftermath of an ostensibly ‘negative’ inspection report in 
2012, senior managers had become more focussed on preparation for inspection 
and had increased their use of managerialist techniques (including audit and 
remedial action plans) to coerce frontline staff to conform with their expectations 
of ‘good performance’ in an inspection context.  
This included evidencing compliance with easily quantifiable ‘output’ measures of 
practice (Munro, 2011b: 39), such as procedures followed, and timescales met, and 
maintaining a full and comprehensive written account of all work undertaken. Such 
was the onus placed on these aspects of a social worker’s work – emphasised 
through departmental mantras like ‘if it’s not on the system, then it hasn’t been 
done’ (see Section 6.2.2) – that practitioners felt compelled to comply (or else risk 
being made subject to disciplinary procedures), sometimes at the expense of the 
individual child. 
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This was evidenced by the fact that social workers estimated 15% of their average 
work time was spent with the child, while 70% was spent on paperwork9, with the 
latter being attributable to efforts to appear compliant with managerial 
expectations of inspection preparedness. This is significant in the context of existing 
estimates of 20-25% of social worker time spent with children – see for example, 
Garrett, 2003; Holmes et al., 2009; Baginsky et al., 2010; Holmes and McDermid, 
2013; White et al., 2010. It is also indicative of that which Parton (2008) describes 
as the ‘shift’ in focus from the ‘relational’ and ‘social’ and towards the 
‘informational’:  
… the nature of [contemporary child protection] practice and the 
knowledge which both informs and characterises it, is less 
concerned with the relational and social dimensions of the work 
and more with the informational (p. 715). 
Indeed, some social workers admitted that they were more focussed on their 
‘inspection-readiness’ than on how to achieve the best interests of the individual 
child (with the implication being that the two were not necessarily complimentary 
of each other). This was said to have a detrimental impact upon the use of 
discretion, not only because of the reduction in de jure discretionary space 
associated with preparation culture (see Section 6.2), but because in their efforts to 
appear ‘compliant’, social workers felt they did not spend adequate time with the 
child to garner the type of knowledge to facilitate a willingness to employ discretion 
within specific contexts (see Section 6.2).  
                                                        
9 The remaining 15% was attributed to ‘other’ tasks. 
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Of course, the significance of this finding is that it indicates little movement from 
the observations made in the Munro Review, specifically about the barriers to 
discretion created by local approach to inspection (see Section 1.4.2). This is 
notable given the recent reform to the inspection system in response to Munro’s 
recommendations for change (see Section, 1.4.3).  
Indeed, while the evidence from the study does not help to elucidate why senior 
managers remained fixed in their focus on evidencing ‘output’ indicators, as 
opposed to the ‘outcome’ measures of performance which have purportedly 
become the new remit of the inspection team (see Munro, 2012 for an account); it 
does suggest that the change to a system of unannounced inspection may have 
increased the bureaucratic burden in the context of this maintained focus. 
This is because, in practical terms, the move to unannounced inspection has meant 
that local authorities are no longer afforded a two-week notice of Ofsted’s ‘intent 
to inspect’, but instead are informed the day before an inspection is due to take 
place. In rationalising this change, Munro (2011b) had considered that it would 
reduce the ‘bureaucratic burden’ associated with preparing for inspection, as local 
authorities would have less time to engage in acts of preparation. However, the 
evidence from this study does not support this assertion; instead it indicates that 
(at least in Marketon) the change may have contributed to an increase in the 
amount of bureaucratisation and the duration of preparation undertaken. 
To illustrate this point, the practitioners involved in this study asserted that during 
the inspection of their services in 2012, the managerial focus on preparation for 
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inspection was relatively confined to the two week notice period (purportedly 
resulting in ‘chaotic scenes’ of practitioners working late into the night and at 
weekends in the days preceding Ofsted’s arrival). However, the removal of the two-
week notice period, and with it the assurance that ‘there was still time available to 
undertake remedial work and to prepare’ (M4, FG), had increased the anxiety about 
potential inspection and engendered a perpetual focus on preparation within the 
CSD. As such, staff, and managers particularly, were eager to ensure all files and 
paperwork were consistently ‘Ofsted-ready’. 
It is not my intention to argue here against the transition to an unannounced 
inspection format, and I believe the rationale for this decision explored within the 
wider literature is sound (see Munro, 2011b). Rather, it is to highlight that this 
move may not have achieved the level of change envisaged by the Munro Review; 
but rather, a possible unintended consequence, or ‘ripple effect’ (to use Munro’s 
term), of unannounced inspection is that social workers are perhaps employing less 
discretion in their practice than they would have before the change in inspection 
arrangements.  
Whilst it remains difficult in the context of this study to separate out the impact of 
receiving an ostensibly ‘negative’ inspection report from the move to unannounced 
inspection, the implication here is the need to explore more broadly (i.e. amongst 
more providers of statutory child protection services) how the reforms to the 
inspection system have impacted upon the use of social worker discretion at the 
frontline of child protection provision. The conclusion drawn from this study is that 
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rather than increase the use of discretion, they may have instead provided 
additional obstacles to social worker discretion. 
7.2.2 A more (not less) restrictive IT system 
Another legacy of the managerialisation, and ‘proceduralisation’ of children’s 
services provision according to the child protection literature, has been the 
‘electronic turn’ towards restrictive IT systems, epitomised by the Integrated 
Children’s System (ICS) (see Shaw and Clayden, 2009; Shaw et al., 2009; Broadhurst 
et al., 2010a; 2010b; Wastell et al., 2010; Wastell et al., 2010; Pithouse et al., 2011; 
Wastell and White, 2014). 
Indeed, the wider literature cites the restriction of a de jure discretionary space 
within many versions of the ICS, due, in the main, to the inherency of core 
information requirements, embedded workflow streams and exemplar templates 
(Shaw et al., 2009; White et al., 2010). However the literature also recognises the 
continuation of a de facto space, where social workers have been exercising 
discretion – in the form of ‘informal processes’ (Broadhurst et al., 2010b: 3); 
‘expedient manoeuvres’ and ‘workarounds’ (Pithouse et al., 2011: 173) – albeit not 
consistently in the interests of the individual child (Broadhurst et al., 2010a; White 
et al., 2010). 
Evident within this study was how the intense focus on the social worker’s ICS 
recordings by managers (particularly in the interests of ensuring their preparedness 
for inspection) had limited the discretionary space available to the social worker, 
with little evidence of them being able to engage in ‘expedient manoeuvres’ or 
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‘workarounds’, either in, or against, the best interest of the child (see Section 
4.2.3). 
As I have explained, the social workers of this study viewed the ICS as a ‘tool for 
audit and surveillance’, employed by managers to actively identify practitioners 
who were not compliant with their expectations of what constituted ‘good 
performance’ (see Section 6.2.2). Indeed, managers utilised functions within 
Marketon’s variant of the ICS – including flashing notifications and the workflow 
stream – to control the social workers’ case recordings (see Section 4.2.3). This was 
significant, as the approach was understood to comprise part of the ‘bureaucratic 
burden’ that social workers associated with their lack of sufficient time to spend 
with the child, and thus their unwillingness to employ discretion in some 
circumstances. 
This finding adds weight to the increasingly influential explanation for children 
becoming ‘invisible’ within the child protection system (Ferguson, 2016: 1009) – 
namely, that the scope for social workers to get to know children sufficiently is 
constrained by excessive levels of case recording; other bureaucracy; restrictive 
timescales for completing work and compliance with managerially directed 
processes and procedures (Broadhurst et al., 2010b; White et al., 2010; Ferguson, 
2016). The effect of these systemic pressures is that social workers do not 
ostensibly have the time to develop the depth of relationship necessary to have a 
confidence to employ discretion in respect to a child (see Section 7.2.1), and thus, 
to keep them safe (Munro, 2011b; Ferguson, 2016). 
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Indeed, the importance of these findings is that they support Munro’s (2010b, 
2011b) observation of how the ICS has restricted a social worker’s use of discretion. 
However, they also indicate that in the context of Marketon, the type of reform 
that Munro had envisioned for the ICS had not subsequently been achieved. On the 
contrary, the evidence suggests the inverse is true, and a regression in the freedom 
available to social workers in respect to their electronic recording. 
This is due to the fact that two years after the publication of the final Munro Review 
report – in which she had called for local providers to jettison variants of the ICS 
with restrictive workflow steams, and excessive controls on the content of data 
records (see Section 1.4.3a) – those with responsibility for commissioning the ICT 
systems in Marketon, introduced a new variant of ICS; one that incorporated more 
embedded restriction (for example, the introduction of the rule that tasks could 
only be completed in the order that the workflow dictated), to the admitted 
consternation of many of the social workers within this study. 
Indeed, during the data collection the practitioners repeatedly expressed their 
frustration at the decision to commission a new system that, in contrast to Munro’s 
recommendation, had only compounded the bureaucratic element of their work:  
By the way, wasn’t it recommended that we move away from and 
not towards these systems? It makes you wonder whether 
managers even read the [Munro] report (SW16, Q). 
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The problem is that the new system requires so much more 
time… there are so many more boxes to fill and stages to go 
through before you can get anything done (SW11, Q). 
Ultimately, I think the new system has increased our time in the 
office (SW6, FG). 
I should highlight that whilst I was not part of the commissioning process for this 
new variant of the system, I was, during the course of the data collection, given 
access to the local authority records of procurement, which detailed the logistics of 
that process and why the decision had been made to commission that specific 
variant. In my analysis of these documents, I noted two points which are prudent to 
consider here.  
The first was that of the six Marketon employees chosen to ‘test’ the new system 
on behalf of the local authority, none were social workers. Instead, managers 
undertook the task (the IT manager, two CSD senior managers, two CSD team 
managers) with only one practitioner (a family support worker from the LAC Team) 
in attendance. Secondly, the written rationale for the decision included several 
justifications characteristic of a managerialist discourse, detailing how: ‘managers 
can easily identify areas requiring remedial work’; ‘tasks cannot be progressed 
without manager approval’; ‘the system facilitates the measurement of compliance 
with performance targets’. 
What is striking about these points is that they appear to highlight that it was the 
needs of the manager, as opposed to the needs of the practitioner as users of the 
new system, that took precedence during the procurement process.  
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The importance of this observation is that it again indicates a continued inclination 
towards managerialist methods of control over the desire to increase practitioner 
discretionary freedom. Whilst it remains to be seen whether other local authorities 
have taken a similar approach in their procurement of new IT systems since 
publication of the Munro Review, this finding provides a context for discussion in 
the consideration of progress towards Munro’s image for a more ‘child-centred’ 
system (see Section 7.2.3). 
7.2.3 The perpetuation of unrealistic expectations and the 
continued risk of discretion  
Inherent within both the child protection and wider social work literature is the 
notion that discretionary behaviour at the frontline of public service provision can 
pose an element of risk both to the practitioner in question, and to their employer 
(Evans and Harris, 2004; Lipsky, 2010; Evans, 2010; Munro, 2004; 2009; 2011b).  
Often, this risk has been framed as the potential of being held (or labelled as) 
accountable for any negative consequence that may result from a specific 
discretionary behaviour (Evans and Harris, 2004; Munro, 2010b). This has led to 
repeated observations of employers exercising efforts to reduce a practitioner’s 
discretionary space, so as to minimise ‘risk to the agency’ (Munro, 2004: 1094), and 
of practitioners either rejecting or seeking to limit the discretionary space available 
to them (Munro, 2009; 2011b; see also Lipsky, 2010; Evans and Harris, 2004).  
Similar findings were made within this study and were seen in senior management 
decisions to emphasise inspection preparation, relying on ‘protocolization’ (Munro, 
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2004: 1096) and restrictive IT systems to ensure compliance (see Sections 7.2.1-
7.2.2). It was also evident in the choices made by the social workers, most notably 
in the tendency not to employ discretion in the de facto space – reporting an 
increased vulnerability to being held ‘individually accountable’ – but also in 
exceptions to the general tendencies, where social workers chose not to employ 
discretion in the entrepreneurial, but perhaps most intriguingly, the de jure space. 
The importance of this was that it illustrated how, for some practitioners, discretion 
continued to be perceived as ‘risky’, even in areas where there was an explicit 
expectation that they would use it. At these times, social workers often engaged in 
that which Whittaker (2011: 481) describes as ‘upward delegation’, that is, 
deferring responsibility for a decision to a manager. Whilst I reflected that these 
occasions might be considered contrary to the professional expectation placed on 
social workers to be able (and, by implication, willing) to make decisions 
independently (see Health Care Professions Council, 2017 ‘Standards of 
Proficiency’10 and also the Department for Education’s, 2018 ‘Knowledge and Skills 
Statements for Child and Family’ Social Workers11), this is not my focus here. More 
so, it is to emphasise how the social workers continued to reject opportunities for 
discretion, due to a perceived ‘risk’ posed by the discretionary space.  
                                                        
10 Specifically, ‘Standard 4’ – ‘be able to practise as an autonomous professional, exercising their 
own professional judgement’ (p. 7). 
11 Specifically, ‘Statement 7’ – ‘Analysis, decision-making, planning and review’ (p. 5-6). 
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Indeed, the implication is that practitioners do not consistently view discretionary 
space as the ‘good thing’ espoused in much of the wider literature, with assertions 
to the contrary appearing throughout the participants’ testimonies: 
I don’t agree with the position that having the freedom to make 
decisions independently [as a social worker] is a good thing… 
Sometimes, I would much prefer for my manager to tell me what 
to do (SW5, SSI). 
I do feel that I have quite a lot of discretionary space in my 
decisions. I think that some social workers feel that they don’t 
have enough… but to be honest I feel the opposite; I feel that I 
have too much, and I don’t want it… I don’t like it… sometimes I 
want to go to my manager and pass the decision onto him (SW4, 
SSI). 
The explanation offered by Munro for why discretion had become ‘risky’ for the 
practitioner included the tendency to blame social workers and their employers in 
the event of child tragedy (Munro, 2005; 2009; 2010b; 2011a; 2011b). This led her 
to make a number of recommendations for reform (see Section 1.4.3), two of which 
are particularly pertinent to consider here. 
The first, was that local child protection partners should adopt a different approach 
in the context of child harm, and not be so ready to label individual social workers, 
their team or department, as blameworthy for the event. The second was that 
politicians and the media should adopt a more responsible approach to their 
commentary and coverage of social work in the aftermath of child tragedy, thereby 
limiting the cultivation of unrealistic expectations placed on child protection 
practitioners (Munro, 2011b).  
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Of course Munro has reacted enthusiastically to the degree of change evidenced in 
the political sense:  
Since my review, something good has happened but it’s so 
invisible nobody really notices it apart from me. And that is when 
there have been horrible stories in the newspapers, the 
government has not come out with any horrible statements. They 
have not been saying ‘heads will roll, someone’s to blame’… They 
have been keeping quiet (Munro, 2016: presentation). 
However, the evidence from this study suggests that whatever change has been 
achieved, it may not be at the level Munro envisioned, with a number of examples 
that show where partners, the press and politicians have purportedly continued to 
undertake behaviours counter to Munro’s recommendations (see Sections 6.3.1 & 
6.3.2).  
Yet also apparent in the accounts of this study was the idea that any reticence on 
the part of the child protection social worker to employ their discretion, was as 
much due to the legacy of a reductionistic coverage of their profession, as well as a 
propensity to blame practitioners when a child had been harmed, as it was a 
continuation of this phenomena – with a particular emphasis placed on the 
longstanding impact of the rhetoric used, and actions taken, in the aftermath of 
Peter Connelly’s case (see Section 1.3).  
On this basis, an implication that emerges is that it might require not only a 
significant change in how child protection is portrayed in the English media and by 
English politicians – as advocated by Munro (2011b) – but also a protracted period 
of time in which this change is allowed to embed and become evident, before child 
286 
 
protection social workers (and perhaps also their employers) will more consistently 
view discretion as a less ‘risky’, and indeed, a worthwhile option. 
Whether such a change is realistic remains to be seen. History tells us that at times 
of ‘moral panic’ emanating from some high profile incidence of child harm (akin to 
the Peter Connelly case), the English media and politicians have invariably resorted 
to their ‘default’ position of ‘scandalising’ (Butler, 2016: 74) and ‘politicising’ 
(Parton, 2014: 166) the issue (see also Franklin and Parton, 2001; Warner, 2015)  –  
engaging in that which Greenland (1986: 164) argues is a ‘peculiarly British sport of 
social worker baiting’.  
Indeed, there is an argument to say that social workers have become, and remain, 
the ‘cultural scapegoats’ of child harm (Garland, 2008: 9) – cast as ‘folk devils… onto 
which society can project sentiments of guilt and ambivalence’ (Parton, 2014: 171). 
Whilst the complexities of people and society mean that it is inevitable that 
children will continue to be harmed, and child tragedy occur (Ferguson, 2011; 
Munro, 2011b; Jones, 2014), Munro (2011b) hopes that the scapegoating and 
labelling of social workers as ‘blameworthy’ ‘is changing, and will continue to do so’ 
(Munro, 2016).  
Perhaps there will come a time when this ambition is fully realised, and yet the 
social workers of this study would express that ‘we are not there yet’ (SW7, SSI). 
Further, that until such time, they will continue to choose not to employ discretion 
on the basis of their ‘fear of being blamed’, by partners, the press and/or 
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politicians, with assertions that ‘I don’t want my face on the front page of the Sun’ 
(SW5, SSI). 
7.2.4 How a high demand for services can inhibit social worker 
discretion 
At this point of the discussion, the systemic factors considered have a strong 
grounding in the existing child protection literature; one which has facilitated our 
understanding of how and why those factors have impacted on the social worker’s 
discretionary space and choice. However, an area which has received less attention, 
but which I wish to reflect on here, is how the demands of a busy caseload can 
impede a social worker’s use of discretion. 
Indeed, whilst the literature has considered the pressures incurred by a high 
caseload (for example, Munro, 2010b, 2011a; 2011b), this has often been framed as 
increasing the social worker’s propensity to employ discretion, namely because it 
has also been associated with more opportunities to engage in discretionary 
behaviour, as practitioners have to decide how best to use the limited time and 
resources available to them (Lipsky, 2010; Shaw et al., 2009; Wastell et al., 2010; 
Pithouse et al., 2011).  
Although the findings of this study do, to some degree, support this assertion – for 
example, identifying increased discretionary space in the context of how to 
organise one’s own time (with social workers ‘choosing between the needs of 
different children’ – see Section 4.3.1) – a busy caseload was also observed to 
contribute (along with the bureaucratic burden of inspection preparation) to a 
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reduction in the willingness of social workers to employ their discretion in particular 
contexts. This was ostensibly because the social workers felt that they had not been 
afforded enough time to establish, what they considered to be, the requisite 
knowledge of the child, their needs and circumstances (see Section 5.2.1). 
Within the study, two factors were identified as contributing to an increase in 
demand experienced by Marketon’s CSD over a period of years, culminating in a 
sense amongst the child protection social workers, that they were ‘overstretched’ 
or else ‘spread too thinly’ (and thus serving as an obstacle to their use of 
discretion). These were the impact of a continuing ‘Baby P effect’ and the 
prolonged period of cuts brought about by the national Government’s policy of 
‘austerity’. 
The wider literature outlines that as a consequence of the Peter Connelly case – 
specifically, the political and media coverage of it, and how this affected the 
national consciousness (Parton, 2014; Jones, 2014; Warner, 2015) – there was an 
upsurge in child protection referrals, plans and care proceedings in the weeks, 
months and years after the details of Peter’s case were made public (Hall and Guy, 
2010; Brooks et al., 2012; and Cooper, 2013). However, the assertion within this 
study is that the ‘Baby P effect’ (Shoesmith, 2016: 18) has not diminished, but has 
continued to have a significant impact on the child protection system. This impact, 
it is argued, can be seen in the adoption of a ‘more cautious approach’ to child 
protection generally, one which has led to a significant increase in the number of 
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children being referred into the system, and to practitioners employing different 
strategies to keep these children within the system (see Section 6.1.2). 
An examination of the quantitative data pertaining to Marketon supports this 
assertion, specifically as it reports a significant increase in local child protection 
referrals (+38%); children designated as ‘in need’ (+52%); child protection plans 
(+72%); and child care proceedings (+41%) between 2008, when Peter’s story 
entered the public domain, and 2016. Indeed, it is in this context that the social 
workers within this study had experienced a substantial rise (+55%) in the size of 
their average caseload despite a 30% increase in their number during this same 
time period (see Section 6.1.1). 
However, the findings suggest that this increase in demand (as evidenced by the 
above figures) can also be partially attributed to the wider impact of the national 
Government’s chosen policy of austerity. This is because since 2010, Marketon has 
experienced a 53% reduction in the funding received from the national 
Government, which has resulted in efforts to save £65m between 2010 and 2016 
(with a purported further £35m saving required by 2020). As a consequence, 
Marketon’s CSD has substantially cut its spending on areas like children’s centres; 
the local youth service; and support services for homelessness, substance misuse 
and domestic violence. 
Whilst this has reportedly achieved £25m in savings to contribute towards the 
£65m required, the data also highlights how concurrently there has been significant 
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increases in measures for poverty; unemployment; and homelessness; and higher 
instances of neglect and emotional abuse amongst local families (see Section 6.1.3). 
The theory put forth is that in cutting services in response to the reduction in 
funding, Marketon has simply ‘shifted the problem’ elsewhere, as more families are 
being ‘tipped over the edge’ and are requiring a service from the child protection 
team. The implication is that, in a local context, the national Government’s policy of 
austerity has not only led to more families entering the child protection system, but 
may have also indirectly inhibited the social worker’s use of discretion in respect to 
those families.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to establish the validity of this claim, 
there is certainly a growing amount of literature linking austerity with many of the 
social problems cited; problems which have been associated with familial crisis and 
the requirement for intervention from public service providers (see for example, 
Main, 2014; UK Children’s Commissioners, 2015; Pemberton et al., 2016; 
Garthwaite, 2016; Loopstra et al., 2015; 2016; Department for Communities and 
Local Government, 2017; Association of Directors of Children’s Services, 2018; UN 
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, 2018; 2019).  
However, it is also pertinent to reflect on the limited consideration offered within 
the child protection literature of either the ‘Baby P effect’ or ‘austerity’ as potential 
obstacles to social worker discretion. Indeed, whilst Munro (2011b: 76) expresses 
concern at the ‘evidence that early support and preventative services are being the 
target for cuts’, linking these to an observed ‘rise in referrals to Children’s Social 
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Care’ (Munro, 2012: 7), she offers little forethought about the level of challenge 
that these cuts might present – particularly in relation to increasing demand for 
child protection services, and how this might impact upon social worker discretion. 
Furthermore, absent from the literature is how the longstanding effect of the Peter 
Connelly case (the role of the media notwithstanding) may have exacerbated the 
‘culture of fear and blame’ reported (Munro, 2010b: 38), and how, as a result, the 
barriers identified to social worker discretion (see Munro, 2004; 2009; 2011b) might 
have been maintained.  
Of course, the limited commentary in the cited sources could be the result of a lack 
of anticipation for the longevity of these factors at the time of their respective 
publication – it is noteworthy that most were published prior to 2012, a time when 
austerity, for example, was being constructed as a four-year policy initiative (see 
Osborne, 2010). However, it is nevertheless noteworthy that commentators have 
not, since that time, sought to better explore the impact of these factors in the 
context of social worker discretion.  
This is important, as it points again to the need to extend the enquiry beyond this 
study, so as to ascertain whether these factors are having a similar influence upon 
the use of social worker discretion in other child protection teams around the 
country. If this was found to be the case, a further discussion about the changes 
that are required would be facilitated, if the increased use of social worker 
discretion in the interests of the child, as advocated within the Munro Review, is to 
be promoted. 
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For now, the message emerging for practice is that a social worker who perceives 
themselves to be ‘overstretched’ or else ‘spread too thinly’, may be less likely to 
employ their discretion in a given discretionary space, especially when that 
practitioner feels that in being ‘overstretched’ they have not been afforded the 
requisite time with the service user to garner a sufficient knowledge of them and 
their circumstance. 
Again, this risks increasing the number of children who are ‘invisible’ within the 
child protection system (Fergusson, 2016: 1018) (see also Fergusson, 2005; 2011) 
and it is in this context that the system’s capacity to cater for the needs of all 
children is reduced (Munro, 2009) – thereby limiting its ability to be ‘effective’ 
(Munro, 2011b: 23), whilst increasing the chances of tragedy occurring (Munro, 
2009; 2011a; 2011b).  
It is on this basis, that it is prudent to ask: ‘What conclusions can be made about the 
realisation of Munro’s more ‘child-centred’ system?’ 
7.3 What conclusions can be made about the realisation of Munro’s 
more ‘child-centred’ system? 
In concluding her review of the English child protection system, Eileen Munro 
(2011b) called for ‘regular reviews of progress’ in the form of follow-up research 
which would look specifically at the degree of ‘change’ and the level to which her 
image for a more ‘child-centred’ system had been realised (p. 22). 
Of course, central to Munro’s notion of a ‘child-centred’ system was that social 
workers would increasingly exercise their discretion in the interests of the 
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individual child, and it was on this basis that I set out to undertake a study exploring 
the ‘extent [to which] frontline statutory social workers [were] employing their 
discretion, in the post-Munro Review world of child protection’.  
An aim of the study was to assess whether this element of Munro’s ‘child-centred’ 
system was evident in the context of Marketon’s Child Protection Team, and to 
identify any barriers that might be impeding its realisation (see Section 3.1). It is in 
this context that this section considers the findings in respect to the stipulated 
research question – ‘What conclusions can be made about the realisation of 
Munro’s more ‘child-centred’ system?’   
The section is organised under the following headings: 
• Evidence that social worker discretion was conceived as a valuable and 
preferred means with which to help children; 
• Evidence that social workers had formal opportunities to employ their 
discretion; 
• Evidence that social workers were choosing to employ their discretion; and 
• The extent of change achieved. 
7.3.1 Evidence that social worker discretion was conceived as a 
valuable and preferred means with which to help a child 
In the simplest terms, Munro (2004; 2005; 2009; 2010b; 2011a; 2011b) believed 
that a more ‘effective’ child protection system, was one that was better able to 
meet the needs of the individual child, and that key to achieving this was for social 
workers to increasingly use their discretion in the interests of the child. Amongst 
294 
 
the many changes that Munro advocated, three were identified as key to achieving 
this aim. The first of these was for local managers to be more inclined to view social 
worker discretion as a valuable and preferred means with which to help the child.  
In this study, it was evident that Marketon’s managers were continuing to negotiate 
particular challenges characteristic of contemporary public service provision – for 
example, how to promote a positive outcome arising from an external inspection 
whilst also reconciling diminishing resources with a high demand for services (see 
Lipsky, 2010). 
As such, some of the behaviours observed in Marketon’s managers are perhaps to 
be expected, including the emphasis placed on inspection preparation and the 
restriction of the frontline practitioner’s ability to spend departmental money 
(Munro, 2011b; Evans, 2010). However, these behaviours were also seen to 
undermine the apparent value placed in, and preference for, social work discretion 
within particular contexts, including with regards to the ‘outcome decisions’ of 
specific decision-making forums (see Section 4.2.1); whether to comply with 
departmental prescription (see Section 4.2.3); and concerning the order and 
content of data recording (see Section 4.2.2). 
At these times, it was understood that managers expected social workers to adhere 
to the stipulated process, follow the procedure, and/or meet the prescribed 
timescale over and above using their discretion in the interests of the child – 
findings which are seemingly contrary to the type of change that Munro (2011b) 
had endorsed. 
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However, it was also the case that Marketon’s managers were seen to value, 
promote and indeed expect social workers to use their discretion in areas including: 
their time management (see Section 4.3.1); logistical case decisions (see Section 
4.3.2); the implementation of the child in need plan (see Section 4.3.3); 
‘emergency’ time-sensitive decisions (see Section 4.3.4); and how to support 
families without incurring any direct cost to the department (see Section 4.2.2).  
Whilst in some of these circumstances social worker discretion was also seen to be 
in the interest of the manager – particularly in the sense of resolving those 
‘political’ and ‘human’ tensions inherent within public service provision (see Lipsky, 
2010) – the social worker’s motivation for using their discretion at these times was, 
more often than not, the needs of the individual child. 
Thus, the message to emerge from this study is that local managers did indeed 
value and prefer social worker discretion, though this was not on a consistent basis 
and was limited to particular contexts, decisions and tasks.   
7.3.2 Evidence that social workers had formal opportunities to 
employ their discretion 
The second change that Munro hoped would result from her review of the child 
protection system was that, on the basis of the greater value placed on social 
worker discretion, social workers would be granted an increasing amount of 
formally acknowledged and officially sanctioned discretionary space.  
Again, evident within this study was that social workers were being afforded a 
number of formal opportunities to employ their discretion (relating to diary 
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management; logistical decision-making etc). However, in line with those 
aforementioned areas where social worker discretion was not the preferred means 
with which to make a decision, there were a number of other examples in which 
managers (but also the Independent Reviewing Officer) sought, not only to restrict 
the formal discretionary space, but also the social worker’s propensity to employ 
discretion in any de facto space that might remain available to them (for example, 
in respect to the timeliness and content of their ICS recordings). 
It is also noteworthy that the study highlighted contexts in which discretionary 
space was afforded to the social worker in the informal, rather than the formal 
sense (for example, in the ability to spend their own money on a child). However, it 
is questionable whether this is in the spirit of change that Munro had endorsed, and 
it is pertinent to note that while, in these examples, managers ostensibly saw value 
in social worker discretion, there was an apparent reticence to officially sanction 
these discretionary spaces (again likely because of the aforementioned ‘political’ 
tensions of public service provision – see Lipsky, 2010), which, according to Munro 
(if not necessarily the social workers of this study) rendered the space ‘risky’. 
7.3.3 Evidence that social workers were choosing to employ their 
discretion 
The third change endorsed by Munro was that, in a context where their discretion 
held increased value and in which they were therefore afforded more officially 
sanctioned opportunities to use it, social workers would have a higher propensity to 
choose to employ their discretion.  
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In ascertaining whether, in the context of Marketon, this change has been realised, 
the evidence suggests that (like the other two measures of ‘child-centredness’) a 
more nuanced answer is the most appropriate. This is because, whilst within the 
study there were occasions in which social workers would choose to employ their 
discretion in the interests of the child, in others they would not, including times 
when by not doing so, it was acknowledged to be counter to the interests of the 
child. 
The study found that a good predictor of whether the social workers would choose 
discretion was the type of discretionary space encountered, with social workers 
tending to choose to employ discretion in those areas that were either formally (de 
jure) or informally (entrepreneurial) granted, but not in those that arose due to 
circumstance (de facto). 
Here the level of anxiety invoked by the type of discretionary space was important, 
as social workers generally saw discretion within the unsanctioned (de facto) space 
to be ‘riskier’, referencing a higher likelihood of being held ‘individually 
accountable’ (and by extension blamed) for negative consequences that might arise 
from their discretionary behaviour. 
However, there were also exceptions to the general tendencies, and what became 
clear during the course of the study, were the myriad factors that could influence a 
social worker’s decision about whether or not to employ discretion, over and above 
whether the discretionary space had been sanctioned by a manager, and indeed, 
the level of formality with which this had occurred. 
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7.3.4 The extent of change observed 
As I have stated, in beginning this study I aimed to consider whether the data 
emerging in the context of Marketon was indicative of the ‘child-centred’ system 
that Munro had proposed (where social worker discretion was valued, promoted 
and exercised in the interests of the individual child). However, in my analysis of the 
research findings it was clear that there were two challenges posed by this aim. The 
first was that it provided an inclination to answer in binary terms, which the 
evidence of this study would suggest is unsuitable.   
The second was the difficulty of knowing the level with which Munro envisioned 
that managers would value and prefer social worker discretion; the extent of the 
formally sanctioned space that social workers were to be afforded; and the degree 
with which social workers were to choose discretion in the interests of the child. 
This is because Munro does not provide sufficient detail on any of these points 
either in her formal review or her earlier writing.  
It is on this basis, that during the course of research, I transitioned away from a 
focus on whether or not Munro’s image for social worker discretion within a ‘child-
centred’ system was apparent in the context of Marketon, and towards a 
consideration of the extent of evidenced change, especially as it related to her 
previous assertion that social worker discretion had been ‘eroded’ (Munro, 2005: 
39) and thus that social workers were unable and/or unwilling to employ their 
discretion in the interests of the child (Munro, 2011b). 
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In these terms, the study pointed to evidence of significant change relative to the 
notion that social worker discretion has been ‘eroded’ or else ‘curtailed’ as 
propagated within the Munro Review of Child Protection (see Munro, 2010b; 
2011b; 2011c), and indeed, Munro’s earlier written work (see Munro, 2004; 2005; 
2009). This was not only in the value that managers ostensibly placed in social 
worker discretion; in the examples of the officially sanctioned and granted 
discretionary space afforded; and how often social workers would choose to 
employ discretion in the interests of the child, but also other examples of ‘child-
centredness’ beyond the three measures implicit in Munro’s account.  
This included where managers decided to afford social workers an informal 
discretionary space, in contradiction of the official policy position, because they 
deemed it appropriate to the needs of the individual child. Further, where social 
workers chose to employ their discretion in the interests of the child, despite 
attempts by managers (and others) to restrict the discretionary space available to 
them, and even though they perceived a heightened degree of ‘personal risk’ as 
existing within the discretionary space. 
Of course, the study also highlighted the obstacles to social worker discretion that 
were restrictive of both the formally or informally granted space, and the 
propensity of social workers to choose discretion within a variety of contexts – for 
example, the ‘Baby P effect’; the government policy of ‘austerity’; the anxiety for 
external inspection; and a fear of being blamed by inter-agency partners, the media 
and/or politicians. However, this did not manifest into the ‘eroded’ or ‘curtailed’ 
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discretion that Munro and others have previously reported, and there was clear 
evidence that the child protection social workers of Marketon were employing their 
discretion in the interests of the children with whom they worked and, moreover, 
that they were receiving managerial endorsement to do so. 
Ultimately, whether the level of discretion being exercised is to the extent that 
Munro had envisioned, or indeed, whether it is enough to satisfy her image of a 
more ‘child-centred’ system, remains to be seen, and this is perhaps a question that 
can only be legitimately answered with additional enquiry, and by Munro herself.  
Thus perhaps a more pertinent question to ask at this juncture – in addition to 
whether similar results might be found in other child protection teams around the 
country – is how we might more consistently align the interests of the social worker 
and their employer with those of the child, so that social worker discretion might 
also be more consistently used to support and protect individual children accessing 
the child protection system. 
It is in these terms that I conclude the chapter with a consideration of the 
‘messiness’ of social worker discretion and of the implications for further reform. 
7.4 Conclusion: The messiness of social worker discretion and 
implications for further reform 
In much of the existing literature, social worker discretion is discussed in a binary 
sense. That is to say that it is, or is not, viewed as a valuable means with which to 
elicit change and support service users (see Molander, 2016). Further, frontline 
practitioners either have, or do not have, opportunities to use discretion (for 
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example, Howe, 1986; Munro, 2004; 2005; 2009), and social workers will, or will 
not, choose to employ their discretion when encountering a discretionary space 
(for example, Hupe et al., 2015; Lipsky, 2010).  
However, what many of these assertions fail to acknowledge, is the nuanced 
nature, or else the ‘messiness’ (SW5, FG) and ‘complexity’ (SW2, SSI) of social 
worker discretion apparent within this study. Indeed, in contrast to binary 
arguments, the results of this study highlight examples in which the same manager 
could value social worker discretion in one context, but not another; how a social 
worker’s discretionary space was restricted, only for this to change with the 
acquisition of new information; and where different social workers, when faced 
with the same decision-making scenario, reported contrasting levels of ‘willingness’ 
to choose discretion. 
Underlying these nuances was a myriad of factors (operating within the micro, 
meso and macro sense) which were seen to inform both the type of discretionary 
space afforded to a social worker and when a social worker chose to employ their 
discretion. In critical realist terms, the fluid and evolving nature of these factors, 
and how they interacted and influenced an individual practitioner at any given time, 
meant that it was difficult to know, with any degree of certainty, when social 
workers would, or would not, employ their discretion within their practice tasks.  
However also evident, was that social workers were, on occasions, exercising their 
discretion in the interests of the child, and further, that in many of these contexts, 
this was either at the behest, or with the support of, their manager.  
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This evidence is important, both as it contrasts with the assertion that the child 
protection social worker’s discretion has been ‘eroded’ or else ‘curtailed’, and 
because it suggests at least a partial realisation of Munro’s image for the child 
protection system – where social worker discretion is considered a legitimate and 
valuable means with which to help the individual child, and where it is exercised on 
this basis. 
Conversely, the study also highlights examples in which social worker discretionary 
space was restricted and discretion discouraged, and where social workers were 
choosing not to employ their discretion, apparently in opposition to the interests of 
the individual child. Underpinning these occasions were a series of continuing 
(relative to those identified within the Munro Review) but also ‘new’ obstacles to 
social worker discretion.  
What these obstacles – and their propensity to negatively impact upon a social 
worker’s use of discretion in the interests of the child – indicate, is that there is 
need for additional reform before social worker discretion can become the type of 
feature of the English child protection system that Munro (2010b; 2011a; 2011b) 
had envisioned. 
With that being said, the continued absence of follow-up enquiry or indeed 
commentary since the Munro Review – especially on the issue of social worker 
discretion in the interests of the child – is perhaps indicative of a lack of political 
and/or social appetite for achieving additional reform of the child protection 
system at this time. It is certainly noteworthy how, during recent years, the 
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Conservative administration, along with their Coalition partners, who 
commissioned the Review, have said little of it, or the progress towards achieving 
its recommended reforms. Furthermore, it could be argued that they have taken 
steps counter to the Review’s recommendations – for example, in the decision to 
cease funding to The College of Social Work, leading to its short-lived tenure, and 
subsequent demise. 
At the time of writing the current political landscape is one that is dominated by the 
spectre of Brexit (and to a lesser degree the various ‘costs’ associated with nearly 
ten years of ‘austerity’). However, the history of the English child protection system 
would suggest that there will again come a time (perhaps in the not too distant 
future) where some observed tragedy (as in the case of Peter Connelly, Victoria 
Climbié and Maria Colwell), will push the task of further improving the system in 
the interests of the individual child to the top of the political agenda. At that time, 
we might expect (given the precedent set by the Munro Review) additional 
discussions about the value of the discretionary space, and of social worker 
discretion.  
It is within these discussions that the messages arising from this study become 
particularly important. Namely, that for child protection social workers to more 
consistently exercise their discretion in the interests of the child, then there is a 
need to address the enduring barriers that were seen to render discretion, in 
certain contexts, less ‘valuable’ than compliance with prescription, and more ‘risky’ 
than other defensive behaviours. This includes the restriction and/or minimisation 
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of the discretionary space, and the upward – or indeed, outward – delegation of a 
decision. 
Until such time, the extent to which social workers are able, and indeed choose, to 
employ their discretion in the interests of the individual child is likely to vary, which 
will, according to Munro (2010b; 2011a; 2011b) limit the ‘effectiveness’ with which 
children can be supported and protected, and thus, rather ironically, increase the 
likelihood of tragedy occurring. 
Having elucidated the main findings of this study and considered them in the 
context of the wider literature, I will, in the next chapter, conclude this thesis with a 
summary of its constituent parts; its limitations; and the implications that emerge 
for future enquiry. 
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CHAPTER 8 – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two parts. Firstly, I provide an overview of the study 
underpinning this thesis, highlighting the main conclusions which have emerged. 
Secondly, I consider the limitations of the study, identifying implications for further 
research. 
8.1 Overview of study and main conclusions 
In 2012 Eileen Munro published her ‘Progress Report… towards a child-centred 
system’ (Munro, 2012: 1). The paper reflected on the degree of change evidenced 
in the year since Munro had concluded her formal review of the English child 
protection system. At that time, I was a practising child protection social worker 
and had read each of Munro’s three review reports several times over. As such, I 
was familiar with Munro’s main arguments for how the child protection system 
might be improved. 
Of the different ideas posited within the ‘Munro Review’, the one which resonated 
most from the perspective of a practitioner was that statutory child protection 
social workers should be better enabled and encouraged to employ their discretion 
in the interests of the individual child, with the implication being that this would 
improve the system’s capacity to cater for the needs of all children, not only those 
whose circumstances fitted neatly within predefined cohorts. Such a change would, 
according to Munro (2011b), cultivate a system that was more ‘child-centred’ (p.1) 
and thus ‘effective’ (p.23). 
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However, absent from the 2012 paper was evidence of follow-up enquiry which 
sought to explore the extent to which contemporary child protection social workers 
were employing their discretion in the interests of the individual child. Thus, shortly 
after the publication of the ‘Progress Report’, I submitted a thesis proposal to 
Manchester Metropolitan University citing my aim of addressing this gap in the 
knowledge area.  
At the time of writing it is almost 7 years since my proposal was accepted, during 
which time I have undertaken several tasks that have facilitated the writing of this 
thesis. These have included the refinement of my research focus towards structural 
discretion (see Chapter 1); a comprehensive review of the existing literature and 
development of an empirical framework with which to inform my study (see 
Chapter 2); and the undertaking of an 18-month ethnography of one local authority 
child protection team (see Chapter 3). 
Underpinning my enquiry was a series of research aims (see Section 3.1), which led 
me to consider where participating social workers were encountering discretionary 
space and when they were choosing to employ their discretion; how systemic 
factors were impacting upon the social worker’s discretionary space and choice; 
and the conclusions that could be made about the realisation of this element of 
Munro’s image of a ‘child-centred’ system. 
In accordance with my critical realist ethnographic framework (see Section 3.2), the 
findings to emerge from this study were ‘grounded’ in the participants’ own 
perspectives and experiences of – as well as the language used to describe – their 
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working environment and the causal structures, and processes, which were said to 
underpin their discretionary space and choice (Kempster and Parry, 2014). Indeed, 
my goal throughout the study has been to recount these experiences and the 
participants’ explanations for them. Whilst another group of participants may have 
had different experiences (and thus perhaps also a different perspective about the 
manifestation of the social worker’s discretionary space and choice), the results of 
this study offer an accurate and comprehensive account of this cohort of 
practitioners’ views and experiences. 
In Chapter 4 I set out the different contexts and tasks in which the social workers of 
this study were encountering a discretionary space and differentiated them on the 
basis of the formality with which they were recognised and sanctioned, or because 
they occurred in circumstances that were outside of managerial control.  Whilst I 
also highlighted areas in which the social worker’s discretionary space was 
restricted, the main conclusion of the chapter was that social worker discretion was 
not the ‘curtailed’ phenomena that parts of the wider literature would purport. 
In Chapter 5 I outlined the tendency of the social workers to choose discretion 
within particular types of discretionary space but not in others, highlighting that a 
good predictor of this was whether the discretionary space had been endorsed by a 
manager. However, I also detailed a series of other factors which were understood 
to influence a social worker’s willingness to employ discretion within different 
contexts and linked these to the exceptions to the general tendencies. The main 
conclusion to emerge from the chapter was the difficulty of knowing when a social 
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worker would, or would not, choose to employ discretion, with the assertion being 
that it is more prudent to think in terms of a ‘likelihood’ and ‘tendency’ to exercise 
discretion. 
Throughout Chapter 6, I documented the causal structures and processes 
influencing the social worker’s discretionary space and choice. In doing so I 
highlighted the obstacles to social worker discretion which had endured despite the 
conclusions and recommendations of the Munro Review, as well as those which 
might be considered ‘new’ obstacles relative to the findings of the review. The main 
conclusions of the chapter were the myriad of factors impacting upon, and 
continued barriers to, social worker discretion apparent within the study. 
Chapter 7 comprised a discussion of the main findings relative to the wider 
literature. However, I also offered an appraisal of whether the level of social worker 
discretion exercised was indicative of the ‘child-centred’ system that Munro had 
endorsed. Whilst I concluded that there was evidence of significant change relative 
to Munro’s assertion that social worker discretion had been ‘eroded’, I also 
suggested that further reform is required if social workers are to more consistently 
employ their discretion in the interests of the individual child.    
8.2 Limitations of the study and implications for further enquiry 
This study has, I believe, provided a rigorous and comprehensive account of the 
extent to which contemporary child protection social workers are employing their 
discretion in the post-Munro Review world of child protection. This is an important 
contribution to the existing literature which addresses a notable gap in the 
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knowledge area, especially in terms of how structural discretion is manifested in 
contemporary child protection. Further, it provides empirical evidence, which I 
believe will be useful in any future ‘review of progress’ relative to the Munro 
Review findings and recommendations for reform. 
That being said, there are a number of limitations to the study which are prudent to 
consider here. The first pertains to its scope and, by implication, the claims that can 
and cannot be made, as a result. 
Of course, this was a case study of a single and relatively small (in comparison to 
geographical neighbours) statutory child protection team. The remit of the study 
did not require any consideration of other local authority child protection teams, 
and thus the research lacks a comparative element, meaning that the conclusions 
that can be made are (currently) limited to the setting of Marketon.  
Munro (2012; 2016) observes the degree of variance in how local authorities have 
embraced her recommendations for reform, with, for example, differing levels of 
local emphasis on compliance with process and prescription. Therefore, it is 
possible that the factors which have been identified within this study as impacting 
upon social worker discretionary space and choice are being experienced differently 
elsewhere. 
To address this, the study should be extended to other statutory child protection 
teams around the country. This will help to ascertain whether the results can be 
replicated, and indeed, whether my conclusions are representative of the national, 
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rather than a local, context. This would enable a more authoritative comment on 
the pervasiveness of not only social worker discretion within the English child 
protection system, but also, of the enduring barriers to discretionary space and 
choice, and as to the realisation of this element of Munro’s more ‘child-centred’ 
system. 
For example, additional enquiry would facilitate a greater understating of whether 
other practising social workers identify factors like the ‘Baby P effect’ and/or the 
government policy of ‘austerity’ as influences upon their use of discretion; and if 
other child protection teams consider issues such as a fear of being blamed by the 
media and/or politicians, and of a local culture of inspection preparation, as 
continued obstacles to discretionary space and choice. 
Another limitation of this study is that its focus is largely limited to the views and 
experiences of the statutory social worker – with the local manager’s contribution 
being confined to the initial stages of the enquiry. As such, the study generally 
failed to provide an account of how other stakeholders (beyond the child protection 
social worker) accounted for frontline discretion; the causal processes underpinning 
discretionary space and choice; and the obstacles to social workers exercising 
discretion in the interests of the child. 
As both this study and the wider literature highlight how these other stakeholders 
(including the team manager, senior manager, Independent Reviewing Officer, 
other child protection professionals, and the service user) can influence the social 
worker’s discretionary space and choice, future research might seek to better 
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include the testimonies of these individuals so as to provide a more thorough 
account of how and why social worker discretion is manifesting at the frontline of 
service provision.  
This, I believe would further elucidate ideas about not only the value of social 
worker discretion to the child protection system, but would also facilitate 
discussion about the necessary changes to the system (and the reality of achieving 
these changes) if statutory child protection social workers are to more consistently 
exercise their discretion in the interests of the individual child. 
Finally, whilst this study has engaged with much of the empirical framework derived 
from the wider literature (see Chapter 2), there remain areas which were not 
addressed within this study, but which warrant further exploration. This includes a 
more comprehensive exploration on those features of the social worker-manager 
relationship that engender not only the granting of discretionary space, but also a 
social worker’s willingness  to employ their discretion (see Evans 2010; 2011); how 
differing notions of ‘professionalism’ might impact upon both discretionary space 
and choice (see Evans 2013); and whether Ellis’ (2011; 2014) ‘Taxonomy of 
Discretion’ can be applied to a child protection context. 
Whilst the aims of this study did not facilitate an exploration of any of these areas, 
they remain valid fields for additional enquiry, which might be incorporated by 
future researchers, seeking to extend, or build upon, the results of this study. 
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  8.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the focus of this study has been the level of structural discretion 
(discretionary space) available to contemporary frontline social workers practising 
in the English child protection system. It highlights areas where these social workers 
continue to experience opportunities to employ their discretion and distinguishes 
these by the type of discretionary space available. It also supports the claims of 
some that on encountering a discretionary space the question becomes whether a 
social worker is willing to exercise discretion. The study highlights the structures 
and processes that continue to impede the discretionary space available to the 
social worker as well as their propensity to choose to exercise discretion within the 
discretionary space. 
The origin of the study was the Munro Review of Child Protection and specifically its 
conclusion that social workers should be better enabled and encouraged to employ 
discretion in the interests of the individual child. In these terms, the study suggests 
some progress in respect to the notion that the child protection social worker’s 
structural discretion has been ‘eroded’ or else ‘curtailed’. However, it also 
highlights that further reform may be required before Munro’s image for a more 
‘child-centred’ and thus ‘effective’ system – in which social workers consistently 
exercise discretion in the interests of the child – can be realised.   
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APPENDIX 1: WALLACE AND WRAY’S ‘CRITICAL SYNOPSIS OF 
TEXT’ FRAMEWORK 
1. Why am I reading this? (i.e. what am I trying to find out?)  
2. What are the authors trying to do in writing this? (e.g. report on research, 
review others’ work, develop theory, express particular views or opinions, 
criticise what is currently done, advise about what should be done in the 
future)  
3. What are the authors saying which is relevant to what I want to find out? 
(What is the essence of the message conveyed by the text? How does it 
relate to my interests?)  
4. How convincing is what the authors are saying? (evaluating the quality of 
the argument and digging beneath the assumptions made by the author)  
5. In conclusion, what use can I make of this? (what is your stance towards this 
text? To what extent are you likely to draw upon it and in which respects?) 
Taken from Wallace and Wray (2011: 37-41). 
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APPENDIX 2: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FOR RESEARCH 
PARTICIPANTS 
Demographically, each of the team manager participants held a Diploma in Social 
Work (obtained prior to 2005); each had practiced as a child protection social 
worker for at least two years before assuming a managerial role; and their mean 
managerial experience at the point of participation was 4 years and 5 months (with 
a mean of 2 years and 7 months on Marketon’s CPT).  
Of the social worker participants, each held either a Bachelors or Masters Degree in 
Social Work (acquired after 2008); their mean level of child protection social work 
experience at the point of participation was 2 years and 8 months (with a mean of 2 
years and 2 months on the CPT).  
Whilst the age of the manager participants ranged from 36 -47 years old; the social 
workers’ age ranged from 26-54 years old.  Furthermore, all the participants were 
British nationals, with a stated first language of ‘English’; all bar one classified 
themselves as ‘White British’; and of the 25 different CPT staff to participate within 
the focus groups, questionnaires and interviews, 23 identified as ‘female’; whereas 
only 2 identified as ‘male’. 
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APPENDIX 3: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
(OBSERVATION) 
To what extent are frontline statutory social workers employing their 
discretion, in the post-Munro Review world of child protection? 
Statement of Invitation 
Dear prospective participant, you are invited to take part in the PhD research 
project of Ciarán Murphy, a research student of Manchester Metropolitan 
University (the research is organised and sponsored by the Department of Social 
Care and Social Work). This information sheet will explain why the research is being 
carried out and what the research will involve for you, if you decide to take part. 
Please take some time to read the following carefully, and ask questions if anything 
you read is not clear, or you would like more information. Please take your time to 
decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
In 2011 Professor Eileen Munro published her final report into the Review of Child 
Protection in England. This concluded that the conditions under which social 
workers and managers were practising were not conducive to safe and effective 
practice, and that the system had lost sight of the best interests of children. Munro 
(2011) highlighted that front-line workers were burdened by unnecessary 
bureaucracy, a climate of fear and blame, and a culture of compliance with 
procedures. She produced a series of recommendations which she outlined when 
[t]aken together … will redress the balance between prescription and the 
exercise of [discretion] so that those working in child protection are able to 
stay child-centred (Munro, 2011:10). 
It is now over 3.5 years since the publication of the Munro Review. To this date 
there has been limited exploration as to the progress that has been made in respect 
to the experience of frontline staff in the children protection system. My research 
will consider whether there has been any lasting impact of the Munro 
recommendations, in respect to the extent to which frontline social workers are 
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able to employ discretion in how to best meet the needs of the individual child. 
 
Why have you been invited to participate? 
You have been invited as you are either a qualified social worker currently employed 
by [Marketon’s Child Protection Team] and I want to hear about your experience of 
safeguarding post Munro. 
 
Do you have to take part? 
No, you do not have to take part in this study, and participation is voluntary. If you 
do decide to participate, but later change your mind; then please be reassured that 
you are free to withdraw at any time, without penalty, and without giving a reason. 
You are also entitled to request that any contributions that you have already made 
not be included, but be discarded from the research project. If you withdraw before 
the end of the study, but you do not request that all past contributions be 
discarded, then I will continue to use the data that you have contributed, whilst 
continuing to ensure your privacy and confidentiality are maintained. 
 
What will participation entail? 
If you decide to participate in the research project, then firstly, you will be asked to 
complete the consent form attached and return to me (via email). This is to indicate 
your agreement to take part and acknowledge that you understand the research 
project processes. Once you have provided consent to take part in the study, you 
will not immediately be asked to do anything different, but you may notice that at 
times in which I am in your presence I take a note of the conversations that are 
taking place, including your conversations. If on such occasions you decide that you 
would rather that I do not make a note of conversations that you are part of, you 
have the right to ask me not to make a note, and I will endeavour to comply. 
 
What are the advantages of taking part? 
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I believe that this is an important opportunity for you as a social worker to report 
back about what is actually taking place on the front-line, and to challenge the 
pervading negative narrative in respect to the daily practice of front-line child 
protection practitioners. It will be an opportunity for you to ‘have a voice’ and to 
communicate to the senior management of the local authority (as well as to a wider 
audience), as to the factors that are supporting / hindering good practice, and what 
changes could be made to promote better practice in the best interests of social 
workers, your employer, and importantly the children and families with whom you 
work. This will also make an important and timely contribution to the (currently 
sparse) body of knowledge about the impact and legacy of the Munro Review. I 
hope (and expect) that if you participate in this study, you will experience it to be an 
interesting and rewarding exercise. 
Confidentiality 
Please be advised that all the information collected as part of the study will be kept 
private and confidential (this includes the name of individuals, the local authority, 
department and team being studied). All information which is collected about you 
during the course of the research will also be kept strictly confidential. All data will 
be stored securely on an encrypted hard drive that will be locked in a secure filing 
cabinet, and will be available only to me and my two supervisors. This applies in all 
circumstances, unless you as a participant specifically give me permission in writing 
to make it available to others. No reference will be made in oral or written reports 
which could link you as a participant to the study, and as stated above, steps will be 
taken to ensure that no piece of information is attributable to any individual. All 
transcribed data will be kept for a period of 3 years following the completion of my 
PhD, after which it will be destroyed. During this time, I may use the collected data 
for further publications, such as journal articles. The only time when confidentiality 
will be broken is if I feel that you as a participant disclose practice which does not 
correspond with that which is expected of you as a social worker (and outlined by 
The Health Care Professions Council code of conduct), which places ‘the health, 
safety or wellbeing of a service user in danger’ (Health Care Professions Council, 
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2012: 8) or places yourself, the profession and / or the client / service user in an 
ethically compromised position. On any occasion in which I am compelled to report 
such information to the relevant person(s), then I will communicate this to you 
beforehand. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results from the study will be used in my PhD thesis, which is due for 
publication in 2018. I will also invite you to attend a future Local Authority seminar 
in which I will share the research findings. 
 
Further information and contact details: 
For all further information please in the first instance contact me: 
Ciarán Murphy  [email address]  [phone number] 
 
If you have a problem that I am unable to resolve and you wish to complain 
formally, you can do this by contacting my supervisors, Professor Hugh McLaughlin 
or Ann Potter at: [email addresses]  
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APPENDIX 4: EXTRACT FROM ‘PARTICIPANT INFORMATION 
SHEET (FOCUS GROUP)’ 
… 
What will participation entail? 
If you decide to participate in the research project, then firstly, you will be asked to 
sign a consent form which gives me permission to collect data from you about your 
experiences of being a social worker / social work manager; whilst also 
acknowledging that you understand the research project processes. Once you have 
provided consent to take part in the study, you will be asked to participate in a focus 
group with 5-7 other participants. If you choose to participate in the focus group, 
then you will be invited to attend at a specified date and time, and participate in the 
group discussion about the identified themes. The focus group will take up a 
maximum of 1.5 hours of your time. Please be advised that I am the sole researcher, 
which means that I will be the focus group facilitator. With your permission, I will 
employ audio equipment within the focus group, so as to ensure that all valuable 
data is recorded. The audio recordings will be transcribed within 48 hours of the 
data collection, after which the individual recording will be permanently deleted. 
You will have the opportunity to review written transcripts of your contribution if 
you wish, and add to, or edit your responses. 
… 
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APPENDIX 5: EXTRACT FROM ‘PARTICIPANT INFORMATION 
SHEET (QUESTIONNAIRE)’ 
… 
What will participation entail? 
If you decide to participate in the research project, then you will be asked to 
complete a questionnaire. By completing the questionnaire you will be 
acknowledging that you have read this information sheet, had the opportunity to 
ask questions about the study, and be giving consent to take part with the research 
data collection. The questionnaire will ask you about your experiences of being a 
social worker. You will be asked to complete the questionnaire openly and 
honestly, and submit it by an agreed date. The questionnaire should take no more 
than 15 minutes to complete, however, you may take as much time as you wish in 
completing it.  
… 
 
  
351 
 
APPENDIX 6: EXTRACT FROM ‘PARTICIPANT INFORMATION 
SHEET (INTERVIEW)’ 
… 
What will participation entail? 
If you decide to participate in the research project, then firstly, you will be asked to 
sign a consent form which gives me permission to collect data from you about your 
experiences of being a social worker; whilst also acknowledging that you 
understand the research project processes. Once you have provided consent to take 
part in the study, you will be asked to participate in an interview, in which you will 
be asked about your experiences.  I will invite you to attend for your individual 
interview at an agreeable date and time. The interview will take place at a mutually 
convenient location and take up a maximum of 2 hours of your time. Please be 
advised that I am the sole researcher, which means that I will be the interviewer for 
your interview (no other parties will be present). With your permission, I will 
employ audio equipment within the interview, so as to ensure that all valuable data 
is recorded. The audio recordings will be transcribed within 48 hours of the data 
collection, after which the individual recording will be permanently deleted. You will 
have the opportunity to review written transcripts of your contribution if you wish, 
and add to, or edit your responses. 
… 
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APPENDIX 7: CONSENT FORM (OBSERVATION)  
To what extent are frontline statutory social workers employing their 
discretion, in the post-Munro Review world of child protection? 
Ciarán Murphy, a PhD student at Manchester Metropolitan University is 
conducting research that will explore the research question: To what 
extent are frontline statutory social workers employing their discretion, in 
the post-Munro Review world of child protection? You have been invited 
to participate in this research as outlined in the Participant Information 
Sheet.  Prior to taking part in the research study, please could you confirm 
the following by putting your initials in each appropriate box, and 
completing the required fields:  
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the Participant Information 
Sheet and have had the opportunity to ask questions about the data 
collection procedure. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason to the named researcher. 
 
3. I understand that my responses will remain anonymous; all information 
about me will remain confidential; and that I will not be personally 
identified in publications or in subsequent reports (including those to my 
employer). 
 
4. I am aware that the researcher may be compelled to break confidentiality 
if he assesses that I am disclosing practice which is unethical or harmful, 
but that he will inform me of this decision prior to bringing it to the 
attention of others. 
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5. I agree to being observed, but understand that I can request that any 
observations made are not included within the researcher’s report. 
 
6. I understand that all information that I provide will be stored on an 
encrypted external hard drive in a locked cabinet. 
 
By initialling the boxes above I confirm that I have read about, and understand 
the purpose, nature and content of this research project, and that I hereby give 
consent to participate the data collection. 
 
 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
Researcher Date Signature 
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant 
Once this has been signed, you will receive a copy of your signed and dated consent 
form and information sheet. 
 
If you have any question or queries about this research and your participation, 
then please don't hesitate to contact me on the details below.  
Ciarán Murphy  [email address]   [phone number] 
 
Alternatively you can contact my supervisors: [email addresses] 
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APPENDIX 8: EXTRACT FROM ‘CONSENT FORM (FOCUS 
GROUP)’  
… 
5. I understand that as part of the focus group, I will be sharing my thoughts 
with others, but that there will be an agreement that what is shared 
within the group remains confidential, and should not be shared outside 
of the focus group forum. 
6. I understand that my responses may be audio recorded and used for 
analysis for this research project, but that the recordings will not be 
shared with anyone other than the researcher and his supervisors. 
7. I understand that all information that I provide will be stored on an 
encrypted external hard drive in a locked cabinet. 
 
By initialling the boxes above I confirm that I have read about, and understand 
the purpose, nature and content of this research project, and that I hereby give 
consent to participate the data collection. 
 
 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
Researcher Date Signature 
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant 
Once this has been signed, you will receive a copy of your signed and dated 
consent form and information sheet. 
… 
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APPENDIX 9: EXTRACT FROM ‘CONSENT FORM (INTERVIEW)’  
… 
5. I understand that my responses may be audio recorded and used for 
analysis for this research project, but that the recordings will not be shared 
with anyone other than the researcher and his supervisors. 
6.  I understand that if I request a transcript of my interview, then it can be 
made available to me. 
7. I understand that all information that I provide will be stored on an 
encrypted external hard drive in a locked cabinet. 
 
By initialling the boxes above I confirm that I have read about, and understand the 
purpose, nature and content of this research project, and that I hereby give consent 
to participate the data collection. 
 
 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
Researcher Date Signature 
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant 
Once this has been signed, you will receive a copy of your signed and dated consent 
form and information sheet. 
… 
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APPENDIX 10: FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS 
Focus Group 1: 
1. What do you understand the term ‘discretion’ to mean in respect to social 
workers and their practice? 
2. How then might you define the notion of ‘discretionary space’ in relation to 
social workers and their practice? 
3. Where do you as social workers have discretionary space in your practice?  
4. What influences whether you have discretionary space? 
5. In which discretionary spaces are you more or less likely to choose to 
employ your discretion? 
6. What influences whether you choose to employ discretion within a 
discretionary space? 
Focus Group 2: 
1. What do you understand the term ‘discretion’ to mean in respect to social 
workers and their practice? 
2. How then might you define the notion of ‘discretionary space’ in relation to 
social workers and their practice? 
3. Where do you think social workers in your team have discretionary space?  
4. What influences whether social workers in your team have discretionary 
space? 
5. In which discretionary spaces are social workers in your team more or less 
likely to choose to employ their discretion? 
6. What influences whether social workers in your team choose to employ 
discretion within a discretionary space? 
 
 
357 
 
APPENDIX 11: OPENING PARAGRAPH OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire the results of the survey will be 
used to help answer the question: ‘To what extent are frontline statutory 
social workers employing their discretion, in the post-Munro world of child 
protection?’.  
You do not have to complete every question, and can finish the questionnaire at 
any time without prejudice. All your information will remain confidential to the 
researcher and his supervisors whilst your anonymity will be maintained through 
the use of a password-protected file. At the end of the questionnaire you will also 
be given the opportunity to identify yourself as someone who would be willing to 
discuss your answers in greater detail with me.  
The questionnaire should only take up to 15 minutes to complete. 
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APPENDIX 12: QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTIONS 
Part 1: 
Please think about your current social work practice and the organisation in which 
you are working, and answer the following questions in as much detail as possible: 
1. In your social work practice, when do you have the freedom to decide on a 
next course of action (i.e. when do you have discretionary space)?  
 
2. In your social work practice, when do you not have the freedom to decide 
on a next course of action (i.e. when do you not have discretionary space)? 
 
3. What key factors enables your use your discretion?  
 
4. What key factors inhibits your use your discretion?  
 
5. a) When in your practice might you choose to use your discretion? 
b) What factors influence this choice? 
 
You may be aware that in her ‘Review of Child Protection’ (2010-2011), Eileen 
Munro found that frontline child protection social workers were frequently unable to 
use their discretion in deciding how to best meet the needs of a child with whom 
they were working. Therefore, she made a number of recommendations that she 
hoped would enable frontline child protection social workers to increasingly use 
their discretion in their practice decision making.  
 
6. Thinking about Munro’s findings, and based on your experience;  
To what extent has the Munro Review impacted upon the level of freedom that you 
have in your practice to use your discretion? (Please explain your answer).   
 
359 
 
7. What single thing could your organisation change that would significantly 
support you in exercising your discretion in the course of your practice?   
Part 2: 
Please think about your current social work practice and the organisation in which 
you are working, and answer the following questions, selecting the options which 
most represent your current practice experience. 
8. Generally, when making a practice decision, what most determines how you 
will choose to proceed?  
(Please rate next to each option the level with which it determines how you choose 
to proceed; where ‘1’ is ‘most determines’, and ‘4’ is ‘least determines’ the decision 
that you arrive at):  
a) What I think is best for the child    
b) What my manager tells me    
c) What the procedures say    
d) Other (please specify) 
 
9. During your last working week, what percentage of your daily practice time 
is taken up by the following tasks: 
(Please select an estimated percentage to the nearest five percent)  
a) Working directly with (including visiting) children and/or their families  
b) Paperwork 
c) Other (please specify)  
 
10. Please indicate (by marking ‘X’) the level with which you agree with the 
following statements about your practice decision-making:  
 Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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I am more likely to use discretion in 
the course of my practice when I feel 
trusted to do so by my manager 
 
    
I am less likely to use my discretion 
with respect to a child when I don't 
have enough time to spend working 
directly (including visiting) with that 
child. 
     
Having a good knowledge of a child 
increases my willingness to use 
discretion with respect to that child. 
     
Having irregular reflective supervision 
impedes my confidence to use 
discretion. 
     
Fear of something going wrong 
prevents me from using my 
discretion. 
     
The knowledge that my manager 
would back me up if something went 
wrong enables me to use my 
discretion. 
     
Fear that my organisation would not 
back me up if something went wrong 
prevents me from using my 
discretion. 
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Fear of being named in the media if 
something went wrong prevents me 
from using my discretion. 
     
The actions and behaviours of other 
professionals (i.e. IRO’s, health and 
education professionals) prevents me 
from using my discretion.  
     
The actions and behaviours of senior 
management enables me to use my 
discretion. 
     
 
11. Please indicate (by marking ‘X’) the level with which you agree with the 
following statements about your experience of practice, including your 
organisation’s culture:  
 Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The legacy of the Peter Connelly case is 
still impacting on the system, and the level 
of demand for child protection services. 
 
   
A policy of cuts and austerity is impacting 
upon the demand for child protection 
services. 
 
   
The culture here expects social workers to 
follow procedures in all circumstances. 
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The culture here expects social workers to 
always adhere to timescales when they are 
applicable. 
    
The culture here encourages social workers 
to seek the direction of a manager when 
making a decision. 
    
The culture here is one in which practice is 
influenced by preparation for an Ofsted 
Inspection. 
    
The culture here is one in which practice is 
judged by completion of checklists – 
‘ticking boxes’. 
    
The culture here is one in which social 
workers are expected to record all of their 
tasks on the ICS system – ‘if it’s not on the 
system, then it hasn’t been done’ 
    
 
 
12. Please indicate (by marking ‘X’) the level with which you agree with the 
following statements about your working environment:  
 Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
I feel that I generally have enough time to 
work directly (including visiting) with a 
child.  
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I feel that the amount of time that I spend 
at my computer is about right. 
    
I feel that I have a manageable caseload. 
    
I feel that my opinions and professional 
judgment is valued by my manager 
    
I feel that my opinions and professional 
judgment is valued by other professionals 
with whom I work.  
    
 
13. In thinking about your child protection work more generally, to what extent 
do you have the freedom to decide on a next course of action (i.e. use your 
discretion) in the course of your practice?  
 Never Rarely Half the 
time 
Often Always 
In the course of my practice I 
use my discretion - 
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APPENDIX 13: INTERVIEW OPENING STATEMENT; PROMPTS; 
AND VIGNETTES 
Part 1: 
Opening statement: 
Within this interview I would like to discuss with you your discretionary space as a 
child protection social worker; when you might choose to use discretion within a 
discretionary space; and what you think is impacting upon both the discretionary 
space that you have and your choice within that space.  
Please tell me about your discretionary space and choices, and what you think is 
influencing this? 
Prompts: 
• Where in your practice do you have discretionary space? 
o Why do you think that you have discretionary space here? 
o What influences this? 
• Where in your practice do you not have discretionary space? 
o Why do you think that you have discretionary space here? 
o What influences this? 
• Are there times in which you have discretionary space but choose not to use 
it? 
o Can you give me some examples? 
o What influences this decision? 
▪ Type of space; confidence; fear; other? 
• What within your organisation is impacting upon the level of discretionary 
space that you have and whether you choose to employ discretion within 
that space? 
o What is the role of the manager? 
o What about senior management? 
o What about the impact of caseload; ICS; other? 
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• What external to your organisation is impacting upon the level of 
discretionary space that you have and whether you choose to employ 
discretion within that space? 
o What about the impact of demand on service? 
o … Ofsted? 
o … media; politicians; other? 
• What do you think about the level of discretionary space that you have?  
o Is it/is it not enough? – Why? 
o What other freedoms would you like?  
▪ Why would these be important? 
• How has the level of discretionary space that you are afforded changed? 
o Why do you think that is? 
Part 2:  
I am going to describe to you a scenario. Please will you tell me how you would 
choose to respond in the given situation? 
Vignette 1: 
You are working with a family in which the children are subject to a Child Protection 
Plan under the category of emotional abuse. The person of most concern is the 
children’s father, who has now been living out of the home for a period of time. 
During a core group meeting; the father asks you if he could return home on 
Christmas Day, ‘just for a few hours’ so that he can eat Christmas dinner with his 
family. What would be your response? 
Prompts:  
1. The Core Group was taking place at School. 
2. The time of the request is Christmas Eve at 6.30pm; your manager has left 
for Christmas, and there is no one left in the office. 
3. You know that the children’s wishes are for the father to return. 
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4. The father has made good progress accessing therapeutic courses and there 
have been no concerns about his behaviour since he has been out of the 
home. 
5. The father has a history of violence against the mother on Christmas Day. 
 
Vignette 2: 
After conducting a home visit, you are driving back to the office when you see a 
mother and children on your caseload. They are walking down the street in the 
company of another person. You recognise this person, and know that they are 
considered to pose a risk to children. What would be your response? 
Prompts:  
1. Your manager is not in work today. 
2. You consider this mother to be particularly vulnerable. 
3. You know that the individual poses a sexual risk to young children. 
4. You see the individual harming the mother and/or child. 
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APPENDIX 14: PERMISSION FROM ADCS TO CONDUCT 
RESEARCH 
 
From: ************ 
Sent: 10 September 2013 15:48 
To: Murphy, Ciaran 
Subject: RE: Permission to access staff and necessary materials 
Ciaran, 
This is agreed; you can access the staff and all necessary materials. 
Thanks. 
***** 
Assistant Director  
Children's Services 
 
 
From: Murphy, Ciaran  
Sent: 06 September 2013 13:59 
To: ****** 
Subject: Permission to access staff and necessary materials - PhD 
 
Hi *****, 
I am planning ahead for my ethical approval, and when I hand in the ethics forms to 
MMU as part of the formal PhD proposal; I therefore need written confirmation 
that as Assistant Director of Children's Services, you have agreed that as part of my 
research piece, I can access [Marketon] Children's Services staff and documents. 
I know we have discussed this and you have given verbal permission, but please can 
you send an email back confirming that you have agreed to this, so that I can 
include this with my paperwork. 
With thanks, 
 
Ciaran Murphy 
Social Worker 
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APPENDIX 15: ETHICAL APPROVAL FACULTY ACADEMIC ETHICS 
COMMITTEE 
MANCHESTER METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF HEALTH, PSYCHOLOGY 
AND SOCIAL CARE 
MEMORANDUM 
FACULTY ACADEMIC ETHICS COMMITTEE 
To:  Ciaran Murphy  
From:  Prof Carol Haigh                  
Date:  26/11/2014  
Subject:   Ethics Application 1259  
Title: To what extent are frontline statutory social workers employing their 
discretion in the post-Munro Review world of child protection? 
Thank you for your application for ethical approval.  
The Faculty Academic Ethics Committee review process has recommended approval 
of your ethics application. This approval is granted for 42 months for full-time 
students or staff and 60 months for part-time students. Extensions to the approval 
period can be requested.  
If your research changes you might need to seek ethical approval for the 
amendments. Please request an amendment form.  
We wish you every success with your project.  
Prof Carol Haigh and Prof Jois Stansfield Chair and Deputy Chair Faculty Academic 
Ethics Committee  
  
369 
 
APPENDIX 16: MARKETON ‘STANDARDS OF GOOD PRACTICE: 
CHILD PROTECTION’ 
5.0 Child Protection  
5.1 I have informed the child, their family and key agencies that I am their 
worker and I have given them details of how to contact me and the 
Emergency Duty Team. 
5.2 The focus of my work is to listen to the voice of the child and their whole 
family and together with them and members of the Core Group reduce the 
risks that have been identified. 
5.3 I have ensured that the first Core Group meeting with the child (where 
appropriate), the family and all the key agencies (members of the Core 
Group) has taken place within 10 working days of the Initial Child 
Protection Conference. The Child Protection Plan is agreed upon in this 
meeting and is owned by the Core Group. 
5.4 I have ensured at the initial Core Group that parents/carers know how we 
will work together to support them with what needs to change and the 
timescales. 
5.5 I have ensured that the Core Group has met every 4 weeks and that a copy 
of the Child Protection Plan is available at Core Groups, is central to the 
review and is updated within 10 working days after each Core Group.  
5.6 I have ensured that I have had a discussion with members of the Core 
Group in relation to the chairing and minute taking of Core Group 
Meetings (as per Working Together 2015). In exceptional circumstances, if 
I cannot attend the Core Group meeting, this should result in the meeting 
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being chaired in my absence and the minutes of the meeting being sent to 
me. 
5.7 I have ensured that a record of the Core Group meeting is recorded on the 
ICS and sent out to all attendees within 3 working days of the meeting. 
5.8 I have ensured that I understand the role of other adults (including fathers, 
male partners and absent parents) in the household and that any new 
members of the household have been properly assessed. 
5.9 I have undertaken visits to the child according to their plan (but at least 
every 28 days), and recorded this on the ICS within 1 working day of the 
visit. 
5.10 I have seen the child alone, listened to them or observed them and 
recorded their wishes and feelings properly. 
I have ensured that the visits are focussed on the identified concerns and 
that I have recorded what the child is. 
5.11 I have checked that the home environment is of a suitable standard for a 
child to live in. 
5.12 I have used my supervision to reflect on my feelings about the child’s 
circumstances, to review the plan and to ensure that I am putting the child 
first in my considerations. 
5.13 I have completed my Report for the Child Protection Review at least 7 
working days before conference, have shared this with the parents/carers 
and the child at least 2 days hours before the meeting, and I have left a 
copy of the report with the parents/carers. 
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5.14 I have fully considered with my manager at each Review whether a legal 
planning meeting is required to ensure the right planning is in place for the 
child and there is no drift.  
5.15 I have ensured that parents/carers know they can be accompanied by a 
relative, friend or independent advocate to enable them to participate and 
provide them with support at the Child Protection Conference.  
5.16 I have identified any additional concerns about the wellbeing of the child, I 
have discussed these with my manager and the Conference Chair as they 
occur and agreed any necessary actions. 
5.17 I will ensure that I use relevant tools and specialist assessments where this 
is applicable (e.g. Graded Care Profile; up dated C&F Assessment; Risk 
Assessment etc). I will ensure that an assessment clearly setting out the 
reduction in risks is completed prior to the review CP Conference if my 
view is that the CP Plan should be ended. 
5.18 I will ensure that the Case Summary is updated every 3 months or more 
often if there is a significant development. 
 
 
   
372 
 
APPENDIX 17: CONTRASTING THE PROCESS OF RECORDING A 
CHILD AS ‘LAC’ BETWEEN THE ‘OLD’ AND ‘NEW’ ICS VARIANT 
Child subject to 
Child Protection 
Plan
Child recorded 
as being a 
‘Looked After 
Child’
Social Worker 
completes 
update form, 
and Admin 
Team complete 
necessary tasks
Child subject to 
Child Protection 
Plan
Request to 
remove child 
from Child 
Protection Plan 
via post
Request 
checked and 
authorised by 
Child Protection 
Manager.
Request that a 
child becomes a 
‘LAC’.
Request 
checked and 
authorised by 
Child Protection 
Manager.
Child Protection 
SW opens ‘PIR’ 
and reassigns it 
to Family 
Placement SW
Child recorded 
as being a 
‘Looked After 
Child’
Family Placemnt 
SW completes 
PIR.
Admin 
Team are 
bypassed.
Old Process, using database that did not utilise workflow processes
Process using new system; task dictated by work flow processes
Family 
Placement 
Manger checks 
and authorises 
‘PIR’
Child Protection 
SW ‘Makes 
Placement Live’
Child Protection 
SW confirms 
‘Progress Child 
to Looked After’
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APPENDIX 18: OFSTED CATEGORIES OF INSPECTION 
JUDGMENT (2012) 
All [Ofsted] inspection judgments are made using the following four-point scale:  
• ‘Outstanding’ (Grade 1) A service that significantly exceeds minimum 
requirements  
• ‘Good’ (Grade 2) A service that exceeds minimum requirements  
• ‘Adequate’ (Grade 3) A service that only meets minimum requirements  
• ‘Inadequate’ (Grade 4) A service that does not meet minimum requirements 
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APPENDIX 19: LIST OF LOCAL AUTHORITY ACRONYMS 
CIN – Child in Need 
CP – Child Protection 
CPC – Child Protection Conference 
CPP – Child Protection Plan 
FCM – Final Care Planning Meeting 
ICO – Interim Care Order 
IRO – Independent Reviewing Officer 
LPM – Legal Planning Meeting 
MASH – Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub 
PPO – Police Protection Order12 
SGO – Special Guardianship Order 
TAC – Team Around the Child 
TAF – Team Around the Family 
 
 
 
                                                        
12 Whilst no such ‘order’ exists, this term was used to denote the power of the police to remove 
children to a place of safety and protection. 
